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 Résumé 
Le présent mémoire est consacré à l'étude des chevauchements entre revendications 
territoriales autochtones. On s'y interroge sur l’origine et l’évolution de ces 
chevauchements ainsi que sur les mécanismes qui pourraient être employés pour trouver 
des solutions acceptables pour toutes les parties. Notre étude retrace d'abord l'évolution 
du critère d’exclusivité élaboré par les politiques et décisions judiciaires canadiennes 
relativement à l’octroi du titre autochtone, concluant que ce critère d’exclusivité est 
devenu un enjeu déterminant dans l’élaboration d’une solution relative aux 
chevauchements entre revendications territoriales. En observant la manière dont les 
différents paliers de gouvernement ont échoué dans leurs tentatives de solutionner les 
enjeux de chevauchement, nous constatons que les traditions juridiques autochtones 
doivent être intégrées à la résolution des conflits et à l’interprétation du critère 
d’exclusivité. Ceci exige de percevoir l’institution juridique de la résolution de conflits 
selon une certaine vision du droit. Nous utilisons ici celle de Lon Fuller, qui présente une 
approche permettant de réconcilier plusieurs traditions juridiques. Notre étude nous 
conduit à proposer le système du Indigenous Legal Lodge comme mécanisme de 
résolution de conflit permettant aux autochtones de faire appel à leurs traditions 
juridiques dans la résolution des chevauchements, permettant ainsi de réconcilier ces 
traditions diverses. 
Mots-clés: autochtones, revendication territoriale, chevauchement, exclusivité, théorie du 
droit, Fuller, non-dérogation, traditions juridiques autochtones, mécanisme de résolution 
de conflit, Indigenous Legal Lodge.  
 Abstract 
This thesis is dedicated to the study of overlapping aboriginal land claims. We question 
the origin and evolution of these overlaps and study the mechanisms which could be used 
in order to determine a solution acceptable to all parties. Our study first discusses the 
evolution of the exclusivity criterion developed in Canadian policy and case law relating 
to the granting of an aboriginal title, concluding that the criterion of exclusivity has 
become a defining issue in the development of a solution to overlaps between land 
claims. By observing the failures of the various levels of government in their attempts to 
develop solutions to overlapping claims, we find that Aboriginal legal traditions must be 
integrated into conflict resolution and be used when interpreting the exclusivity criterion. 
This requires us to perceive conflict resolution, as a legal institution, according to a 
certain understanding of the law. We use Lon Fuller’s vision, who presents an approach 
for reconciling various legal traditions. Our study brings us to propose the Indigenous 
Legal Lodge as a conflict resolution mechanism enabling Aboriginal groups to call upon 
their own legal traditions in resolving overlaps and to reconcile their differing traditions. 
Keywords: Aboriginal, land claims, overlap, exclusivity, legal theory, Fuller, non-
derogation, Aboriginal legal traditions, conflict resolution mechanisms, Indigenous Legal 
Lodge. 
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Introduction 
Several challenges exist in the modern land claim resolution process. Whether these land 
claims are addressed within negotiation processes or before Canadian courts, there will 
surely be hurdles along the way. These challenges become increasingly complex in a 
landscape which includes overlapping land claims. Such a situation occurs when an 
Aboriginal group's land claim overlaps with that of one or more Aboriginal groups’ land 
claim or confirmed territory. Such claims have proven to be very problematic, whether 
they are raised during treaty negotiations or, as often happens, after a treaty is concluded. 
In many cases, they culminate in litigation before the courts.  
Until now, the federal, provincial and territorial governments have adopted a laissez-faire 
attitude towards the resolution of these overlapping claims: “First Nations resolve issues 
related to overlapping traditional territories among themselves”1 is the principle which 
has been repeated time and time again by all levels of government with regard to the 
resolution of overlapping claims. Yet, this seemingly simple requirement is not without 
complex consequences raising questions of colonization, Aboriginal epistemology, 
morality, power struggles and other practical considerations.  
The purpose of this thesis is to address some of these implications, while suggesting a 
new intellectual approach to the issue of resolving Aboriginal land claims. As will be 
demonstrated, the issue of overlapping claims has deeply rooted ties in colonization and 
the imposition of Western values on Aboriginal societies. The overlapping claim 
                                               
1British Columbia Claims Task Force, The Report of the British Columbia Claims Task Force (1991). 
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phenomenon is therefore “more than a ‘problem’ looking for a ‘solution’, more than a 
mechanical issue of ‘resolving’ contested boundary locations”2, it is indicative of a 
competing understanding, between Aboriginal peoples and Western society, of the legal 
and social traditions by which we should consider issues relating to territory. 
This paper will explore the issue of overlapping claims and argue that, when approaching 
the resolution of such overlapping claims, it is crucial that the analysis employed be 
integrated into a larger framework which includes an Aboriginal3 legal perspective. In 
order to be successful, our approach must reframe overlapping claims as more than a 
physical issue of conciliating boundaries. Resolving overlapping claims must be 
perceived as the possibility to articulate, harmonize and communicate about Aboriginal 
territorial relations4. It must also be accepted that not all territorial relations will fit into 
the requirement of mutual exclusivity and therefore, that some answers will not meet the 
current Supreme Court requirements. We propose that these requirements be reformed 
and that we to look further than the current state of normative law in order to achieve a 
viable solution. 
We argue that one of the important pieces in solving this puzzle rests on the recognition 
of Aboriginal conflict mechanisms to address overlapping claim situations. In fact, 
                                               
2RG Christopher Turner, “Overlap”: Causes and Implications of Contested Indigenous Claims to Territory 
in the Context of the BC Treaty Process (Master of Arts in Natural Resources and Environmental Studies 
(Geography), University of Northern British Columbia, 2011) [unpublished] at 1. 
3In this section, the term “First Nation” will be used as the documentation and principles exposed are 
specific to the First Nations of British Columbia and do not refer to other Aboriginal groups. 
4Christopher Turner & Gail Fondahl, “‘Overlapping claims’ to territory confronting treaty making in 
British Columbia: Causes and implications” doi: 10.1111/cag.12205 The Canadian Geographer, online: 
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cag.12205/epdf> at 12. See also Brian Thom, “Reframing 
Indigenous Territories: Private Property, Human Rights and Overlapping Claims” (2014) 38:4 American 
Indian Culture and Research Journal 3. 
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conflict exists within Aboriginal groups in large part because of the destruction of their 
conflict management systems and law5. In order to constructively deal with conflict, we 
must therefore re-examine Aboriginal conflict management systems within a legal 
framework that would allow such flexibility.  
Chapter 1 will address the legal, judicial and political evolution of Aboriginal land claims 
in Canada, including the notion of Western exclusivity and how its introduction into 
Aboriginal land claim scenarios has caused tremendous conflict among Aboriginal 
groups with competing land claims. From there, we will examine the approaches and 
solutions currently used in order to address overlapping claims and their failure to 
functionally provide any kind of long lasting solution.  
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the intellectual framework we are proposing, based on 
Lon L. Fuller's legal theory of perceiving law as a means of facilitating human 
interaction. The theory underlying this thesis is that it is possible, in Canadian law, to 
develop a legal framework which is flexible enough to allow Aboriginal peoples to resort 
to their own legal orders and norms and apply them to the resolution of overlapping land 
claim conflicts6. This approach could also strengthen what Fuller would call the “inner 
morality” of the dispute resolution practices which are currently used in overlapping 
situations. By highlighting elements offering insight into the existing conflict resolution 
                                               
5Val Napoleon, Thinking About Indigenous Legal Orders (National Centre for First Nations Governance, 
2007) at 12. 
6Val Napoleon, supra note 5.This framework was first developed by Val Napoleon. I will borrow her ideas 
and transform them into my own, allowing as she has, my framework to “reflect the legal orders and laws 
of decentralized Indigenous peoples” and “allow for the diverse way that each society's culture is reflected 
in their legal orders and laws”, at 19. 
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mechanisms used by Aboriginal peoples, this paper aims at demonstrating that the 
system presently used to address overlapping land claims would be enhanced if it took 
into account Aboriginal perspectives, concepts and legal traditions. Elements of 
Aboriginal law and dispute resolution mechanisms will thus be examined which could be 
considered in the case of overlapping claims. This exercise will give a voice to these 
legal traditions in ensuring that they can be used to interpret complex territorial 
situations.  
Recognizing Aboriginal legal traditions from a vantage point of Aboriginal legal culture 
and not only Western legal culture is paramount in order to respect the internal morality 
of the very dispute resolution rules which will be used to solve overlapping claims. 
Simply put: “Aboriginal law cannot be considered from European-based legal 
principles”7. The same can be said for Aboriginal groups around the world. For instance, 
some indigenous groups in Bolivia have argued for the recognition of their own legal 
criteria when defining land and territory, indicating that they are “distinct from dominant 
national ones”8. 
Finally, we will offer examples of some approaches offering promises of theoretical and 
practical successes, such as Val Napoleon's Indigenous Legal Lodge framework.  
As for positioning myself within this endeavour, it is important to note that I am not 
Aboriginal and cannot call upon my own Aboriginal knowledge and epistemology. 
                                               
7Mark D. Walters, “The Morality of Aboriginal Law” (2005) 31 Queen’s LJ 470 at 481. 
8Denise Y Arnold & Juan de Dios Yapita, “Strands of indigenism in the Bolivian Andes: Competing 
juridical claims for the ownership and management of indigenous heritage sites in an emerging context of 
legal pluralism.” (2005) 4 Public Archaeology 141 at 144. 
 5 
However, I share the following intellectual posture with a fellow researcher, R.G. 
Christopher Turner, who eloquently explains what it is many Western researchers are 
trying to attempt: “to engage with the intellectual space between indigenous and non-
indigenous perspectives, to improve understanding, and to seek out ways to bridge 
epistemological divides”9.  
                                               
9R.G. Christopher Turner, supra note 2 at 5. 
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Chapter 1 - Treatment of Overlapping Land Claims in Canada: History, Policies and Issues 
1. The Notion of Exclusivity and the Issue of Overlapping Claims 
The purpose of the present chapter is to provide an overview of the impact of Canadian 
legislation and policy on the evolution of Aboriginal land issues in Canada. Aboriginal 
land claims and the issue of exclusivity offer a complex and historical past which must 
be considered in order to begin comprehending the issue in the present. Exclusivity, as it 
is understood today, is a Western concept which has been imposed on Aboriginal 
peoples; first introduced through the creation of reserves, reinforced by strict 
interpretation in judicial decisions and eventually officially implemented in 
governmental policies.  
1.1 Introducing the Exclusivity Requirement - Establishment of Reserves 
References to exclusivity in land ownership can be found in early Western philosophy, 
such as in the ideas of John Locke who claims that if a man works upon a parcel of land, 
he alone should profit from it:  
“Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet 
every man has a property in his own person: this nobody has any right to 
but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may 
say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that 
nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and 
joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It 
being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it 
hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common 
right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the 
labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at 
 7 
least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.”10 
 
This Western philosophy of exclusive land ownership is reflected, for instance, in the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763 which provided that “Indian territories” should be reserved 
to said Indians and that they should not be “molested or disturbed” in their possession of 
these lands. The Royal Proclamation was also intended to protect the lands belonging to 
Indians, prohibiting any person from purchasing lands reserved for Indians: 
“And whereas great Frauds and Abuses have been committed in 
purchasing Lands of the Indians, to the great Prejudice of our Interests. 
and to the great Dissatisfaction of the said Indians: In order, therefore, to 
prevent such Irregularities for the future, and to the end that the Indians 
may be convinced of our Justice and determined Resolution to remove all 
reasonable Cause of Discontent, We do, with the Advice of our Privy 
Council strictly enjoin and require, that no private Person do presume to 
make any purchase from the said Indians of any Lands reserved to the said 
Indians, within those parts of our Colonies where We have thought proper 
to allow Settlement (...)”11 
The Royal Proclamation's purpose was to restore peace between Aboriginal groups and 
the British, by forbidding private transactions over land between British citizens and 
Aboriginal peoples. Author J.R. Miller explains that the expression “great Frauds and 
Abuses” refers to “a favourite trick of colonial land companies and frontier entrepreneurs 
who by dubious means obtained a deed from some member or members of an Indian 
community (...) and then claimed that the document was sufficient title to the lands”12. 
                                               
10John Locke, Second treatise of government, Cathedral classics (London: Aziloth Books, 2013) at 35–
36.Inspiration from: Christopher Campbell-Duruflé, “La nécessité de prendre en compte les 
chevauchements des droits autochtones lors de la conclusion de traités au Canada” (2012) 71 Revue du 
Barreau 3 at 7.See also :Janet Ajzenstat, The Canadian founding: John Locke and parliament, McGill-
Queen’s studies in the history of ideas 44 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007). 
11Royal Proclamation, 1763, R.S.C., 1985, App. II, No. 1. 
12J R Miller, Compact, contract, covenant: Aboriginal treaty-making in Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2009) at 69–70. 
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The Royal Proclamation became “the single most important document in the history of 
treaty-making in Canada”13 and eventually led to the practice of signing treaties for the 
surrender of Indian title, in exchange for “the establishment of reserves, guarantees as to 
hunting and fishing rights, annuities and certain social and economic undertakings”14. 
For instance, the numbered treaties in Northern British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan and Ontario15 provided reserve areas established within the area 
surrendered by the Aboriginal peoples16. 
At Confederation, jurisdiction over “Indian”17 lands, and thus, reserves, was granted to 
the Parliament of Canada according to section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 186718. 
This section devolved to that said Parliament exclusive legislative authority over all 
elements related to “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians”. The federal 
government wasted no time in adopting the first Indian Act19in 1876 which, although 
amended many times since then, still continues to govern reserve lands and to provide 
                                               
13Ibid at 66. 
14Richard H Bartlett, “Indian Reserves on the Prairies” (1985) 23:2 Alberta Law Review 243 at 243. 
15Ibid. These treaties were signed in the later part of the 19th century : Treaty 1 (1871), Treaty 2 (1871), 
Treaty 3 (1873), Treaty 4 (1874), Treaty 5 (1875), Treaty 6 (1876), Treaty 7 (1877), Treaty 8 (1899), 
Treaty 10 (1906). 
16Ibid. The author explains that the reserves in treaties 1, 2 5 and 7 were established near specified lakes 
and rivers. Under treaties 3, 4 6, 8 and 10, it was provided that the location for the reserves would be 
determined by officers of the government who should “confer with the several bands, and pay due respect 
to lands actually cultivated by them” (at 244).  
17At its adoption, the term “Indian” in section 91(24) encompassed only First Nations. It was later 
interpreted as including the Inuit: In The Matter of a Reference as To Whether The Term “Indians” in 
Head 24 of Section 91 of The British North America Act, 1867, Includes Eskimo Inhabitants of The 
Province of Quebec, [1939] SCR 104, 1939 CanLII 22 (SCC). On April 17, 2014, the Federal Court of 
Appeal, in Canada (Indian Affairs) v. Daniels, 2014 FCA 101, confirmed the judgment of the Federal 
Court extending the term “Indian” under 91(24) to Métis individuals in Canada. This case is currently on 
appeal before the Supreme Court.  
18The Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3. 
19An Act to amend and consolidate the laws respecting Indians, S.C. 1876, c. 18. 
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“protection” for “Indians” (as defined by the Indian Act), now more commonly known as 
the First Nations’ peoples in Canada.  
The origins of the first Indian Act can be found in the United Province of Canada's 
Gradual Civilization Act20of 1857 and the Federal Gradual Enfranchisement Act21of 
1869. The purpose of these statutes was to assimilate Indian people by enfranchisement. 
Enfranchisement was perceived by the government to be a privilege and there was a 
penalty of imprisonment was provided in the case where an Indian represented himself as 
enfranchised when he was not22. Enfranchisement was only open to Indian men, over the 
age of 21, who wrote English or French and who were “reasonably well educated, free of 
debt, and of good moral character as determined by a commission of non-Indian 
examiners”23. If an Indian abandoned his Indian status, he was gifted with up to 50 acres 
of land within the reserve, not as his personal property, but as a life estate which could be 
passed down to his children24. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples reports that 
the voluntary enfranchisement was a failure as only one Indian was enfranchised in the 
nineteen years between the adoption of the Gradual Civilization Act and the adoption of 
the Indian Act in 187625.  
                                               
20An Act to encourage the gradual Civilization of the Indian Tribes in this Province and to amend the Laws 
respecting Indians, S.C. 1857, c. 26. 
21An Act for the gradual enfranchisement of Indians, the better management of Indian affairs, and to 
extend the provisions of the Act 31st Victoria, Chapter 42, S.C. 1869, c. 6. 
22Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. 
Volume 1: Looking Forward, Looking back (Ottawa: The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996) 
at 271. 
23Ibid. 
24Ibid. 
25Ibid. 
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In response to this failure, Parliament adopted the Gradual Enfranchisement Act in 1869 
establishing the band council system which is still applicable in today's Indian Act. The 
purpose of establishing such a system was to undermine traditional Indian governments 
which were identified as “a key impediment to achieving (...) policy goals”26. The 
jurisdiction of the band council established by the Gradual Enfranchisement Act was 
restricted to the territory of a single band within a limited reserve. There were no 
provisions for “traditional groupings going beyond the individual band level. In fact, the 
goal of the measures was specifically to undermine nation-level governance systems and 
the broader nation-level associations of Indians more generally”27. As we will see further 
in Chapter 2, this man-made restriction has had a long-lasting impact on Aboriginal 
claims and the overlap between them.  
The reserve system entails not only the separation of Aboriginals from non-Aboriginals, 
but also a division between Aboriginal groups themselves. This system has contributed to 
the introduction, within Aboriginal communities, of a territorially delineated, exclusivist 
understanding of political culture28 which can be characterized as differing with the way 
in which Aboriginal groups had organized their societies prior to European arrival and 
Confederation:   
“Celle-ci [la conception exclusiviste] opère une rupture avec divers types 
de relations dynamiques et superposées qui existaient auparavant sur le 
territoire canadien: confédérations politiques autochtones, réseaux 
commerciaux entre Autochtones et colons, cycles migratoires saisonniers 
                                               
26Ibid at 275. 
27Ibid. 
28Campbell-Duruflé, supra note 10 at 5. 
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en vue de la chasse, la pêche, la récolte ou le piégeage, alliances familiales 
entre communautés, mariages entre colons et Autochtones, etc.”29 
The exclusivist tendencies have transcended all three branches of government: as we 
have seen above, the legislative branch integrated the tendencies into their policies and 
legislation. Let us now examine how the judicial branch of government has approached 
the notion of exclusivity. The executive branch’s attitude will be examined later on in 
section 1.3. 
1.2 Reinforcing the Exclusivity Requirement - Determining Aboriginal Rights and Title 
(a) Aboriginal Rights 
The exclusivist tendencies outlined above have also been applied by the judiciary when 
determining cases in which land questions were involved.  This thesis argues that these 
exclusivist tendencies first developed by representatives of the Crown and reiterated by 
Parliament have caused courts and future governments to approach land questions on a 
basis that it is not inclusive or representative of Aboriginal traditions and culture. As we 
will see, courts have determined that Aboriginal claimants must establish exclusive land 
possession in order to be recognized as Aboriginal title holders, therefore creating a 
competitive notion of land tenure, and fuelling the issue of overlapping claims.  
However, before turning to Aboriginal title, it is important to consider the presence of 
exclusivist tendencies in the determination of Aboriginal rights as well. The importance 
of exclusivity and distinction with regard to Aboriginal rights was set out in the landmark 
                                               
29Ibid at 10. 
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case of R v. Van der Peet30, which established that the proof of an Aboriginal right 
required that the practice being alleged be distinct from European practices for it to be 
held as integral to this culture:  
“To satisfy the integral to a distinctive culture test the aboriginal claimant 
must do more than demonstrate that a practice, custom or tradition was an 
aspect of, or took place in, the aboriginal society of which he or she is a 
part. The claimant must demonstrate that the practice, custom or tradition 
was a central and significant part of the society's distinctive culture.  He or 
she must demonstrate, in other words, that the practice, custom or tradition 
was one of the things which made the culture of the society distinctive -- 
that it was one of the things that truly made the society what it was. 
 
This aspect of the integral to a distinctive culture test arises from fact that 
aboriginal rights have their basis in the prior occupation of Canada by 
distinctive aboriginal societies. To recognize and affirm the prior 
occupation of Canada by distinctive aboriginal societies it is to what 
makes those societies distinctive that the court must look in identifying 
aboriginal rights.  The court cannot look at those aspects of the aboriginal 
society that are true of every human society (e.g., eating to survive), nor 
can it look at those aspects of the aboriginal society that are only 
incidental or occasional to that society; the court must look instead to the 
defining and central attributes of the aboriginal society in question.  It is 
only by focusing on the aspects of the aboriginal society that make that 
society distinctive that the definition of aboriginal rights will accomplish 
the purpose underlying s. 35(1).”31 
Aboriginal rights can therefore only be established by comparing Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal societies against each other and determining what practices were distinctive 
to each society, essentially isolating Aboriginal groups by an artificial requirement 
established under a different legal epistemology than that of Aboriginal societies.  
Although the requirements of the Van der Peet case were severely criticized by 
Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals alike for creating a caricature of Aboriginal societies, 
                                               
30R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507. 
31Ibid, paras 55–56. 
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and eventually softened by Justice Bastarache in R v. Sappier32, it is nonetheless 
important to note that the highest court in Canada believed this to be the way in which 
important elements of Aboriginal culture should be determined33. In R v. Sappier, the 
Court moved from the expression “integral to the distinctive culture” towards the larger 
expression “integral elements of the way of life of (...) aboriginal societies”34. The court 
did so in order to move away from an approach which, in practice, tended to stereotype 
Aboriginal practices. Justice Bastarache demonstrates his sensitivity to this issue in his 
decision: 
“The use of the word ‘distinctive’ as a qualifier is meant to incorporate an 
element of aboriginal specificity. However, ‘distinctive’ does not mean 
‘distinct’, and the notion of aboriginality must not be reduced to 
‘racialized’ stereotypes of Aboriginal peoples” (J. Borrows and L. I. 
Rotman, “The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does it Make a 
Difference?”(1997), 36 Alta. L. Rev. 9, at p. 36). 
 
In post-hearing submissions to the Court of Appeal in the Sappier and 
Polchies case, the Crown admitted that gathering birch bark for the 
construction of canoes or hemlock for basket-making were practices likely 
integral to the distinctive Maliseet culture (para. 94). But it would be a 
mistake to reduce the entire pre-contact distinctive Maliseet culture to 
canoe-building and basket-making. To hold otherwise would be to fall in 
the trap of reducing an entire people's culture to specific anthropological 
curiosities and, potentially, racialized aboriginal stereotypes.”35 
The criteria required for demonstrating an Aboriginal right differ from the criteria for 
demonstrating Aboriginal title which will be addressed later. These Aboriginal rights 
can, and do, overlap with each other as do claims to Aboriginal title. However, one 
                                               
32R v Sappier, [2006] 2 SCR 686. 
33Campbell-Duruflé, supra note 10 at 11. 
34R. v. Sappier, supra note 32, para 40. See also Jean Leclair & Michel Morin, “Peuples autochtones et 
droit constitutionnel” in JurisClasseur Quebec, Droit constitutionnel (Montreal: LexisNexis Canada, 2011) 
Fascicule 15, para 40. 
35R. v. Sappier, supra note 32, paras 45–46. 
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essential difference of interest with regard to overlapping claims is the fact that 
aboriginal rights provide protection for activities and do not confer rights to the territory 
itself. Consequently, where an aboriginal right is concerned, an Aboriginal group does 
not have to prove exclusivity over a territory, as more than one Aboriginal group can 
practice an activity on the same territory.  
Nonetheless, the determination of these rights must be considered in the study of 
overlapping claims, as many Aboriginal groups can claim the same Aboriginal right on 
the same territory. Moreover, the recognition of some Aboriginal rights36 are sometimes 
referred to as being defined in “site-specific terms” and “limited to a specific territory or 
location, depending on the actual pattern of exercise of such an activity prior to 
contact”37. This “site-specific” determination could be problematic in the case of 
overlapping claims as the presence of a site-specific Aboriginal right could constitute an 
obstacle to the claim for Aboriginal title by another group. The site-specific right could 
in fact negate the claim to Aboriginal title since the right would render difficult, if not 
impossible, the proof of exclusivity by a third party on this specific site.  
For instance, the Huron of Wendake and the Innu of Mashteuiatsh came head-to-head in 
a serious debate about hunting rights on the Laurentian Wildlife Reserve, ongoing since 
2004. In 2011, the Huron-Wendat Nation mandated retired Justice John Gomery to 
undertake an inquiry into the situation, which he qualified as being “intolerable and 
                                               
36R. v. Van der Peet, supra note 30. Aboriginal rights can also be “free-standing” and not site-specific. 
37R v Côté, [1996] 3 SCR 139, para 39. 
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dangerous”38. In 2012, the Government of Quebec finally decided to name retired Justice 
Louise Otis to act as mediator and finalize an agreement between both parties. A one-
year agreement was signed in August of 2012 splitting the hunting territory between the 
two groups. However, in 2013 the new chief of Mashteuiatsh reneged on the agreement, 
stating that he did not feel compelled to uphold an agreement signed by the previous 
chief39. In 2015, the Huron-Wendat Nation issued a press release indicating their desire 
to continue mediation with the Innu of Mashteuiatsh in order to find a compromise 
similar to that of 201240.  
The above example is one of many situations in which Aboriginal rights can coexist, and 
in some cases, conflict, because of a lack of resources or a history of disagreement over a 
territory. In this case, the method which was successful, even if only for a short period of 
time, was mediation between the two parties. Conflict resolution of overlapping 
Aboriginal rights can be addressed in the same way which will be discussed for 
Aboriginal title. Overlapping Aboriginal rights must therefore be considered in the 
discussion of overlapping claims, as the steps to their resolution must also be inscribed 
within a framework including Aboriginal perspective and epistemology.  
                                               
38Annie Morin, “Réserve des Laurentides: situation explosive entre Hurons et Innus”, Le Soleil (2012), 
online: <http://www.lapresse.ca/le-soleil/actualites/politique/201201/30/01-4490928-reserve-des-
laurentides-situation-explosive-entre-hurons-et-
innus.php?utm_categorieinterne=trafficdrivers&utm_contenuinterne=cyberpresse_vous_suggere_4569781
_article_POS3>. 
39“Chasse dans la réserve faunique des Laurentides : le conflit entre Innus et Hurons-Wendats refait 
surface”, Radio-Canada (2013), online: <http://ici.radio-canada.ca/regions/saguenay-lac/2013/10/01/002-
chasse-parc-laurentides-innus-hurons-wendat.shtml#commenter>. 
40Conseil de la Nation huronne-wendat, “Chasse coutumière à l’orignal 2015 dans la réserve faunique des 
Laurentides : La Nation huronne-wendat respecte ses obligations et propose la médiation”, (2015), online: 
<http://www.newswire.ca/fr/story/1478599/chasse-coutumiere-a-l-orignal-2015-dans-la-reserve-faunique-
des-laurentides-la-nation-huronne-wendat-respecte-ses-obligations-et-propose-la-mediation>. 
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(b) Aboriginal Title 
(i) The Evolution of “Aboriginal Perspective” 
The 1973 Calder41decision held for the first time that Aboriginal title was occupancy-
based and therefore existed at the time of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, independently 
of colonial law:  
“Although I think that it is clear that Indian title in British Columbia 
cannot owe its origin to the Proclamation of 1763, the fact is that when the 
settlers came, the Indians were there, organized in societies and occupying 
the land as their forefathers had done for centuries. This is what Indian 
title means and it does not help one in the solution of this problem to call 
it a “personal and usufructuary right”.42 
This decision opened the door for groups to present claims of Aboriginal title before 
Courts and for the government to enter into a settlement process of these comprehensive 
land claims. As we will see, the occupation related to an Aboriginal title must be 
demonstrated as being to the exclusion of other Aboriginal groups, therefore reinforcing 
the notion of cultural exclusivity created by Western philosophy and implanted into 
Aboriginal societies.  
One of the first cases to deal with a claim of Aboriginal title was Hamlet of Baker Lake 
v. Minister of Indian Affairs43. In this case, the Inuit of the Baker Lake area in the 
Northwest Territories were concerned with the activities of extractive companies and 
sought a declaration that the Baker Lake area was subject to an Inuit Aboriginal title to 
                                               
41Calder v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1973] SCR 313. 
42Ibid at 328, per Judson J. 
43Baker Lake (Hamlet) v Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, [1980] 1 FC 518 (TD). 
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hunt and fish. Drawing on exclusivist notions of territory from past laws and policies, 
Baker Lake establishes the following requirements for proof of Aboriginal title:  
“1. That they [the plaintiffs, the Inuit] and their ancestors were members 
of an organized society. 
2. That the organized society occupied the specific territory over which 
they assert the aboriginal title.  
3. That the occupation was to the exclusion of other organized societies. 
4. That the occupation was an established fact at the time sovereignty was 
asserted by England.”44 
 
[text added in original citation] 
 
In the landmark case of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia45, Chief Justice Lamer (as he 
then was) reformulated the Baker Lake test for proof of Aboriginal title as follows:   
“In order to make out a claim for aboriginal title, the aboriginal group 
asserting title must satisfy the following criteria: (i) the land must have 
been occupied prior to sovereignty, (ii) if present occupation is relied 
on as proof of occupation pre-sovereignty, there must be a continuity 
between present and pre-sovereignty occupation, and (iii) at 
sovereignty, that occupation must have been exclusive.”46 
 
[emphasis added] 
The criterion of interest to us is largely unchanged from the Baker Lake decision to the 
Delgamuukw decision: i.e. exclusive occupation of territory. The requirement of 
exclusivity is mirrored by the granting of an exclusive right to use and occupy the land 
covered by the Aboriginal title. This is why the Court stresses the importance of 
determining exclusivity of occupation, so as to not grant exclusive use and occupation 
rights on land which could have been occupied by others: 
                                               
44Ibid at 557–558. 
45Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010. 
46Ibid, para 143. 
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“The requirement for exclusivity flows from the definition of aboriginal 
title itself, because I have defined aboriginal title in terms of the right to 
exclusive use and occupation of land. Exclusivity, as an aspect of 
aboriginal title, vests in the aboriginal community which holds the ability 
to exclude others from the lands held pursuant to that title. The proof of 
title must, in this respect, mirror the content of the right.  Were it possible 
to prove title without demonstrating exclusive occupation, the result 
would be absurd, because it would be possible for more than one 
aboriginal nation to have aboriginal title over the same piece of land, and 
then for all of them to attempt to assert the right to exclusive use and 
occupation over it.”47 
As we will see, Canada is in fact guilty of the absurdity evoked above, i.e. by resorting to 
the modern practice of non-derogation provisions when recognizing an Aboriginal title to 
the signatories of modern treaties or land settlements, it is in fact reneging on the 
exclusivity requirement which happens to be, according to the Court, the foundational 
criterion of proof of the existence of an Aboriginal title. We do not approve of the 
exclusivity principle. However, if the Court has made it a mandatory criterion, the Crown 
should not be allowed to ignore it when it suits its interests to do so48. More information 
on this practice is provided in Section 2 of Chapter 1.  
The key element in the Delgamuukw case is the determination by Lamer C.J. that the 
establishment of exclusivity or non-exclusivity cannot be undertaken without considering 
the “aboriginal perspective”, in addition to the common law perspective:  
                                               
47Ibid, para 155. 
48See: Brian Thom, “Confusion sur les territoires autochtones au Canada” in Irène Bellier, ed, Terres, 
Territoires, Ressources Politiques, pratiques et droits des peuples autochtones, Collection Horizons 
Autochtones (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014) 90. In some situations, the exclusivity requirement in the land 
claims process is used by the federal government in order to disqualify claims when they are faced with 
overlaps, claiming that these overlaps remove the exclusive aspect of a land claim. In other situations, the 
federal government accepts the land claim even though it is subject to overlaps, by including a non-
derogation provision. The exclusivity requirement is therefore used as a malleable criterion when this is not 
what the Supreme Court teaches us in its judgments. 
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“As with the proof of occupation, proof of exclusivity must rely on both 
the perspective of the common law and the aboriginal perspective, placing 
equal weight on each. At common law, a premium is placed on the factual 
reality of occupation, as encountered by the Europeans. However, as the 
common law concept of possession must be sensitive to the realities of 
aboriginal society, so must the concept of exclusivity. Exclusivity is a 
common law principle derived from the notion of fee simple ownership 
and should be imported into the concept of aboriginal title with caution. 
As such, the test required to establish exclusive occupation must take into 
account the context of the aboriginal society at the time of sovereignty. 
For example, it is important to note that exclusive occupation can be 
demonstrated even if other aboriginal groups were present, or frequented 
the claimed lands. Under those circumstances, exclusivity would be 
demonstrated by “the intention and capacity to retain exclusive control” 
(McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra, at p. 204).”49 
 
[emphasis added] 
 
Lamer C.J. uses the example of Aboriginal laws regarding trespass to demonstrate his 
determination that proof of exclusivity must take into account Aboriginal perspective: 
“Thus, an act of trespass, if isolated, would not undermine a general 
finding of exclusivity, if aboriginal groups intended to and attempted to 
enforce their exclusive occupation. Moreover, as Professor McNeil 
suggests, the presence of other aboriginal groups might actually reinforce 
a finding of exclusivity. For example, “[w]here others were allowed 
access upon request, the very fact that permission was asked for and given 
would be further evidence of the group’s exclusive control” (at p. 204). 
 
A consideration of the aboriginal perspective may also lead to the 
conclusion that trespass by other aboriginal groups does not undermine, 
and that presence of those groups by permission may reinforce, the 
exclusive occupation of the aboriginal group asserting title. For example, 
the aboriginal group asserting the claim to aboriginal title may have 
trespass laws which are proof of exclusive occupation, such that the 
presence of trespassers does not count as evidence against exclusivity. As 
well, aboriginal laws under which permission may be granted to other 
aboriginal groups to use or reside even temporarily on land would 
reinforce the finding of exclusive occupation. Indeed, if that permission 
                                               
49Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra note 45, para 156. 
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were the subject of treaties between the aboriginal nations in question, 
those treaties would also form part of the aboriginal perspective.”50 
Another interesting point made in Delgamuukw by Lamer C.J. was the determination that 
two or more Aboriginal groups could hold joint title if they demonstrated shared 
exclusivity over a territory51. Lamer C.J. bases this determination on the American case 
of United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co.52 
In this case, the United States, in its own right and as guardian of the Indians of the 
Walapai (Hualpai) Tribe, brought forward a suit asking the Court to stop the respondent, 
Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co. from interfering with the possession and occupancy by the 
Indians of certain lands in North-western Arizona. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co. claimed 
that it had full title to the lands, by way of the Act of July 27, 1866, 14 Stat. 292. The 
government requested that Santa Fe's rights under the Act of 1866 be subject to the 
Walapai's right of occupancy. The Court determined that the Walapai had only 
relinquished their rights to a tribal claim for the lands located outside their reserve, when 
they requested the creation of the Walapai Indian Reservation in 1883, as this request and 
acceptance of reserve lands had amounted to a voluntary cession as provided under the 
Act of 1866. But no such cession applied to the lands located within the reservation. 
Speaking of the exclusivity of Walapai occupancy, the Court stated the following:  
                                               
50Ibid, paras 156–157. 
51Chief Justice Lamer indicates that there may be cases in which “two aboriginal nations lived on a 
particular piece of land and recognized each other’s entitlement to that land but nobody else’s”. However, 
Lamer C.J. does not elaborate further on the concept of joint title, as the facts of the case did not justify it. 
He instead indicates that he will “leave it to another day to work out all the complexities and implications 
of joint title, as well as any limits that another band’s title may have on the way in which one band uses its 
title lands”. That day has not yet come. On the possibility of joint title: see Kent McNeil, “Exclusive 
Occupation and Joint Aboriginal Title” (2015) 48 University of British Columbia Law Review 821. 
52United States v Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co, [1941] 314 US 339. 
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“Occupancy necessary to establish aboriginal possession is a question of 
fact to be determined as any other question of fact. If it were established as 
a fact that the lands in question were, or were included in, the ancestral 
home of the Walapais in the sense that they constituted definable territory 
occupied exclusively by the Walapais (as distinguished from lands 
wandered over by many tribes), then the Walapais had 'Indian title' which 
unless extinguished survived the railroad grant of 1866.”53 
Therefore, since the lands within the reservation were not extinguished, the Court 
essentially recognized title to both the Walapais and Santa Fe. Although this judgment 
did not oppose two Aboriginal groups, it is instructive as to the considerations to take 
into account when determining exclusivity and the practicalities of joint title.  
Returning to Delgamuukw, it is unfortunate that Lamer C.J. did not elaborate further with 
regard to how a demonstration of shared exclusivity could be successful. We believe that 
the joint title would have to reflect the Aboriginal legal traditions of both groups 
involved. It is evident that Lamer C.J. drafted his judgment while considering the 
consequences on overlapping land claims. He emphasized the importance of considering 
overlapping land claims in relation to the requirement of exclusivity:  
“(...) many aboriginal nations with territorial claims that overlap with 
those of the appellants did not intervene in this appeal, and do not 
appear to have done so at trial. This is unfortunate, because 
determinations of aboriginal title for the Gitskan and Wet’suwet’en will 
undoubtedly affect their claims as well. This is particularly so because 
aboriginal title encompasses an exclusive right to the use and 
occupation of land, i.e., to the exclusion of both non-aboriginals and 
members of other aboriginal nations. It may, therefore, be advisable if 
those aboriginal nations intervened in any new litigation. 
 
Finally, this litigation has been both long and expensive, not only in 
economic but in human terms as well. By ordering a new trial, I do not 
                                               
53Ibid at 345. 
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necessarily encourage the parties to proceed to litigation and to settle 
their dispute through the courts. As was said in Sparrow, at p. 1105, s. 
35(1) “provides a solid constitutional base upon which subsequent 
negotiations can take place”. Those negotiations should also include 
other aboriginal nations which have a stake in the territory claimed.”54 
 
[emphasis in original citation] 
 
Another unfortunate element of Lamer C.J.’s ruling regarding Aboriginal perspective is 
that it was somewhat deconstructed by Chief Justice McLachlin's ruling in the case of R. 
v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard55. In this case, the Court was asked to determine if members 
of the Mi'kmaq people in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick could engage in commercial 
logging without authorization, by way of treaty rights or Aboriginal title56. When 
considering determination of Aboriginal title, the Chief Justice stated, as did Lamer C.J. 
in Delgamuukw, that “both aboriginal and European common law perspectives must be 
considered”57. However, it is in her manner of addressing the Aboriginal perspective that 
we respectfully find fault.  
She elaborates on Aboriginal perspective by explaining that the perspective should be 
used to identify the aboriginal practice, but that it has no pertinence when time comes to 
translate that practice into a “modern legal right”:  
“This exercise involves both aboriginal and European perspectives. The 
Court must consider the pre-sovereignty practice from the perspective of 
the aboriginal people. But in translating it to a common law right, the 
Court must also consider the European perspective; the nature of the right 
                                               
54Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra note 45, paras 185–186. 
55R v Marshall; R v Bernard, [2005] 2 SCR 220. 
56Ibid. The claimants here explicitly refused to claim Aboriginal rights; only a claim of Aboriginal title was 
at stake. 
57Ibid, para 223. 
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at common law must be examined to determine whether a particular 
aboriginal practice fits it.”58 
McLachlin C.J. justifies her opinion as follows: “Thus, to insist that the pre-sovereignty 
practices correspond in some broad sense to the modern right claimed, is not to ignore 
the aboriginal perspective. The aboriginal perspective grounds the analysis and imbues 
its every step”59. However, Lamer C.J.’s decision in Delgamuukw provided that 
Aboriginal perspective could be found in Aboriginal law itself, without needing to refer 
to the common law60. McLachlin C.J. is of the opinion that the Aboriginal land practices 
must translate into exclusive occupation which could constitute title under common law: 
“[w]hile she stressed the importance of Aboriginal perspectives in evaluating Aboriginal 
practices, the Chief Justice did not explicitly consider Aboriginal law in her analysis”61. 
Lamer C.J.’s judgment on Aboriginal perspective went much further in its recognition of 
Aboriginal law than did the Chief Justice’s: “as we have seen, for Lamer C.J. proof of 
physical occupation is only one way of establishing Aboriginal title; in addition, the 
requisite occupation can be proven through Aboriginal systems of law”62.   
As for proof of exclusivity, the Chief Justice explains that, in European-based systems, 
exclusivity is generally based on a right to control land and to exclude others from said 
land, and that it can be difficult to determine if this existed in Aboriginal societies63. 
Since groups may encounter difficulties proving their control, especially since “the 
                                               
58Ibid, para 243. 
59Ibid, para 244. 
60Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Supreme Court: What’s Happening” (2006) 69 Sask L Rev 281. 
61Ibid at 298. 
62Ibid. 
63R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, supra note 55, para 64. 
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people may have been peaceful and have chosen to exercise their control by sharing 
rather than exclusion”64, all that is required is “demonstration of effective control of the 
land by the group, from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that it could have 
excluded others had it chosen to do so”65. As author Kent McNeil aptly points out, the 
Chief Justice’s opinion contrasts with Lamer C.J.’s opinion in Delgamuukw which 
argued that Aboriginal law could be used to prove exclusivity66.  
Respectfully, we do not agree with the method employed by the Chief Justice in her 
judgment of the Marshall/Bernard case67. In order to meet the requirements she outlined, 
Aboriginal rights would have to be shaped, broken down and defined into an idea which 
fits within “the legal realities that non-aboriginal legal principles and traditions 
represent”68. The stand-alone nature and independence of Aboriginal law was not fully 
considered by the Chief Justice. In his concurring judgment, Justice LeBel directed his 
thoughts on this lacking element:  
“The role of the aboriginal perspective cannot be simply to help in the 
interpretation of aboriginal practices in order to assess whether they 
conform to common law concepts of title. The aboriginal perspective 
shapes the very concept of aboriginal title. “Aboriginal law should not just 
be received as evidence that Aboriginal peoples did something in the past 
on a piece of land. It is more than evidence: it is actually law. And so, 
                                               
64Ibid. 
65Ibid, para 65. 
66Kent McNeil, supra note 60 at 299. 
67See: Nigel Bankes, “Marshall and Bernard: Ignoring the Relevance of Customary Property Laws” (2006) 
55 UNBLJ 120, at page 124: “By ignoring or downplaying the significance of indigenous legal systems, 
the judgment undermines the fundamental goal of reconciliation and calls into question the conceptual 
underpinnings of aboriginal title in Canadian law. By emphasizing the facts of possession rather than the 
recognition of a pre-existing system of laws, the judgment decontextualizes and trivializes the concept of 
aboriginal title. Finally, the judgment raises the spectre, hinted at in the separate concurring opinion of 
Justice LeBel, that the Court has revived a version of terra nullius doctrine”. 
68Mark D. Walters, supra note 7 at 502. 
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there should be some way to bring to the decision-making process those 
laws that arise from the standards of the indigenous people before the 
court” (Borrows, at p. 173). In the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, 
Cromwell J.A. tried to reflect on and develop the notion of occupation in 
order to reconcile aboriginal and common law perspectives on ownership: 
R. v. Marshall (2003), 218 N.S.R. (2d) 78, 2003 NSCA 105, at paras. 
153‑56.”69 
For instance, demonstration of effective control can be hard to determine in the case of 
an unchallenged territory70. If territory was unchallenged, Aboriginal groups may or may 
not, depending on their legal traditions, have felt the need to express an exclusive type of 
possession over a piece of land: “Euro-Canadian law is trying to draw a conceptual line 
which may be invisible from an Aboriginal perspective”71. 
The appeal level judgments in the Marshall/Bernard case included in-depth examinations 
of Aboriginal perspective over exclusivity. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal decision in 
R. v. Marshall72examined three elements of Aboriginal perspective over exclusivity: 
polity, territoriality and land tenure and use73. Under polity, the Court reviewed the 
Mi'kmaq's political organization. On the topic of aboriginal perspective on territoriality, 
the Court explains that although the Mi'kmaq moved from place to place, “there was no 
evidence that any other aboriginal group challenged the Mi'kmaq claim to live in that 
                                               
69R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, supra note 55, para 130., quoting from: John Borrows, “Creating an 
Indigenous Legal Community” (2005) 50 McGill Law Journal 153 at 173. 
70HW Roger Townshend, Can Euro-Canadian law and Indigenous Law Find Common Ground? 
(Presented to the Joint Study Institute, 2010). 
71Ibid. 
72R v Marshall, 2003 NSCA 105. 
73Ibid, para 141. 
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territory”74. As for land tenure and use, the Court quotes evidence provided by Chief 
Augustine as to the lack of term in Mi'kmaq language referring to property:  
“The term that would best identify that would be a relationship to the land. 
That Iroquoian people had a relationship to the land.  The Mi'kmaq had a 
relationship to the land. And whether they travelled into each other's 
territories, as long as they were not disrupting the way of life of those 
people that they would not run into any kind of problems. If they were to 
disrupt the way of life of the other people, then they would be dealt with 
according to how those individuals would deal with this kind of situation. 
And which was not always one rule or policy that that group would follow 
in terms of dealing with those individuals.”75 
 
[emphasis in original citation] 
Taking into account the Aboriginal perspective, the Court decided to apply a standard of 
“occupation” in order to determine Aboriginal title. The Court based its decision on 
uncertain boundaries of the land in question and on the requirement under Delgamuukw 
that when making a determination regarding “sufficiency of occupation, one should take 
account of the aboriginal group's size, manner of life, material resources, technological 
abilities and the character of the lands claimed”76. Most importantly, the Court chose the 
standard of occupation because it was “compatible with the Mi'kmaq perspective 
regarding territoriality and ownership”77. As the Court explained, a more demanding 
standard would not be in line with the Mi'kmaq culture and practices, which led them to 
“frequent movement within the territory they considered theirs”78.    
                                               
74Ibid, para 146. 
75Ibid, para 148. 
76Ibid, para 155. The Court referred to Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra note 45, para 149. 
77R. v. Marshall, supra note 72, para 156. 
78Ibid. 
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In R. v. Bernard79, the Court of Appeal of New Brunswick similarly decided that the 
Miramichi Mi'kmaq had provided enough evidence to meet the requirement of exclusive 
occupation, as set out in the Delgamuukw case. The Court did indeed find that there was 
occupation by the Mi'kmaq, and, in considering the exclusive nature of the occupation, it 
resorted to Mi'kmaq practices and relationship to land.  
(ii) Tsilhqot’in: Questioning the Need for “Classic” Exclusivity 
The possibility of Aboriginal title in the case of semi-nomadic peoples was recently 
analyzed by the Supreme Court in the case of Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia80. 
The Tsilhqot’in Nation is a group of six bands sharing a common culture and history81. In 
1983, the government of British Columbia granted a commercial logging license on a 
part of land that the Tsilhqot’in Nation considered as their own82. The case first went 
before the Supreme Court of British Columbia in 2002 and continued over a span of five 
years. Justice Vickers determined, in 2007, that the Tsilhqot’in people were “in principle 
entitled to a declaration of Aboriginal title to a portion of the claim area as well as to a 
small area outside the claim area”83. However, for procedural reasons, he denied the 
declaration of title. In 2012, The British Columbia Court of Appeal heard the appeal and 
held, based on a site-specific occupation test, that the Tsilhqot’in claim to title had not 
                                               
79R v Bernard, [2003] NBCA 55. 
80Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44. 
81Ibid at 259. 
82Ibid. 
83Ibid, para 7. 
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been established84.The case went before the Supreme Court of Canada in 2014 and 
resulted in a unanimous and historic judgment delivered by Chief Justice McLachlin.  
The Chief Justice made the following comments on the exclusivity-portion of the 
Aboriginal title test:  
“Exclusivity should be understood in the sense of intention and capacity to 
control the land. The fact that other groups or individuals were on the land 
does not necessarily negate exclusivity of occupation. Whether a claimant 
group had the intention and capacity to control the land at the time of 
sovereignty is a question of fact for the trial judge and depends on various 
factors such as the characteristics of the claimant group, the nature of 
other groups in the area, and the characteristics of the land in question. 
Exclusivity can be established by proof that others were excluded from the 
land, or by proof that others were only allowed access to the land with the 
permission of the claimant group. The fact that permission was requested 
and granted or refused, or that treaties were made with other groups, may 
show intention and capacity to control the land. Even the lack of 
challenges to occupancy may support an inference of an established 
group’s intention and capacity to control.  
 
As with sufficiency of occupation, the exclusivity requirement must be 
approached from both the common law and Aboriginal perspectives, and 
must take into account the context and characteristics of the Aboriginal 
society.”85 
This opinion expressed by the Chief Justice is in fact a return to Delgamuukw and to the 
equal role of perspectives set out by Lamer C.J.86 Indeed, the opinion expressed by 
McLachlin C.J. in this case is different from the one which was put forward in the 
Marshall/Bernard case under which she held that Aboriginal rights had to be translated 
into modern legal rights. Instead, in Tsilhqot’in she stresses that the forcing of “ancestral 
                                               
84Ibid, para 8. 
85Ibid, paras 48–49. 
86Jonnette Watson Hamilton, “Establishing Aboriginal Title: A Return to Delgamuukw”, (2 July 2014), 
online: ABlawg<http://ablawg.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/Blog_JWH_Tsilhqotin_Nation_v_BC_Title_Issues_July-2014.pdf> at 1. 
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practices into the square boxes of common law concepts”87 should be avoided because it 
would “frustrat[e] the goal of faithfully translating pre-sovereignty Aboriginal interests 
into equivalent modern legal rights”88.  
The Chief Justice focuses instead on the importance of the Aboriginal perspective stating 
that the question of sufficiency “must be approached from the perspective of the 
Aboriginal group as well as the common law, bearing in mind the customs of the people 
and the nature of the land”89. As for occupation, she rejects the idea that only specific and 
intensive occupation can support Aboriginal title. Rather, she employs a control-based 
approach based on both the common law and Aboriginal perspectives, including the laws 
and practices of a said group90:  
“The common law test for possession — which requires an intention to 
occupy or hold land for the purposes of the occupant — must be 
considered alongside the perspective of the Aboriginal group which, 
depending on its size and manner of living, might conceive of possession 
of land in a somewhat different manner than did the common law.”91 
Despite the historical importance of this judgment, important questions remain 
unanswered, such as those related to exclusivity. The issue of exclusivity was not 
litigious in this case as the Tsilhqot’in was not faced with competing claims:  
“Isolated and sparsely inhabited, the land was not subject to overlapping 
Aboriginal claims, which characterize most claims for unceded land 
across British Columbia. The Tsilhqot’in made no claim to the portion of 
the land held by anyone other than the Crown, or to submerged land, or to 
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surface or ground waters, leaving each of these issues for potential future 
litigation. So on these facts, the court’s use of exclusivity – whether the 
group ‘has historically acted in a way that would communicate to third 
parties that it held the land for its own purposes’ – as the prime criterion 
for occupation was comparatively readily met [...] future situations where 
Aboriginal title might be asserted will almost certainly present more 
complex facts – water rights, competing fee simple claimants, overlapping 
title with other Aboriginal groups, and so on.”92 
 
[emphasis added] 
In the case of overlap, how will the courts reconcile the requirement of exclusivity where 
two groups or more fulfill the requirement of possession, based on regular use of the 
territory? We fear the solution may be to reject both claims for Aboriginal title for lack of 
exclusivity. This solution is nonsensical if we are to consider that semi-nomadic 
populations could very well have overlapped, based on particular practices.  
The Canadian approach to exclusivity is severely flawed on a fundamental level as it 
grants a group an exclusive right to use and occupy the land without epistemological 
consideration of this group’s territorial and legal realities and those of surrounding 
groups. Occupation of land by Aboriginal groups is a multifaceted issue, implicating a 
host of underlying considerations which surpass that of territorial presence. Authors 
Turner and Fondahl provide a brief yet comprehensive summary of these issues as 
follows: 
“1) the area in question was and often still is governed by nuanced 
Indigenous protocol that is not well represented by simple, mutually 
exclusive territorial boundaries; 2) different Indigenous groups have used 
different criteria to determine the extent of their territory; and 3) 
Indigenous territorial identities have shifted over time, not only with the 
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movement of peoples but also with the merging and division of groups 
and the forging of new identities, often as a result of colonial violence 
including the Indian Reserve system and other State interventions.”93 
It is our opinion that the Supreme Court should review its exclusivity requirement, in 
order to reconnect its approach with the normative power associated with Aboriginal use 
of land. What the Supreme Court seems to overlook in its decisions regarding 
overlapping claims, is that the determination of Aboriginal right and title is not a simple 
determination over the possession of a tract of land. Granting a right to a territory implies 
the granting of normative power over the given territory. The manner in which the 
exclusivity requirement is currently defined implies that the Supreme Court or the 
government representatives negotiating a treaty must ignore the fact that other groups 
may have used this territory, albeit in a non-exclusive manner, and must deny their rights 
on the same territory. 
If, instead of exclusivity, the Supreme Court required that Aboriginal groups demonstrate 
control of land, the Court could grant a source of normative authority over the 
management of the land to various groups. If the Chief Justice had jettisoned the 
exclusivity principle, her ruling in Tsilhqot’in, based as it is on control rather than 
extensive occupation, might have opened the door to this approach. Aboriginal rights 
holders and Aboriginal title holders could then adopt norms and institutions which 
correspond to their legal realities in order to manage the rights of each group on the 
overlapping territory.  
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Before considering this aspect further, let us first examine how the federal and provincial 
governments have implemented the exclusivity requirement developed by the Courts. 
1.3. Implementing the Exclusivity Requirement - Government Policy 
The judicial recognition of Aboriginal rights and Aboriginal title in the late 1980's and 
1990's created an obligation for the federal and provincial governments to adjust their 
policies and provide mechanisms to address and bring resolution to the comprehensive 
claims of Aboriginal groups. These policies had no choice but to integrate mechanisms 
and procedures addressing overlapping claims, as governments and Aboriginal groups 
alike realized that the claims being deposited covered areas overlapping one another. 
This section will provide an overview of the various federal policies, as well as two 
provincial policies having been developed over past few decades to address 
comprehensive land claims. When applicable, a discussion is also included regarding the 
measures contained in these policies addressing overlapping claims.   
(a) Federal Government Policy 
Over the years, the federal government has adopted many policies relating to the 
Aboriginal peoples of Canada, including with regard to the issue of overlapping land 
claims. The political and legal development of Aboriginal rights has closely influenced 
the government’s approach to overlapping land claims, providing Aboriginal groups with 
more independence in addressing these claims as their constitutional rights increased. 
The Government of Canada has recognized that “[t]he evolution and development of the 
federal government's land claims policy has been closely linked to court decisions, 
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particularly decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada”94. Having provided an overview 
of landmark decisions relating to Aboriginal rights, Aboriginal title, and more 
specifically on exclusivity and overlapping land claims, let us now examine how the 
teachings of these rulings have influenced political policy over the last few decades.  
Our analysis will demonstrate that, unfortunately, the approach used by the federal 
government has failed to efficiently address the issue of overlapping land claims and has 
not provided Aboriginal groups or government officials with the appropriate baggage of 
cultural and theoretical knowledge required to consider the various epistemological 
approaches of Aboriginal groups towards conflict resolution and problem-solving.  
(i) Prior Federal Policy 
Since Confederation, Aboriginal groups have been considered as a “responsibility” of the 
federal government. As we have seen, in order to fulfill this responsibility, the 
government has historically adopted laws focussed on the protection of Aboriginal 
peoples through strict governance, fostering paternalistic tendencies within the 
Aboriginal government-relationship95. Aboriginal policy centers around the provisions 
provided in the Indian Act96, which control all aspects of life on reserves. As Dale Turner 
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argues, “[i]t cannot be overemphasized that the Indian Act and its enforcer the 
Department of Indian Affairs, have always had a stranglehold over Indians”97. 
(1) White Paper Policy 
Demands by Aboriginal groups for recognition of treaty rights and Aboriginal title would 
only be addressed more than a century after Confederation. The 1969 Statement of the 
Government of Canada on Indian Policy (known as the “White Paper”) represents the 
government’s first official policy addressing Aboriginal rights and claims in Canada. The 
White Paper called for a removal of policies which “carry with them the seeds of 
disharmony and disunity (...)98” and which “perpetuate the separation of Canadians”99. 
The government believed that the most efficient way to ensure the unity between 
Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals was to repeal the Indian Act and shut down the 
Department of Indian Affairs, therefore erasing the special treatment of Aboriginal 
peoples: “The policy promises all Indian people a new opportunity to expand and 
develop their identity within the framework of a Canadian society which offers them the 
rewards and responsibilities of participation, the benefits of involvement and the pride of 
belonging”100.  
Canada blamed the Indian Act's legal provisions and administrative regime for the 
discrimination faced by Aboriginal peoples, which in turn, created a sentiment of 
                                               
97Dale A. Turner, supra note 95 at 18. 
98Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1969 Statement of the Government of Canada on 
Indian Policy at 5. 
99Ibid at 6. 
100Ibid at 7. 
 35 
dependency and lack of confidence amongst Aboriginal groups. The White Paper went as 
far as to suggest that the removal of references to Aboriginal people in the Constitution 
would be “necessary to end the legal distinction between Indians and other 
Canadians”101.   
Unfortunately for the Canadian government, the Aboriginal peoples of Canada did not 
share Canada's enthusiasm for the White Paper. The policy was considered to be an 
affront to Aboriginal peoples' identity, ignoring not only the political differences between 
Aboriginal Canadians and other Canadians, but the historical and societal differences as 
well: “There was no need to discuss Indian understandings of treaty obligations, and 
fiduciary relationships, because such obligations did not matter as long as 'equality 
between individuals' drove basic understandings of justice”102.  
Another central theme of this policy was the transformation of Aboriginal lands into 
private property, treating and qualifying Aboriginal claims to land as “so general and 
undefined that it is not realistic to think of them as specific claims capable of remedy 
except through a policy and program that will end injustice to Indians as members of the 
Canadian community”103.  
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This said policy and program which was poised to end injustice to Aboriginal peoples 
was instead perceived as “cultural genocide”104. Aboriginal leaders across Canada argued 
that the policy ignored their grievances regarding land and treaty recognition and ignored 
their desire to participate in the creation of policies regarding Aboriginal issues105. For 
instance, a young Cree activist, Harold Cardinal stated that:  
“The new Indian policy promulgated by the Prime Minister Pierre Elliot 
Trudeau's government (...) is a thinly disguised programme of 
extermination through assimilation. For the Indians to survive, says the 
government in effect, he must become a good little brown white man.”106 
The White Paper is an example of a policy which did not reflect nor acknowledge 
Aboriginal philosophy. In fact, instead of embracing a different ideology and cultural 
references, the federal government attempted to use basic political values in Canadian 
society as the basis for a policy which would be applied to a minority group107. The 
policy represented a liberal ideology, emphasizing classical liberal values such as 
equality, responsibility and freedom108. Aboriginal leaders across Canada rejected the 
liberal ideology, disassociating themselves from the White Paper’s recommendations and 
rejecting the idea that this policy responded in any way to their grievances, calling 
instead for a review and a renewal of historic treaties109. The White Paper, rather than 
providing a tool for reconciliation, became “the single most powerful catalyst of the 
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Indian nationalist movement, launching it into a determined force for nativism – a 
reaffirmation of a unique cultural heritage and identity”110.  
(2) Late Twentieth Century Policies 
The 1969 White Paper was officially withdrawn after the 1973 ruling by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the case of Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General)111. The 
government had no other choice but to review its White Paper policy and released a 
policy statement in 1973 indicating that it was willing to accept and negotiate settlement 
of land claims112. In order to do so, the government established the Office of Native 
Claims (ONC) to settle both comprehensive and specific claims via negotiation, rather 
than litigation113. Although the federal government backed down from the White Paper, 
“its underlying philosophy seemed to animate federal policy for years to come”114.  
The 1973 policy was reviewed during the following years culminating into the 
publication of a second policy in 1981115. The federal government indicated that it had 
considered various alternatives from other colonial territories such as Australia, the 
United States and New Zealand. Specifically, the government considered whether a 
different alternative should be sought to resolve comprehensive land claims, such as 
mediation or arbitration, but chose instead to remain with its adopted strategy of 
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negotiation, insisting that this format “permits Natives not only to express their opinions 
and state their grievances, but it further allows them to participate in the formulation of 
the terms of their own settlement”116. 
Neither the 1973 policy nor the 1981 policy addressed overlapping claims of Aboriginal 
groups. In 1982, after the adoption of the Constitution Act, 1982117, the government went 
to work developing a renewed comprehensive claims policy which would recognize the 
recent protections offered by Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and address issues 
of slow negotiations and “growing inconsistency between comprehensive land claims 
policy and other federal policy initiatives”118. Aboriginal groups were particularly 
unhappy with the requirement that their aboriginal rights be first extinguished in order to 
receive benefits provided in a settlement agreement119. They considered that this 
requirement was not harmonious with Section 35 recognitions. In 1985, the task force to 
review comprehensive claims policy published its findings in the report commonly 
known as the Coolican report. This report identified a deep-seated problem within the 
federal government approach:  
“The federal government has sought to extinguish rights and to achieve a 
once-and-for-all settlement of historical claims. The aboriginal peoples, on 
the other hand, have sought to affirm the aboriginal rights and to guarantee 
their unique place in Canadian society for generations to come.”120 
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The Coolican report called for recognition of Aboriginal rights rather than surrender of 
these rights. However, the government's response to the Coolican report was not 
satisfactory to Aboriginal groups and their supporters.  
The federal government responded to the Coolican report in 1986 by producing its third 
comprehensive land claims policy entitled Comprehensive Land Claims Policy121. As the 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples explains, the alternative to extinguishment of 
rights offered by the policy was “more illusory than real: self-government negotiations, if 
they resulted in an agreement, would receive no constitutional protection or independent 
monitoring authority”122.  This policy is the first to address the question of overlapping 
land claims, stating that “[w]here more than one claimant group utilizes common areas of 
land and resources, and the claimants cannot agree on boundaries, resource access or 
land-sharing arrangements, no lands will be granted to any group in the contested area 
until the dispute is resolved”123. Therefore, the government's first approach was one 
characterized by hope for conciliation between Aboriginal groups through negotiation 
and framework agreements, barring treaty negotiations until common ground could be 
achieved.  
During the decade following the adoption of the Constitution Act, 1982, the Supreme 
Court of Canada and lower Canadian courts continued to render important judgments 
with regard to Aboriginal rights and title in Canada. In keeping with its tradition of 
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aligning the judicial with the political, Canada readied itself for the development of a 
new comprehensive claims policy, and in 1993, published a document entitled Federal 
Policy for the Settlement of Native Claims124 which provided an update on the progress 
made regarding settlement of claims. This 1993 document outlined the elements which 
must be demonstrated in order to make a claim for Aboriginal title. The document 
essentially repeated the requirements set out by Justice Mahoney in Baker Lake. As 
discussed in section 1.2(b) of this chapter, of most relevance to our study of overlapping 
claims is the criterion of demonstrating exclusive occupation. By including the 
requirement of exclusivity in their 1993 policy, the federal government essentially 
removed the 1986 requirement providing that the conclusion of treaties was postponed 
until overlapping claims were resolved. According to the terms of the 1993 policy 
document, a group facing an overlapping claim could encounter some difficulty in 
demonstrating exclusive occupation.  
In 1996, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (“RCAP”) Report reviewed these 
land claim policies and characterized the land claim process as a “dilatory and frustrating 
one for all concerned”125. The RCAP identified various elements as frustration sources, 
such as the fact that the burden of proof of the existence of a claim rests upon the 
Aboriginal group claiming the land, that the government can unilaterally decide if the 
claim if valid, that within this acceptance of negotiation, the government can pick and 
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choose what it will negotiate or not negotiate and that it has sole determination of the 
basis for compensation126. 
A decade after the 1993 policy document, the federal government released a document 
entitled Resolving Aboriginal Claims - A Practical Guide to Canadian Experiences127. 
Although this document was not a comprehensive policy on Aboriginal rights or claims, 
it contained updates on many elements of Canada’s approach to determining Aboriginal 
rights and title. The government indicated that its primary objective in releasing this 
document was “to share the Government of Canada’s domestic experience of these issues 
[Aboriginal rights and title] with other nations interested in initiating and implementing 
similar processes with the goal of resolving Aboriginal claims to lands, resources and 
self-government”128.  
In it, the government details a six-step process for the resolution of comprehensive land 
claims. The first step is the submission of a claim: in order for the comprehensive land 
claims submission to be accepted, proof must be made of various elements, including the 
fact that the Aboriginal group occupied a specific territory over which it asserts 
Aboriginal title from time immemorial and that the occupation of this territory was 
largely to the exclusion of other organized societies (i.e. largely exclusive occupation), 
the same criterion developed by the Federal Court in the Baker Lake decision and 
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repeated by the Supreme Court in the Delgamuukw case129 and previously included in the 
1993 federal government policy.  
The 2003 information document also provided a renewed approach to the resolution of 
overlapping conflicts resulting from multiple Aboriginal land claims. This approach did 
not explicitly mention approaching the issue from an Aboriginal philosophy, but it did 
provide, as a general rule, that “Aboriginal groups favour the resolution of the dispute 
through negotiation committees comprised of a combination of community leaders and 
elders”130. The document explained that if two or more Aboriginal groups were unable to 
reach an agreement, the federal government could become involved if its intervention is 
welcomed and favoured. In this case, the government would “engage in overlap 
discussion at the invitation of the groups in question”131. The approach also provided a 
secondary role in which the government would be responsible for providing financial 
assistance for neutral mediation or facilitation services132. The 2011 Updated Guidelines 
for Federal Officials to Fulfill the Duty to Consult also provided that the active role in an 
overlapping claims negotiation belonged to the Aboriginal groups. In fact, these 
guidelines indicated that the Crown may “reasonably expect Aboriginal groups to (...) 
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attempt to resolve any issues with any other Aboriginal groups with overlapping claims 
and interests”133.  
The only innovation provided in the 2003 document was the possibility to add non-
derogation language to settlement agreements if all attempts at resolving overlaps have 
failed. The resolution of overlapping claims was therefore considered as non-compulsory 
before the conclusion of an agreement between the federal government and an Aboriginal 
group, contrary to what had been provided in 1986.  
This is in itself contradictory, as the government requires the demonstration of exclusive 
occupation, but then allows non-derogation language in the case of an overlap. The non-
derogation language added to a settlement agreement generally implies that the 
agreements are without prejudice to the rights of groups with overlapping claims, 
therefore giving another Aboriginal group an opportunity to negotiate its own settlement 
agreement. In practice, this solution does not address the issue of overlapping claims; it 
simply relegates it to be considered at a later time. Non-derogation language provisions 
are analyzed in further detail in section 2.2(b) of Chapter 1, below.  
It appears that the federal government recognized the weakness of its approach to 
overlapping claims in the 2003 information document, indicating at that moment, that 
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“Aboriginal groups are exploring additional approaches to solve land disputes among 
themselves that are acceptable to the federal/provincial/territorial governments”134. 
(ii) Current Federal Policy 
In September 2014, the federal government released an interim policy135 setting out the 
government’s “current position at a high level as a starting point for discussions with 
partners”136 (emphasis in original document) with regard to a new comprehensive land 
claims policy, replacing the last published policy in 1986137.  
The bulk of this policy concentrates on land issues and mentions the recognition of 
Aboriginal perspectives as having an influence on the conduct of treaty negotiations. 
Although this is a step in the right direction, as we will demonstrate, the government 
must take one step further recognizing not only Aboriginal perspectives but the existence 
of Aboriginal legal orders which can and do provide “a conceptual and legal framework 
for examining territorial claims”138.  
With regard to the issue of overlapping claims and shared territories, the interim policy 
recognizes the need for action, stating that if these issues are left unresolved, “shared 
territory and overlap issues can harm both the process or reconciliation between Canada 
and Aboriginal groups and the relationships among Aboriginal groups”139. The 
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government stresses that the resolution of overlaps “is a key interest for all parties”140. 
The policy reiterates the sentiment expressed in the 2003 information document that 
Aboriginal groups are “best placed to resolved shared territory and overlap disputes 
between themselves”141. Canada continues to give itself a secondary role, indicating that 
it can “consider options” which would help encourage Aboriginal groups to come to a 
solution relating to their dispute142. The language used is patently vague and reflects the 
fact that the federal government together with the Aboriginal groups have yet to develop 
a successful approach to overlapping claims.  
Although the federal government's policy has a national application, some provinces 
have also chosen to adopt their own policies, as their particular situations do not 
necessarily correspond to the one-size-fits-all approach outlined by the federal 
government in its policies.  
(b) Provincial policies 
The following section will examine both the policy from British Columbia and the policy 
from Newfoundland-and-Labrador. Focus is put on these two policies as they are the 
most comprehensive available provincial policies concerning overlapping claims. This 
may be explained by the fact that both these provinces did not sign, for the majority of 
their territory, historical treaties with Aboriginal groups living within their borders. 
Moreover, while these policies have some points in common, they also present 
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interesting differences which provide elements for consideration in our development of a 
new framework to address overlapping claims.  
(i) British Columbia Treaty Commission Policies 
In British Columbia, provincial and Aboriginal leaders have chosen to take a different 
approach with regard to Aboriginal issues, including those related to the settlement of 
land claims and overlaps. British Columbia must cope with an enormous amount of 
overlaps which affect almost all treaty negotiations between First Nations and the 
government. As Grand Chief Stewart Philip from Okanagan Nation Alliance has stated, 
“[t]he overlap issue is the cancer of the B.C. treaty process”143. 
In 1990, British Columbia created the British Columbia Claims Task Force (the “Task 
Force”) by an agreement between representatives of First Nations in British Columbia, 
the provincial government and the federal government. In 1991, the Task Force delivered 
a report outlining a six-stage treaty process specific to British Columbia144. This report 
provides two key elements relating to the issue of overlapping claims. First, the report 
reiterates previous federal policy which provided that solutions should be determined by 
First Nations themselves: “First Nations resolve issues related to overlapping traditional 
territories among themselves”145 (Recommendation 8).  
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Second, the report also provides that the BC Treaty Commission (“BCTC”), a tripartite 
organization appointed by the First Nations and the federal and provincial governments, 
shall have a secondary role, including providing advice on dispute resolution services 
available to resolve overlap issues, when requested by First Nations, and providing 
funding to carry out the necessary studies to assist in resolving overlaps146.  
The BCTC requires that First Nations provide a statement of intent in order to negotiate a 
treaty with Canada and British Columbia. Within such statement of intent, the First 
Nation must provide a description of its traditional territory, and must also identify any 
overlaps with other First Nations. It has been said that this exercise reduces complex 
territorial concepts, existing under an independent legal framework, into two-
dimensional maps which must be moulded into a Western legal framework: “First Nation 
Territories are not simply lines of a map. Traditionally, the territories were defined by a 
complex interaction of history, laws, place names, language, different activities, family 
and clan relations, different seasons and time periods, etc.”147 The result has been some 
confusion amongst First Nations as to what should be included or excluded on these 
statements of intent maps. Some First Nations submitted only their core territory, while 
other submitted larger portions of land where their ancestors fished, hunted and 
gathered148. As some First Nations began adding more territory, so the trend grew and 
competition and tension between territories was unnaturally created between First 
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Nations149. In fact, the BCTC process is different from the federal process in that it does 
not require proof of exclusivity or prior occupation, making it more prone to overlapping 
claims. 
In order to address issues emerging from the land claim process, the BCTC produces an 
Annual Report outlining both achievements and issues to be addressed. Year after year, 
the BCTC has reflected upon the existence of overlapping claims and their impact on 
negotiations with Aboriginal groups. In its 2008 Annual Report, the BCTC underlined 
the importance of overlapping land claims, indicating that certain measures would be 
taken to help solve this issue, such as an intensification of dialogue on overlapping and 
shared territories, focussing on instances where negotiations have progressed to the final 
stage150. In an update to that 2008 Report, the BCTC also recognized that agreements 
among overlapping First Nations can “provide a solid foundation for their relationships 
with each other”151.  
In 2010, the BCTC's annual report indicated that the current territorial situation is “more 
pressing than the parties previously appreciated and that action is necessary now”152. 
Moreover, the BCTC indicates having “developed an action plan to support First Nations 
in resolving overlapping/shared territory issues, build capacity in First Nations to 
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successfully address these difficult issues, and encourage the early resolution of overlap 
disputes”153.  
However, a 2012 Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples 
brought new issues to light in the approach to solve overlapping claims. In this report 
entitled A Commitment Worth Preserving: Reviving the British Columbia Treaty 
Process154, the Senate Committee indicated that it was concerned with “the lack of 
resources and institutional supports for First Nations in the negotiation of overlapping 
claims”155. The Senate Committee recognized that disputes related to overlapping claims 
“have caused, and may continue to cause, delays impeding the conclusion of treaties”156. 
It also considered the importance of Aboriginal understanding and Aboriginal 
participation in addressing the complex issues surrounding overlapping claims.  
Following the Senate Report, the 2013 BCTC Annual Report again identified 
overlapping claims as one of the principal “barriers to change” and was attributed a 
qualification as “central” to the concerns within the BC treaty negotiation process157. It 
appears that the BCTC truly took note of the Senate's concerns in 2014 as it chose to 
concentrate the entirety of its 2014 Annual Report on the Task Force's 1991 Report, more 
specifically on Recommendation 8 providing that First Nations resolve issues related to 
overlapping territories among themselves. The Chief Commissioner again identified the 
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issue of overlapping claims as “one of the biggest challenges that a First Nation, reaching 
Final Agreement, must overcome”158.  
Current Chief Commissioner Sophie Pierre explored the idea of employing an Aboriginal 
paradigm in conflict-resolution addressing overlapping claims:  
“Our role is to support those communities in being able to bring back their 
own cultural dispute resolution as opposed to the communities running off 
to the courts, spending millions of dollars on lawyers who really do not 
have an understanding of what it is that needs to be done.”159 
Steven Point, Chief Commissioner from 2005-2007 echoed the argument advanced in 
this thesis: that resolving overlapping disputes is more theoretically complex than it 
seems at first glance, underlining the importance of using a traditional understanding of 
property160. 
(ii) Newfoundland-and-Labrador Policy 
In December 1987, the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador adopted a land 
claims policy in order to outline a distinct position than the one provided in the federal 
government's 1986 land claim policy. The issue of overlapping land claims is found as 
the last issue addressed in the Newfoundland and Labrador policy. The latter provides the 
following regarding overlapping land claims:  
“All legitimate overlapping claims between native groups resident in 
Labrador should first be discussed by the native groups concerned. The 
province will not enter into a final settlement concerning lands within the 
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area of claim overlap until the native parties have reached a satisfactory 
mutual agreement. 
 
Crossboundary claims by native groups that are not residents of Labrador 
may be addressed only after the settlement of all claims to that specific 
area by the resident Labrador natives.”161 
 
It appears that the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador has respected this policy. 
The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador only negotiates with Innu Nation as a 
whole (which incorporates two Aboriginal groups in Newfoundland and Labrador) and 
has also demonstrated political willingness by including amendments to the Labrador 
Inuit Land Claims Agreement. These amendments incorporate an Overlap Agreement 
reached in November 2005 between the Labrador Inuit and Nunavik (Quebec) Inuit 
addressing and resolving their overlapping land claims in northern Labrador and offshore 
areas adjacent to northern Labrador and northern Quebec. However, there are some 
complaints issuing from the Labrador Métis Nation which argues that its land claims 
have been entirely ignored.   
(c) Conclusion of Section 1 
The various policies outlined above have certain elements in common. All three policies 
provide that Aboriginal groups should resolve arguments among themselves and all three 
policies provide that agreements should not be concluded unless there is an overlap 
agreement or if best efforts have been used to resolve conflicts with other Aboriginal 
groups with an interest in the overlap area. Although this may appear reasonable at first 
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glance, as we will see, non-indigenous governments have not provided sufficient support 
to Aboriginal methods of conflict resolution. 
No policy provides a veto right permitting an Aboriginal group to halt the negotiation 
process by claiming an overlap with another group negotiating an agreement. Mark E.W. 
East, Counsel to the Department of Justice, explains that there are three situations in 
which Canada will move forward with a treaty despite being faced with an overlapping 
situation. The first situation is when an Aboriginal group has made “reasonable and good 
faith efforts to resolve overlap issues”162 with the group claiming an overlap. The second 
situation is when “measures taken to resolve the outstanding overlap issues have proven 
to be unsuccessful”163, and the third is when there is presence of non-derogation 
provisions in the treaty.  
In reality, despite the Supreme Court’s Delgamuukw decision relating to demonstration 
of exclusive occupation, Aboriginal groups are not required to demonstrate that they 
have exclusivity over a certain territory in order to sign an agreement on land claims with 
the federal or provincial governments, since the governments admit that this signing can 
take place despite the existence of overlapping claims. We reiterate that the Supreme 
Court should take note of this refusal and should, instead of requiring the demonstration 
of exclusivity, require a demonstration of use of land, therefore granting a source of 
normative authority over the management of the land to various groups, allowing 
Aboriginal rights holders and Aboriginal title holders to develop a conflict resolution 
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system reflecting their legal orders to manage the rights of each group on the overlapping 
territory.  
As will be demonstrated in Section 2 both the legal and political approaches are flawed 
and do nothing to address the substance of the overlapping issue. Not only do they 
postpone the opportunity to address overlapping claims but they also forego the 
possibility for both Aboriginal groups to benefit from an equal negotiating power. The 
signing of a treaty with one group unquestionably provides the latter with greater 
bargaining power than that possessed by the group claiming an overlap, and, in our 
opinion, it thus makes resolution between the two groups close to impossible. 
2. Practical Applications of Government Policy in Overlapping Claim Situations 
Having reviewed the theoretical approach elaborated by the federal government and the 
British Columbia and Newfoundland-and-Labrador governments, the following section 
will provide concrete examples of the manner in which these policies are applied.  
Practically speaking, issues relating to overlapping claims generally come to light in one 
of two situations: (i) when a group petitions a court for recognition of Aboriginal title 
over a parcel of land subject to an overlapping claim, and (ii) when a group is finalizing 
negotiation, with the federal or provincial government, of an agreement which would 
have an effect on a piece of land affected by the overlapping claim. In both cases, 
resorting to the courts to achieve resolution of the conflict presents various shortcomings.  
 54 
2.1 Overlapping Claims before the Courts: Shedding Light on a Forum Issue 
The resolution of overlapping aboriginal land claims can be considered as what Lon L. 
Fuller referred to as a “polycentric” issue164. Jean Leclair defines these issues as “issues 
involving many affected parties, not all of them represented before the court, and whose 
complex ramifications make it difficult to measure the repercussion a particular award 
could have on the political dynamics between different Indigenous nations and between 
these and the Crown”165. Although Leclair was discussing treaty implementation, we 
believe that his definition of polycentric issues corresponds exactly to the situation of 
overlapping land claims in Canada.  
The Courts have indeed begun to emit reservations about ruling on such complex issues 
of normative concern. In Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia166, Justice Vickers 
expressed his dissatisfaction with the use of courts to address Aboriginal issues. Hoping 
to “shine new light on the path of reconciliation that lies ahead”167, he said in part: “This 
case demonstrates how the Court, confined by the issues raised in the pleadings and the 
jurisprudence on Aboriginal rights and title, is ill equipped to effect a reconciliation of 
competing interests. That must be reserved for a treaty negotiation process”168. A parallel 
can be drawn with competing interests between Aboriginal nations. They must be 
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expressed in a more flexible manner. Litigation can also generate more litigious 
questions, one lawsuit leading to another, entailing enormous expense169. Other issues 
relating to litigation include long delays, contradictory decisions from the courts and the 
lack of competence and understanding of some lawyers regarding Aboriginal culture170. 
As authors Dwight Newman and Danielle Schweitzer have rightly expressed, choosing 
one group over another aboriginal group to be the property rights holder is hardly in line 
with the idea of “balancing Aboriginal interests (...) While it may fall to the Court to 
consider the implications of finding for one group over the other, it could further be 
argued that perhaps a decision on such matters falls or should fall beyond the scope of 
the Court's powers”171. 
(a) Applicable Case Law 
Below are four examples of how the courts have addressed overlapping land claim 
situations.   
(i) Ahousaht Indian Band v. AG of Canada 
In some cases, judicial decisions run contrary to Aboriginal traditions and Aboriginal 
epistemology, and fail to consider Aboriginal perspective.  
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For instance, in the case of Ahousaht Indian Band v. AG of Canada172, eleven First 
Nations from the Nuu-chah-nulth linguistic group of Aboriginal peoples contended, in 
their Formal Notice Application that they had “[A]boriginal rights to harvest and sell all 
species of fishery resources available to the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nation within the 
territories described as the Fishing Territories in the statement of claim”173.  
The Attorney General of Canada brought two applications before the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia. The first order requested to compel the plaintiffs, constituted by eleven 
Aboriginal groups, to provide the boundaries of each plaintiff's claim area. The second 
application asked the Court to disqualify the plaintiffs’ counsel from acting on behalf of 
the eleven plaintiff first nations by reason of the “conflicting aboriginal title claim of the 
individual first nations as to their adjoining boundaries”174. The plaintiffs objected to the 
removal of their counsel indicating that, in recognizing the existence of an Aboriginal 
title, the Court could refrain from addressing the overlap issue, that is, it could simply 
declare that one or more of the plaintiffs had title, without deciding which plaintiff. 
These plaintiffs had been attempting to resolve their conflicting claims for many years 
but had limited their claims to Aboriginal title in order to avoid conflict, leaving aside 
issues relating to Aboriginal rights. The plaintiffs stated that “they were not asking the 
court to resolve the overlapping claims, as this would require each of the eleven plaintiff 
bands to be represented separately in this proceeding or in separate proceedings”175. The 
Aboriginal groups held that it would be “unjust to require further precision with respect 
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to the claims in areas of overlap, when such precision would likely result in fracturing the 
litigation owing to the financial burden of pursuing matters independently” and could 
ultimately, “result in many or all of the plaintiffs being unable to move forward with their 
claim”176. The judge disagreed and indicated instead that the “areas of overlap create a 
serious problem for the plaintiffs and finding a solution is necessary to go forward in the 
litigation”177. 
The Court ultimately decided to proceed with another option. The judge ruled that the 
trial would move forward on a test case basis in which only one Aboriginal group would 
be represented and the determination of the presence or absence of Aboriginal rights 
relating to fishing would be made relating to that group only. The determination of proof 
of Aboriginal title in the overlap areas would be heard at a later phase of the trial. The 
other groups could join as defendants to determine boundaries, rights and title in the 
overlap areas.  
(ii) Chief Allan Apsassin et al. v. Attorney General (Canada) et al. 
The issue of overlapping claims is simply not progressing in the judicial system and this 
reality has been recognized by judges such as Justice R.D. Wilson who expressed 
disbelief in the case of Chief Allan Apsassin et al. v. Attorney General (Canada) et al.178, 
at the advancement of treaty negotiations without prior consultation of groups with 
overlapping land claims:  
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“Given the recommendations in the report of the British Columbia Claims 
Task Force of 28 June 1991, and the policies and procedures of the B.C. 
Treaty Commission of 11 April 1997, addressing the problem of 
overlapping claims, it is astonishing that this matter has been allowed to 
come this far without resolution. But it has.”179 
In this case, six First Nations with Treaty 8 rights asked the Court for an injunction 
preventing the LheidliT'enneh First Nation from going forward with the community 
ratification vote for the LheidliT'enneh Final Agreement by reason of overlapping land 
claims between the territory provided in Treaty 8 and the territory provided in the 
proposed agreement. The point of contention was the provision of wildlife harvesting 
rights in an area also covered by Treaty 8. The judge ultimately refused to rule in favour 
of the plaintiffs, indicating that neither party would suffer irreparable harm, and 
characterizing the plaintiffs’ arguments as compelling but not dispositive180. 
(iii) Luuxhon v. Canada181 
In this case, the plaintiffs, hereditary chiefs of the Gitanyow First Nation, were seeking 
declarations with respect to the failure of the federal and British Columbia governments 
to negotiate in good faith with the Gitanyow, because of the Agreement-in-Principle with 
the Nisga'a First Nation, a neighbouring First Nation, which provided that: “[t]he rights 
of the Nisga'a Nation set forth in the Final Agreement will not be affected by any treaties 
with other First Nations”182. The Gitanyow argued that this provision in the Nisga'a 
Agreement had removed good faith from the negotiations between the Gitanyow and the 
federal and British Columbia governments since it barred the government from 
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concluding an agreement with the Gitanyow which would be inconsistent with its 
terms183. 
Canada and British Columbia brought a motion to strike all or part of the plaintiffs' 
statement of claim on the ground that the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of 
action, amongst others. Ultimately, the Court sided with the defendants, explaining that 
the Court may not make declarations regarding right violations which may occur in the 
future184. The Court struck the paragraph which asked for a declaration that the Crown 
may not conclude a treaty with the Nisga'a without the consent of the Gitanyow. Justice 
Williamson did not agree with the plaintiffs that section 35(1) provides a veto to one 
Aboriginal group which can be used over agreements reached between another group and 
the Crown185. He also struck the paragraph seeking a declaration that the Crown was in 
breach of a duty to the Gitanyow186. Justice Williamson did however show that he was 
sensitive to the issue of overlapping claims, stating that “myriad Court applications seem 
inevitable unless the treaty negotiation process deals with overlapping claims”187. 
Justice Williamson ended his judgment by eloquently summarizing the problem which 
can arise when resorting to judges to address overlapping claims: “I think it inevitable 
that if the parties fail to deal with the conspicuous problem of overlapping claims, they 
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may well face Court imposed settlements which are less likely to be acceptable to them 
than negotiated solutions”188.  
(iv) Huron-Wendat Nation of Wendake v. Canada 
In May 2014, the Huron Nation of Wendake went before a Federal court judge in order 
to challenge the validity and the legality of the 2004 Entente de principe d'ordre général 
entered into between the Innus of Pessamit, Essipit, Mashteuiatsh and Nutashkuan, the 
Quebec government and federal government. It asked the court to prevent the signing of 
a final treaty, claiming that a portion of its territory, the Nionwentsio, overlapped the 
territory provided in the Entente de principe d’ordre général.   
While Justice de Montigny refused to deliver an order prohibiting the signing of a final 
treaty189, he did agree with the plaintiffs with regard to the important social consequences 
which can materialize when one Aboriginal group has signed an agreement relating to a 
piece of land subject to overlapping claims. Such signing can change the behaviour of a 
group, such as providing them with more confidence, and that must be taken into 
account, even if these changes are an indirect consequence of the agreement190.  
(b) Overlapping Claims and the Duty to Consult 
A common issue within overlap cases is the Crown’s fulfillment of the duty to consult a 
group claiming an overlap. For instance, Justice de Montigny adopted an interesting 
perspective when ruling on the Huron overlapping claim case. Rather than imposing a 
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restriction on the signing of a final agreement, Justice de Montigny focussed his ruling 
on the importance of the Crown’s duty to consult in the case of overlapping claims.  
The duty to consult is derived from the honour of the Crown which cannot “cavalierly 
run roughshod over Aboriginal interests where claims affecting these interests are being 
seriously pursued in the process of treaty negotiation and proof”191. The Crown must 
consult Aboriginal groups if their treaty rights or Aboriginal rights may be adversely 
affected by a decision or action of the Crown. The duty is more than simply procedural, it 
“is not fulfilled simply by providing a process within which to exchange and discuss 
information”192. The consultation must be meaningful and have “the intention of 
substantially addressing the concerns of the Aboriginal peoples whose lands are at 
issue”193.  
In the case of the Huron Nation, the judge ruled that the Crown had the obligation to 
consult and accommodate the Huron Nation before the signing of the EPOG with the 
Innus of Quebec and was therefore in breach of its duty194. As Justice de Montigny 
states, “the inevitable impact that the conclusion of an agreement-in-principle between 
Canada and the interveners will have on ongoing negotiations between Canada and the 
applicant is one of many circumstances to be considered in determining the degree of the 
duty to consult”195. He explains that the duty to consult will increase in importance as the 
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negotiations with the Innus of Quebec progress towards a final agreement and the 
adverse effects on the Huron Nation become increasingly substantial.  
The duty to consult was also invoked by Justice Mactavish in the case SambaaK'e Dene 
Band v. Duncan196. Justice Mactavish granted the application for judicial review filed by 
the SambaaK’e Dene Band (“SKDB”) and the Nahanni Butte Dene Band (“NBDB”) 
against the decision of the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development which 
chose to postpone consultations with the SKDB and NBDB until Canada reached an 
agreement in principle with the Acho Dene Koe First Nation (“ADKFN”) in relation to the 
ongoing comprehensive land claims negotiations between Canada and the ADKFN. This 
ruling recognized that Canada had breached its duty to consult and set aside the 
Minister's decision to postpone consultations.  
In a situation where negotiations take place relating to land subject to overlapping land 
claims, the Supreme Court has provided that these negotiations should be inclusive of 
“other aboriginal nations which have a stake in the territory claimed”, citing the Crown's 
“moral, if not (...) legal, duty to enter into and conduct those negotiations in good 
faith”197. In light of the foregoing case law, it is apparent that the Crown has begun to 
understand the complexities of overlapping claims, but that this “has not prevented the 
Crown from exercising its legislative power to settle treaties in contested areas”198.  
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In 2009, the federal government indicated that its duty to consult is “not necessarily 
triggered as soon as the Crown has knowledge of potentially overlapping territory 
claimed by another aboriginal group (...)”199. This approach is flawed. The consultation 
process should include these groups as soon as they make themselves known, in order to 
avoid future litigation and complexities: “where different First Nations communities have 
competing claims, the result will also be increased complexity to the design of 
consultation processes”200. 
Although much more can be said about the duty to consult, this is not the purpose of our 
thesis. Our hope is that the recent case law will modify the governments’ perception of 
their role when confronted with an overlapping land claim scenario, encouraging them to 
take a more active role in helping Aboriginal groups use mechanisms addressing their 
normative realities to find solutions.  
2.2 Overlapping Claims and Treaty Negotiations: Unequal Treatment of Competing 
Groups 
This section provides a brief overview of three comprehensive land claim negotiations 
which have taken place between Aboriginal groups and governments regarding 
settlement of claims which included issues of overlapping claims. This section will also 
illustrate the deficiencies in government policy by demonstrating that no permanent 
solutions are brought forward by the application of said policies.    
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(a) Concrete Applications of Overlapping Claims 
The following four agreements constitute recent examples of how the signing of an 
agreement or treaty can create important legal and practical consequences for groups 
claiming overlapping territories.    
(i) James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement 
The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (“JBNQA”) and the Northeastern 
Quebec Agreement (“NEQA”) (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “JBNQA”) was 
negotiated and signed in the 1970's and represents the first modern treaty in Canada, 
covering more than 60% of Quebec's territory and settling the land claims of Cree, Inuit 
and Naskapi Aboriginal groups in Quebec. However, the JBNQA does not solely concern 
the Crees, Inuit and Naskapi. The agreement has a tremendous and decisive effect on all 
other existing and unsettled overlapping claims in the JBNQA territory. In fact, section 
2.6 of the JBNQA provides the following:  
“The federal legislation approving, giving effect to and declaring valid the 
Agreement shall extinguish all native claims, rights, title and interests of 
all Indians and all Inuit in and to the Territory and the native claims, 
rights, title and interests of the Inuit of Port Burwell in Canada, whatever 
they may be.”201 
 
The federal legislation in question was passed in 1977 via the James Bay and Northern 
Quebec Native Claims Settlement Act, S.C. 1976-77, c. 32. Section 3(3) of that enactment 
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provides that all Aboriginal claims on the JBNQA territory will be considered as 
extinguished:  
“All native claims, rights, title and interests, whatever they may be, in and 
to the Territory, of all Indians and all Inuit, wherever they may be, are 
hereby extinguished, but nothing in this Act prejudices the rights of such 
persons as Canadian citizens and they shall continue to be entitled to all of 
the rights and benefits of all other citizens as well as those resulting from 
the Indian Act, where applicable, and from other legislation applicable to 
them from time to time.”202 
 
In practice, the combination of these two sections has the effect of extinguishing all 
competing claims on the territory, namely claims made by Innu groups, Innu Nation, 
Atikamekw Nation and some Anicinabek communities, without these groups ever having 
been involved in negotiations relating to the JBNQA. On November 14, 2014, these 
groups announced the creation of the Innu Anicinabek Atikamekw Political Coalition, in 
order to combine their efforts to defend their Aboriginal rights and title, in particular, on 
the JBNQA territory. The chiefs who founded the Coalition have spoken out against the 
extinguishment clause, calling it unconstitutional, illegal and against international 
standards, vowing to “use every means necessary to put an end to this serious 
injustice”203. Chief Bruno Kistabish, of the Abitibiwinni First Nation, explains that he 
believes Aboriginal peoples can come to a solution together:  
“For thousands of years, our people have shared territories without 
borders. Today, we are embarking on a process aimed at settling the 
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sharing of territory and the full recognition of our ancestral rights. We will 
find a satisfactory solution that the governments of Canada and Quebec 
will have to recognize.”204 
It is not the first time that these Aboriginal groups have spoken out against the 1977 
statute, having previously asked the international community for its involvement205. 
(ii) Agreement-in-Principle of General Nature between the First Nations of Mamuitun 
and Nutashkuan, the Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada (“EPOG”) 
In 2004, four Quebec Innu groups206 signed an Agreement-in-Principle referred to in 
French as the Entente de principe d'ordre general (“EPOG”) (better known as the 
“Approche commune” or “Joint Approach”) with the federal and provincial government. 
The EPOG is the last step before a final treaty is to be signed between these groups and 
the federal and provincial governments. However, a portion of the territory covered by 
the EPOG is also claimed by the Huron Nation of Wendake, a separate Aboriginal group 
which claims that its land, the Nionwentsio, was recognized by the government in 1760 
in the context of the Anglo-Huron Treaty of 1760. This treaty was officially recognized 
in 1990 by the Supreme Court of Canada in its ruling in R. v. Sioui207. The Supreme 
Court confirmed the validity of the content of the treaty which assured the Huron 
members the freedom to exercise their religion and customs. This case did not involve a 
territorial claim as such, and therefore did not settle the land issue in a definite manner. 
The Supreme Court held that the rights guaranteed by the treaty could be carried out on 
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the territory frequented by the Hurons at the time of the treaty, as long as the carrying out 
of these rights was not incompatible with the Crown’s use of the territory. However, a 
specifically delineated territory was not defined208.  
This situation concerned the Huron Nation since the final EPOG treaty overlaps on the 
northern portion of the Nionwentsio. The EPOG territory overlaps over 80% of the 
Nionwentsio's northern territory, but the overlap only accounts for 8% of the entire 
EPOG territory. In July of 2004, the Huron Nation wrote to the Minister of Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development to express concern about the impact of the EPOG on their 
territory209. The Minister responded by referring to section 3.4.2 of the EPOG which 
provided that “the status of the south-west part should be determined before the treaty is 
signed” and added that Canada “has a policy of concluding final agreements only if the 
agreement provides that the rights of other First Nations will not be affected”210. In 2008, 
the Grand Chief of the Huron Nation wrote to the Chiefs of the Innu First Nations and 
federal and provincial representatives indicating that the southern portion of the 
Nitassinan overlaps on the ancestral territory of the Huron Nation. The Grand Chief 
asked the parties to refrain from making any decisions on the disputed land211. The 
federal minister answered by indicating that the government “is aware of its duty to 
consult on matters of Aboriginal rights and claims” and that it would “assess the Huron-
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Wendat Nation’s claim on the territory between the Saint-Maurice and Saguenay Rivers 
once it is submitted, in accordance with the Comprehensive Land Claims Policy”212. 
These responses were unsatisfactory for the Huron Nation representatives, and in April 
2009, the Huron Nation chose to institute legal proceedings in Federal Court. The Huron 
Nation asked the Court to suspend the conclusion of a final treaty which would overlap 
the northern portion of the Nionwentsio without the Huron Nation's consent213. It also 
requisitioned the Court to force Canada to respect its constitutional obligations, and to 
obtain an undertaking by Canada to the effect that it agrees to negotiate with the Huron 
Nation regarding an update of the Anglo-Huron Treaty214.   
In 2010, in order to alleviate legal tensions and to better delineate the Huron territory, the 
Court agreed to suspend the hearing in order for the parties to come to an agreeable 
settlement. In 2011, the government of Canada and the Huron Wendat Nation signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding establishing the Discussion Table of the Anglo-Huron 
Treaty of 1760. The provincial government also established a discussion table to this 
effect. The purpose of these discussion tables was to discuss unsolved issues relating to 
the treaty, specifically those related to the overlapping portion of the Nionwentsio 
(northern portion) within the EPOG territory (south-west portion). The discussion tables 
included government representatives with experience in Aboriginal issues and could have 
constituted an interesting exercise in the use of Aboriginal forms of dispute resolution. 
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Over twenty meetings were held from the period of July 2011 to December 2012215.  
Unfortunately, the result from the discussion tables was not as expected by the Huron 
Nation members and the Huron Nation indicated in 2012 that it planned to renew their 
application for judicial review. In 2013, the Department of Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development indicated that it was “ready to support and facilitate the possible 
continuation of discussions” between the Huron-Wendat and the Innu of Mashteuiatsh 
“in order to settle the issues regarding overlapping territory”216. The Huron-Wendat 
nation replied favourably to this offer, but the discussions never took place. Again in 
2013, Canada offered to meet with the representatives of the Innu and Huron nations to 
discuss the consultation process regarding the EPOG. The Grand Chief of the Huron 
Nation put an end to these discussions by indicating that “he felt ‘betrayed’ by 
[Canada’s] decision to not try to obtain a formal mandate to negotiate the renewal of the 
Treaty of 1760 and added that it was difficult not to conclude that Canada’s objective 
when it agreed to join the Discussion Table was to delay or avoid legal proceedings and 
an assessment by the courts of the federal Crown’s conduct, rather than to find real and 
mutually satisfactory solutions”217. On September 25, 2013, the Huron Nation renewed 
their application for judicial review.  
There is also a second overlap resulting from the signing of the EPOG. This overlap is 
between the proposed Nitassinan (Aboriginal territory) belonging to the Innus of 
Pessamit and the territory recognized as belonging to the Crees in the JBNQA. Section 
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3.4.2 of the EPOG provides that the issue must be resolved before the signing of the final 
treaty. However, treaty negotiations have yet to begin, more than ten years after the 
conclusion of the EPOG. Although both parties indicated willingness to negotiate in late 
2013218, the treaty negotiations appear to have stalled during the last decade and do not 
currently seem feasible.  
(iii) New Dawn Agreements 
A third area of contention regarding overlapping claims is along the Quebec-Labrador 
border and within the Labrador region of Newfoundland-and-Labrador. The Innu of 
Labrador, who refer to themselves as Innu Nation, are comprised of two distinct 
communities called Natuashish and Sheshatshiu. In 2011, Innu Nation finalized the 
signing of various agreements with the provincial and federal governments relating to an 
important hydroelectric project in the region. Among these agreements referred to as the 
TshashPetapen Agreements (or “New Dawn” Agreements) is the Land Claim and Self-
Government Agreement-in-Principle (the “Agreement-in-Principle”) setting out rights, 
benefits and limitations for the Labrador Innu communities within specific 
geographically-defined lands. Among these lands is a category of land referred to as the 
“Labrador Innu Lands”, comprised of 5,000 square miles which would be under the 
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administration and control of the Labrador Innu government following the signing of a 
final agreement219.   
The signing of this Agreement-in-Principle caused strong reactions within Aboriginal 
communities who also claim lands covered by the provisions of the Agreement-in-
Principle. In 2013, the Innus of Uashat mak Mani-Utenam, the Innus of Matimekush-Lac 
John, the Innus of Ekuanitshit, the Innus of Unamen Shipu and the Innus of Pakua Shipi 
instituted legal proceedings in Federal Court against the federal government regarding 
the conclusion of this Agreement-in-Principle220. They are asking that their rights in the 
region covered by the Agreement-in-Principle be recognized, that the Agreement-in-
Principle be deemed unconstitutional and illegal, and that an injunction be issued 
preventing the government from entering into a final treaty with Innu Nation and forcing 
them to respect their constitutional obligations towards the Quebec Innu groups. In May 
of 2015, the Federal Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ 
claims since the essence of the action, i.e. the determination of Aboriginal rights and the 
dispute on territory in Newfoundland-and-Labrador, should be heard before the Supreme 
Court of Newfoundland-and-Labrador221. 
(b) Non-Derogation Clauses: “The Easy Way Out” 
A device often used to appease fears in overlapping claim situations is the introduction of 
a non-derogation clause in a final treaty agreement with an Aboriginal group. Non-
                                               
219Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, Backgrounder. Highlights: Land Claims and Self-
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220Instance par représentation, Cour fédérale, T-503-13. 
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derogation clauses have been hailed by some as a “complete answer”222 to the possible 
infringement of competing Aboriginal rights and title in a situation of overlapping 
claims. These clauses essentially provide that a treaty or an agreement with one 
Aboriginal group will not affect the rights (whether treaty rights or Aboriginal rights) of 
another Aboriginal group223. Canadian case law appears to have accepted the use of non-
derogation clauses as acceptable in order to preserve the rights of other Aboriginal 
groups224. 
In Cook v. The Minister of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation225, the Minister's 
position was that non-derogation provisions could be used in order to ensure that a treaty 
would not infringe on the rights of competing overlapping groups. Respectfully, we agree 
with the petitioners who claimed that the non-derogation provisions did not protect their 
rights. In fact, non-derogation provisions raise many difficult issues.   
For instance, several non-derogation provisions, such as those present in this case, entail 
that a group will have to pursue litigation before the courts as the clause may require a 
court determination that their rights, as defined under section 35, are adversely affected 
by a provision of the treaty226 : 
                                               
222Tseshaht First Nation v Huu-ay-aht First Nation, [2007] BCSC 1141, para 25. 
223Mark E.W. East, supra note 162 at 11. 
224Fond du Lac Band v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs) 1992 CanLII 2404 (FC), Paul v. 
Canada, 2002 FCT 615 (CanLII), 2002 FCT 615, 219 F.T.R, and Tremblay v. Pessamit First Nation, 2008 
QCCS 1536 (CanLII), [2008] 4 C.N.L.R. 240) the Court found that the non-derogation provisions of the 
implicated agreements were satisfactory in providing protection to Aboriginal groups who were not named 
parties in the said agreements. 
225Cook v The Minister of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, 2007 BCSC 1722. 
226Moreover, in order to do so, Aboriginal groups must make the demonstration of specific impacts on their 
asserted Aboriginal rights. 
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“In other words, the petitioners say that while their title and rights claim 
may take years to proceed through the complex process of litigating 
aboriginal rights and title in the courts, the subject matter of their 
aboriginal rights may be lost owing to the exercise by the TFN of 
conflicting rights granted to TFN in the meantime.”227 
Justice Garson ultimately ruled that the signing of a final treaty in this case did not cause 
irreparable harm to the petitioners because there was time for the petitioners, British 
Columbia and Canada to engage in consultations before the implementation of the treaty 
in question. She also indicated that the potential infringements on rights and title had not 
been clearly articulated and therefore did not constitute persuasive evidence228.Justice 
Garson did however agree with the petitioner's theory that “the Crown cannot run 
roughshod over one group's potential and claimed aboriginal rights in favour of reaching 
a treaty with another”229.  
Another problem raised by non-derogation clauses is that the protection offered by them 
is often artificial, at best. For instance, in the famous Nisga'a treaty, a neighbouring 
Aboriginal group, the Gitanyow attempted various legal recourses to stop the coming 
into force of the treaty, arguing that the non-derogation provisions would not ensure the 
continued and uninterrupted practice of their traditional activities in the treaty territory. 
In the Huron case, the hereditary chief of the Gitanyow, Glen Williams provided a 
detailed affidavit in which he discusses such non-derogation provisions, explaining that 
they do not protect the rights of the overlapping group:  
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“In conclusion, despite years of vigorously defending the existence and 
exercise of Gitanyow Aboriginal rights and title to its Territory, all at great 
financial an [sic] emotional cost to the Gitanyow people, neither the 
federal or provincial governments have made good on their assurances 
that the singing [sic] of a treaty with another Aboriginal Nation would not 
affect our Aboriginal rights and title. On the contrary, they now hold up to 
the Gitanyow that we have ‘undefined rights and title’ versus the Nisga'a 
having a Treaty. That is, the Nisga'a Treaty trumps Gitanyow rights and 
title in the opinion of government and their agencies.  
 
It is my belief that the Federal Government in its role as fiduciary to 
Aboriginal people should not and cannot conclude agreements with First 
Nations until and unless the overlap issues are resolved. This obligation on 
the part of the Federal Government is an active one, where it must play a 
part in the resolution of the overlap claims. It cannot be passive, as is its 
current policy, by claiming that it is up to the First Nations with 
competing claims to resolve their issues. Nor can it proceed with singing 
[sic] a treaty with only one of the First Nations if the First Nations cannot 
resolve their issues, without the other's claims being resolved. This policy 
results in extreme prejudice to the Nation who has not yet concluded a 
formal agreement.”230 
Similar concerns were expressed by Justice Mactavish in a previously mentioned case 
involving the SKDB, the NBDB and the ADKFN231. In this case, the SKDB and NBDB 
were seeking judicial review of a decision made by the federal government postponing 
consultations with them until the signing of an agreement-in-principle with the ADKFN 
relating to the ongoing comprehensive land claim negotiations between Canada and the 
ADKFN. Justice Mactavish acknowledged that “a non-derogation clause in a final 
agreement between Canada and the ADKFN will offer the SKBD and NBDB some 
measure of protection”232 but she voiced concerns relating to the reality that the SKBD 
and NBDB will have to face once an agreement in principle is signed, stating that the 
                                               
230The Huron-Wendat Nation of Wendake v. The Crown in Right of Canada, Federal Court of Canada, File 
no T-699-09, Affidavit of Glen Williams, June 9, 2009, para 46-50. 
231 See discussion surrounding footnote 193: Sambaa K’e Dene First Nation v. Duncan, supra note 196. 
232Ibid, para 183. 
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“prospect of reconciliation between the Crown and the SKBD and NBDB will inevitably 
be undermined if meaningful discussion with Canada only start after it has reached an 
agreement in principle with the ADKFN”233.  
Non-derogation provisions cannot prevent the very practical consequences of treaties 
which provide the signatory group with many advantages which are not made available 
to the overlapping non-signatory group, such as participation in decision-making 
committees often provided in land claim treaties. As R.G. Christopher Turner explains, 
the lack of a representative voice from the overlapping group can have the practical 
effect of removing rights from the territory in question:   
“Such shared decision-making typically includes a right for a treaty First 
Nation to provide input on the designation of land use zones in contested 
areas, such as for mining or intensive forest harvesting. Indigenous groups 
with overlapping claims, on the other hand, may have different visions and 
objectives for the contested area, such as the designation of a conservation 
zone. Under such a scenario, it is not difficult to imagine that conflicts 
may arise, which essentially pit the explicitly defined treaty rights of one 
group against the unproven and largely undefined aboriginal rights of 
another”234.  
 
Courts often favour non-derogation provisions since they believe that the only other 
option available to them is agreeing to halt the signing of an agreement. This solution is 
regarded as unacceptable, as it equates to the granting of a veto to the contesting group. 
As Justice Williamson indicated in the Gitanyow case, “[w]hile it is reasonable to argue 
overlapping claims must be taken into account in concluding a treaty, plainly s. 35(1) of 
the Constitution Act cannot be said to bestow upon one Aboriginal nation a right to a 
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veto over agreements between the Crown and other first nations”235. A similar opinion 
was expressed in the Huron case236. The judge refused to order that the signing of a final 
agreement be subject to the consent of the opposing group, claiming that this would undo 
many years of fruitful negotiations:  
“It would be unacceptable to allow the applicant to thwart almost 30 years 
of negotiations between the respondent and the interveners and veto the 
conclusion of a treaty for the sole reason that the territory on which it 
claims rights was not completely excluded from the scope of the 
treaty.”237 
In any case, non-derogation clauses generally lead to litigation as Aboriginal groups are 
either forced to have their right recognized by courts or are not satisfied that these 
provisions will protect their rights. As Judith Sayers, former chief of the Hupacasath First 
Nation explained in an interview with The Globe and Mail, it was expected that 
boundary issues would be resolved before agreements were signed with an Aboriginal 
group party to an overlapping claims. However, as Ms. Sayers states, “these governments 
want settlements so bad that they don’t care about overlap, (...) [i]t is first-come, first 
serve.”238  
There is something fundamentally hypocritical about non-derogation provisions when 
considered simultaneously with the requirement of exclusivity set out by the courts and 
government policy. On the one hand, exclusivity requirements indicate that an 
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Aboriginal group must have had exclusive occupation of a territory, while, on the other 
hand, non-derogation provisions explicitly recognize the possibility that this may not 
have been the case. Moreover, these clauses allow the Crown to accept the first request 
for treaty negotiation, even if the land claim set out in this request does not meet the 
criterion of exclusivity established by the Crown. These non-derogation provisions 
maintain the uncertainty regarding jurisdiction over claimed lands and the potential for 
related litigation: “Worse yet, the framework may be seen as potentially coercive, in that 
it may be seen to reward those groups prepared to engage “voluntarily” within the current 
framework”.239 
3. Conclusion of Chapter 
The foregoing overlapping situations constitute a small sample from the hundreds of 
overlapping claims currently present on Canadian territory. Based upon the policies 
developed by the provincial and federal governments, it is apparent that government 
officials rely on one of two strategies when faced with a situation of overlapping claims, 
either allowing competing groups to pursue their dispute before the courts or proceeding 
with the inclusion of a non-derogation provision in the agreement. Neither of these 
approaches has provided lasting solutions to the issue of overlapping claims as they do 
not address the underlying issues presented by the multiplicity of normative orders within 
a same conflict situation: “[i]n order to be sensitive, the court would have to allow for the 
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fact that an entirely different conceptual framework may apply and that they (the 
judiciary) are not capable of knowing or reconciling the differences”240.   
Too much attention is given to the structure which must be used to address overlapping 
claims. Awareness of moral substance rather than strict structure is required to 
successfully address Aboriginal conflicts: “So long as law is premised upon a narrative to 
which its subjects cannot relate, one that refuses to respect their common humanity, then 
it is not “law” in any meaningful sense”241.  Therefore, we must ask ourselves what steps 
must be taken in order to achieve a different narrative.  
                                               
240Mary Ellen Turpel, “Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpretive Monopolies, Cultural 
Differences”, Canadian Human Rights Year Book (1990 1989) 3 at 28. 
241Mark D. Walters, supra note 7, para 478. 
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Chapter 2 - Achieving an Inner Morality in Land Claim Conflicts - An (Alter)Native 
Approach Based on Aboriginal Legal Traditions and Dispute Resolution Practices 
1. Setting the Stage for an (Alter)Native Approach 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the intellectual reasoning supporting our 
contention that Aboriginal legal traditions should be integrated into a conflict resolution 
process which could be used to solve overlapping land claim conflicts, in replacement of 
current policies and judicial approaches being carried out by Canadian governments and 
courts. References will be made to the lack of recognition of Aboriginal legal traditions 
in the legislative process, although this is not the crux of the issue in resolving 
overlapping claims as Western laws do not contain provisions regulating overlapping 
claims. However, a parallel can be drawn here, between the importance of recognizing 
Aboriginal legal traditions in legislation and in an eventual conflict resolution process 
addressing overlapping claims. The second part of this chapter offers a brief overview of 
the characteristics of Aboriginal legal traditions which could be used in conflict 
resolution.  
1.1 Legal Theory 
Our study of case law and current overlapping land claim situations in the previous 
chapter demonstrates that there is a problem with the way overlapping land claims are 
currently being addressed. The past and present approaches to resolving overlapping 
claims have failed all parties. All those involved in this issue, whether judges, politicians, 
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elders or Aboriginal individuals, have expressed dissatisfaction and frustration with the 
way in which progress (or lack thereof) has been made.  
To identify the missing characteristics which would lead to a successful system 
addressing overlapping land claims, we must first ask ourselves why the current 
approach has failed. 
We share the perspective set out by Jean Leclair who explains that the answer to this 
question depends on the manner in which we perceive law itself242. Various legal 
perceptions will provide different answers to this question. In dealing with issues related 
to Aboriginal peoples, the tendency to couch one's position at one end of a theoretical 
spectrum, placing it in its “own self-contained and self-referential universe”243 has 
contributed to the resounding failure of reconciliation between Aboriginal interests and 
non-Aboriginal interests.  
There are those who believe in a liberal approach, arguing that abstract rules, applied 
equally to all, will produce a just solution244 : 
“They will claim, for instance, that a close analysis of the wording of legal 
texts and historical treaties, conjoined with the mobilization of supposedly 
universal a priori abstract legal standards such as the concepts of contract, 
sovereignty or rights, will lead to just interpretations and therefore to just 
remedies.”245 
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However, as Leclair points out, these legal standards and interpretations depend on a 
framework of Western legal traditions - representing one of the main objections of those 
who share in the intellectual posture positioned at the other end of the spectrum, i.e. those 
arguing that there exists an “unbridgeable cultural divide between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous peoples”. As professor Leclair indicates, proponents of this posture believe 
that the intrinsic morality of a Court's decision is “tainted by the inherently imperialistic 
content of Western legal culture”246. They qualify the values of Aboriginal legal orders as 
being more flexible and fluid in comparison to the “artificial quality of State law”247.  
In order to determine a new intellectual posture, situated closer to the center of this 
theoretical spectrum, we must elaborate a theoretical framework which can provide 
insight into a situation opposing different epistemological views. As Bradley Bryan has 
written, “[w]e require new political and legal institutions that will allow divergent ways 
of life to cohere. We need to look for alternative ways to organise two cultures, ways that 
allow for divergent worldviews to subsist without one being subservient to the other - 
that is without one being allodial to the other”248. 
We believe that this insight can be found in Professor Lon L. Fuller's theory of the 
internal morality of law and his conception of law as an “interactional phenomenon”249. 
Professor Fuller attributed the term “eunomics” to the kind of reflection that we propose 
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to partake in: “The science, theory or study of good order and workable social 
arrangements”.  
1.2 Achieving the Inner Morality of Law 
Lon L. Fuller is widely known for his rejections of the positivistic contention of neutral 
morality. Legal positivism is essentially the viewpoint that law becomes law when it has 
been declared as such by the State, free of moral considerations:   
“At its origin, a custom is a rule of conduct which the governed observe 
spontaneously, or not in pursuance of a law set by a political superior. The 
custom is transmuted into positive law, when it is adopted as such by the 
courts of justice, and when the judicial decisions fashioned upon it are 
enforced by the power of the state. But before it is adopted by the courts, 
and clothed with legal sanction, it is merely a rule of positive morality: a 
rule generally observed by the citizens or subjects; but deriving the only 
force, which it can be said to possess, from the general disapprobation 
falling on those who transgress it”250 
 
For those who adhere to a positivistic stance, law is a system of social control, which 
must be vertically implanted251. Discussing positivism, it being a polysemic expression, 
can lead to debate and misunderstanding252. For the purpose of this thesis, we will 
understand “positivism” as that positivism suggested by H.L.A. Hart, holding a vision 
separating law and morality. 
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Hart’s understanding of positivism does include a nuanced approach indicating that the 
“legal” recognition of a rule could depend on the point of view chosen by the person 
conducting the analysis: 
“The case for calling the rule of recognition ‘law’ is that the rule providing 
criteria for the identification of other rules of the system may well be 
thought a defining feature of a legal system, and so itself worth calling 
‘law’; the case for calling it ‘fact’ is that to assert that such a rule exists is 
indeed to make an external statement of an actual fact concerning the 
manner in which the rules of an ‘efficacious’ system are identified. Both 
these aspects claim attention but we cannot do justice to them both by 
choosing one of the labels ‘law’ or ‘fact’. Instead, we need to remember 
that the ultimate rule of recognition may be regarded from two points of 
view: one is expressed in the external statement of fact that the rule exists 
in the actual practice of the system; the other is expressed in the internal 
statements of validity made by those who use it in identifying the law.”253 
However, he does not consider that the morality aspect associated to a certain point of 
view must be fulfilled in order to determine what constitutes law and what does not: 
“There are [...] two dangers between which insistence on this distinction 
will help us to steer: the danger that law and its authority may be dissolved 
in man's conceptions of what law ought to be and the danger that the 
existing law may supplant morality as a final test of conduct and so escape 
criticism.”254 
Fuller rejects the Hartian concept of law255, and believes, rather, that law can only 
survive if a community, together, is engaged, enabling a government which is ordered, 
fair and decent256:  
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“the analytical positivist sees law as a one-way projection of authority, 
emanating from an authorized source and imposing itself on the citizen. It 
does not discern as an essential element in the creation of a legal system 
any tacit cooperation between lawgiver and citizen; the law is seen as 
simply acting on the citizen - morally or immorally, justly or unjustly, as 
the case may be.”257 
For Fuller, a legal theory must insure the comprehension of “the status of legal 
institutions as focal points of collective problem solving and moral striving, modalities 
through which social conduct and decisions become legitimized and norms gain the 
allegiance of citizens”258. In order to do so, he argues, law must be represented “in terms 
of the ideals toward which it aims”259.  
Fuller's morality of law theory embraces a horizontal approach based on reciprocal 
relationships, not only between citizens but also between citizens and those which govern 
them260: “The functioning of a legal system depends upon a cooperative effort - an 
effective and responsible interaction - between lawgiver and subject”261. He believes that 
“the creating of an effective interaction” between lawgiver and citizen is “an essential 
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ingredient of the law itself”262. Fuller further explicates his theory of reciprocity as 
follows:  
“If we accept the view that the central purpose of law is to provide 
baselines for human interaction, it then becomes apparent why the 
existence of enacted law as an effectively functioning system depends 
upon the establishment of stable interactional expectancies between 
lawgiver and subject. On the one hand, the lawgiver must be able to 
anticipate that the citizenry as a whole will accept as law and generally 
observe the body of rules he has promulgated. On the other hand, the legal 
subject must be able to anticipate that government will itself abide by its 
own declared rules when it comes to judge his actions, as in deciding, for 
example, whether he has committed a crime or claims property under a 
valid deed. A gross failure in the realization of either of these anticipations 
- of government toward citizen and of citizen toward government - can 
have the result that the most carefully drafted code will fail to become a 
functioning system of law.”263 
By creating an environment where reciprocity can be expected, Fuller explains that his 
theory will “rescue man from the blind play of chance and [...] put him safely on the road 
to purposeful and creative activity”264. What we can construe from Fuller's inner morality 
is that participation in the legal process is crucial to the success of a functioning system 
of law265. As discussed above, this participation must be measured not only in quantity, 
but also in quality, as it is the “quality of participation allowed by a process aimed at 
formulating a common normative outcome that will determine the internal morality of a 
legal order”266.  
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Law must therefore be understood “as a form of social capital”267. The function of law is 
to be perceived as “a means for facilitating human interaction”268. Fuller argues that legal 
theorists “need to give more attention than they have in the past to the social processes 
from which rules can emerge and become effective as law without receiving the 
imprimatur of any explicitly legislative organ of government”269. Although our thesis 
does not address integrating Aboriginal legal traditions into official Canadian legislation 
specifically, the principles and reflections offered by Fuller's theory and the manner in 
which human interaction is stressed, support our argument that a conflict-resolution 
process addressing overlapping claims must include Aboriginal legal traditions.  
Relying on this parallel to Fuller's theory, we can imagine a theoretical perspective 
allowing us to make use of Aboriginal legal traditions as an answer to overlapping claim 
issues.  
1.3 Canadian Aboriginal Law and the Absence of Inner Morality 
How does Canadian law measure up to Fuller's morality of law requirement? In other 
words, is “Canadian aboriginal law (...) sufficiently grounded in a reciprocal relationship 
of respect between the Canadian state and aboriginal peoples for it to constitute ‘law’ in a 
meaningful sense, rather than mere power or force”270? The answer to this question is 
currently negative. Notwithstanding their diverse traditions, each Aboriginal group has a 
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“common experience” in that “their Indigenous legal traditions are not reflected in 
Canada's multi-juridical state”271. As Mark D. Walters explains, the narrative of 
Canadian Aboriginal law does not achieve Fuller's morality of law requirement:  
“(...); subjugated peoples cannot participate in or identify with the national 
moral narrative that founds legal meaning, and so the power that is 
brought to bear upon them in the form of law is only law in a thin or 
positivist sense.”272 
 
The Aboriginal voice may participate in the dialogue, but “to do so intelligibly, it must 
be subsumed within the existing discourses of political liberalism, nationalism, 
constitutionalism, and sovereignty”273. Historically, the colonization of Aboriginal 
peoples has entailed that their laws and traditions have been regarded as inferior to 
Western laws and have been discarded by Western laws274:  
“It is one of the tragedies of [W]estern history that the culture-specific 
nature of its own systems of law has blinded it to the existence of law in 
other societies. This monocultural myopia, coupled with the economic 
demands of an imperial ethic, has led to a dismissal of other cultural 
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systems as not being ‘legal’ and a subsequent imposition of the Western 
way.”275 
The outright dismissal of the legality of other legal systems removes the legitimacy of the 
Canadian or “dominant” legal system for those whose system has been dismissed. To 
achieve legitimacy, “democratic institutions must rest, ultimately, on a legal foundation. 
That is, they must allow for the participation of, and accountability to, the people, 
through public institutions created under the Constitution”276. A similar argument can be 
made about the legitimacy of judicial institutions and other conflict resolution 
mechanisms. Their legitimacy will depend on their ability to allow for the meaningful 
participation of Aboriginal peoples and for the use of Aboriginal legal concepts and 
understandings in the process of resolving disputes. The current Western legal traditions 
which are being used do not allow for the true participation of Aboriginal peoples since 
they do not recognize their principles and culture within the institutions applying these 
traditions. As John Borrows argues, “Indigenous adjudicative institutions using 
indigenous principles would correct this oversight”277.  
The rule of law crisis plaguing Aboriginal communities explains, in large part, why there 
are so many issues troubling these communities, including the issue of overlapping 
claims:  
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“We have a real crisis in the rule of law in Aboriginal communities. And it 
is not a crisis because Aboriginal peoples don't have the rule of law; it is a 
crisis of legitimacy about the rule of law and Aboriginal communities. If 
Aboriginal peoples were able to start to see themselves and their 
normative values reflected in how they conduct their day-to-day affairs, I 
believe that would go at least some distance to diminishing some of the 
problems that we have. It is not the whole solution, but it is a part of the 
solution.”278 
1.4 Proposing a New Framework 
The purpose of this thesis is not to provide a framework which could guarantee 
reciprocal relationships of respect in every field of law. We only intend to address the 
creation of such a reciprocal relationship in the case of conflict resolution mechanisms 
which could address the issue of overlapping land claims in Canada. In order to do so, 
and since these disputes involve Aboriginal claimants, we must identify Aboriginal 
notions of the rule of law “that produce the sort of internal morality of law contemplated 
by Fuller - a spirit of legality that respects the common humanity of people”279.  
Currently, there is a lack of consideration of Aboriginal epistemology in the conflict 
resolution process in Canadian overlapping claim situations. If Aboriginal legal traditions 
were integrated into the legal and political approach to solving overlapping land claims, 
this would not only meet the demands of all the Aboriginal claimants involved, but it 
would also ground the Canadian and Aboriginal relationship in a reciprocal relationship 
based on respect, rather than a “mere exercise of power”280, therefore meeting elements 
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of internal morality. This, by ricochet, would also strengthen the legitimacy of the 
Canadian legal order as a whole. 
Aboriginal legal traditions must not merely be integrated and translated into existing 
Western legal concepts, as suggested by the Supreme Court of Canada. It is our opinion 
that Aboriginal legal traditions must be considered along with, rather than within 
Western legal traditions, and as integral to Canada's legal foundation, instead of 
integrated and amalgamated to the current legal foundation281. This is particularly so in 
overlapping claims' cases.  
As Borrows explains, “[a]ffirming Indigenous legal traditions would expand and improve 
the rule of law in the country, and benefit Aboriginal peoples and our society as a 
whole”282. A dispute resolution system, in a situation of overlapping claims concerning 
primarily two or more Aboriginal parties, which would allow said Aboriginal parties to 
interact according to their own legal principles could constitute the uniting point between 
legitimacy and legality.  
The recognition of Aboriginal legal traditions with regard to dispute resolution 
mechanisms for overlapping claims must be undertaken under a renewed epistemological 
lens, integrating “indigenous intellectual methodologies that express indigenous legal 
concepts”283 in order to fully consider the Aboriginal dispute resolution system as “an 
active system that contains its own values, norms, uses, standards, criteria and principles 
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for the use of such knowledge”284. In the case of overlapping claims, such an approach 
“may result in a range of outcomes much more sophisticated, and appropriate, than the 
narrow and limited approach of simply drawing a line on a map”285. 
However, more must be done than the recognition of Aboriginal legal traditions. There is 
a need for a serious internal reflection on the part of the Supreme Court regarding the 
understanding of the exclusivity requirement and the refusal of the Crown to honour such 
requirement. Two separate but equally important conclusions should be drawn from this 
reflection.  
As we have seen above, the exclusivity requirement is interpreted without the 
consideration of the underlying normative authority which may have existed for other 
groups using the same territory. For instance, if group A uses a tract of land which is also 
used by group B, and if group A petitions the Court for a declaration of Aboriginal title, 
group B could be faced with a situation where its pre-existing rights on the land are 
jeopardized. These rights on overlapping lands must survive the determination of 
Aboriginal title and must not be ignored. In order to do so, as we have discussed in 
Chapter 1, the Court should interpret these rights as a source of normative authority over 
the management of the land. For instance, this theory could be applicable in the case of 
shared lands for which only a section overlap, creating buffer zones on which both 
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groups could hold joint Aboriginal title; recognizing that exclusivity need not exclude all 
other Aboriginal groups:  
“Preference for exclusivity (e.g., a resolution to “the overlap problem”) 
reproduces the hegemonic order of mutually exclusive property (Egan 
2013; Thom 2014). In one sense overlapping claims can be understood as 
a (perhaps unintentional) challenge to the taken-for-granted spatial 
practice of representing territories as discretely bounded and exclusive.”286 
Moreover, the Supreme Court must take note of the dubious (to say the least) manner in 
which the Crown applies the exclusivity requirement in negotiations with Aboriginal 
groups. As we have seen, by agreeing to sign a treaty over land which it is entirely aware 
is subject to overlapping land claims, the Crown is implicitly denying any legitimacy to 
these overlapping claims even though, historically, other Aboriginal groups have shared 
the territory’s resources. Now, even though a group may achieve a certain demonstration 
of exclusivity, if, in fact, another group claims an overlap on the same portion of land, 
can exclusivity really be demonstrated? Hence our indication that the Crown uses a 
“modified” approach to exclusivity, one that is not in harmony with either government 
policy or judicial decisions. It is our opinion that non-derogation provisions are not an 
acceptable solution as they do not offer protection of section 35 rights. As such, and at 
the very least, one could claim that the Crown is not acting, as it should, in an honourable 
fashion. The Supreme Court must recognize that the Crown’s methods contradict the 
exclusivity requirement it developed and that such methods deny the possibility of joint 
title between two groups287.  
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In undertaking both these actions, the Court must recognize that many Aboriginal groups 
can hold rights on a given territory. As Turner and Fondahl explain, it is not only 
physical tracts of land which overlap which each other, but also the criteria employed by 
Aboriginal groups in order to define these lands288. The meaning of traditional territory 
can be interpreted in a host of ways, prompting difficulty in knowing whether the claim 
to this territory if based on “exclusivity, shared exclusivity, or other markers of 
distinction such as language, historic land use and occupancy, contemporary land use and 
occupancy and so on”289. 
The Court must engage all groups equally by requiring that the Crown consult with all 
Aboriginal groups involved with a particular tract of land and by legitimizing the fact 
that these groups are legally and morally entitled to put in place institutions to address 
their overlapping claims amongst themselves, allowing their respective criteria for 
defining traditional territory to interact. In doing so, the Crown would not only fulfill its 
constitutional duty to consult; it would substantially modify the moral narrative by 
trading a purely Western-centric legal understanding of land “control” for one that, 
without excluding Western notions, would give ample space to the appropriate legal and 
cultural references of each Aboriginal group involved.  
What we are suggesting is eloquently explained by Diana Lowe and Jonathan H. 
Davidson as follows: “a multi-option dispute resolution system that enables our 
contemporary legal system to recognize, incorporate, and defer to culturally appropriate 
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dispute resolution”290. As will be explained in the final section of Chapter 2, we believe 
that such a dispute resolution system addressing overlapping claims and employing 
Aboriginal legal traditions can exist within the framework of Canadian law.  
2. Defining a Conflict-Resolution Process Based in Internal Morality 
John Borrows describes Aboriginal legal traditions as originating in “the political, 
economic, spiritual and social values expressed through the teachings and behaviour of 
knowledgeable and respected individuals and elders”291. Aboriginal legal traditions are at 
the center of Aboriginal culture, identity, languages, institutions, and relationships with 
land and resources292. Historically, they governed the relations within nations in addition 
to providing a set of rules in order to maintain a peaceful coexistence with other 
nations293. In order to achieve a successful discussion surrounding the resolution of 
overlapping claims, these traditions must be identified and included in the normative 
framework employed to address such claims.  
The first part of this section will provide a brief definition of the term “legal tradition” 
used throughout this thesis in order to situate the reader. The second part of the section 
will offer certain Aboriginal perspectives on key elements which may help in unlocking 
the solution to addressing overlapping claims within a legitimate and efficient process.  
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2.1 Defining an Aboriginal Legal Tradition Using the Notion of Chthonic Traditions 
Defining an Aboriginal legal tradition is not a simple task. Entire theses have been 
devoted to this feat. For the purpose of this thesis, we will use the work of author 
H. Patrick Glenn, more specifically his book Legal Traditions of the World in which he 
provides a definition of a “chthonic legal tradition”294. Before providing a definition of a 
chtonic legal tradition, let us look at the meaning of tradition and, more specifically the 
meaning of “legal tradition”.  
The word tradition is associated to the passage of time or to a “pastness”295. As a 
tradition ages in time, its fragility decreases and its support increases296. A tradition must 
further be “continuously transmitted, in a particular social context, in order for it to be of 
current relevance”297. The continuity of tradition distinguishes it from law in the strict 
sense. For instance, under a positivist understanding of law, a law can move from non-
existent to existent by a simple act of sanction, an act which does not require pastness or 
continuity. 
A tradition is composed of different information as it evolves through a generation’s 
interpretation298. This causes Glenn to conclude that “all traditions are undefinable or 
incomplete”299. Thinking of tradition in this manner provokes questions of stability and 
fragility. As Glenn explains, perceiving a tradition as received information entails 
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elements of diversity and change, but “[i]t also bears within itself the seeds of corruption, 
the various forms of human frailty which would convert it to an instrument of perverse 
and personal ends. All this is the world within, the risks and perils in the internal life of a 
tradition”300. 
The question of what is understood by a “legal tradition” remains. Legal traditions have 
the characteristic of being operative over time301. They present a normative function, 
being composed of information which is normative in nature. Glenn offers the following 
definition: “A legal tradition is thus inclusive of a great deal of normative information 
that may be gathered or captured over a very long period of time”302. 
It is crucial to this thesis that our concept of “law” be perceived as tradition-based as it 
allows the possibility of conciliating Aboriginal laws and Western laws303. As Glenn 
explains, a concept of legal tradition “provides the conceptual and conciliatory devices 
necessary for the peaceful coexistence of different ideas and peoples”304. Legal traditions 
evolve together; communicate with each other and can each recognize normativity 
attached to the rules and principles which they are composed of: “tradition is compatible 
with dialogue, and this is the case for national legal traditions as well as non-national 
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legal traditions. The concept of a legal tradition allows for normative engagement, as 
opposed to hierarchical dominance”305. 
Glenn proposes a “multivalent logic” in order to accept that legal traditions can interact 
and are not mutually exclusive. This conciliatory method must be employed by the courts 
in order to accept that both Aboriginal legal traditions and Western legal traditions 
interact while each retain their normative function. Moreover, this logic must also be 
adopted by the Aboriginal groups themselves when considering a solution to their 
overlapping claims, in order to recognize that a certain area of land can be subject to 
multiple normative rights. 
In the case of Aboriginal peoples, Glenn attaches the term “chthonic” to their legal 
traditions. Chthonic designates close harmony with the earth. Describing a legal tradition 
as chthonic is an “attempt to see the tradition from within itself, as opposed to imposed 
criteria”306.  
Glenn explains that a chthonic legal tradition has no point of origin. Such a tradition 
“simply emerged, as experience grew and orality and memory did their work. Since all 
people of the earth are descended from people who were chthonic, all other traditions 
have emerged in contrast to chthonic tradition”307. He describes the most obvious feature 
of a chthonic tradition as being its orality308. Although this may appear, at first glance, to 
be an unreliable source of information, one can be comforted by the fact that these legal 
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traditions have been preserved for a large part of humanity309. Moreover, as the chthonic 
legal traditions have not been written down, they have not been influenced by what 
Glenn refers to as “large, ongoing commentaries” written by scribes who themselves 
became a source of law310.  
Chthonic legal traditions are composed of a fundamental core, “the sacred character of 
the world”, which cannot be changed, as it would remove the chthonic characteristic 
from the tradition311. However, this does not mean that chthonic legal traditions are 
immutable or frozen in time312. In fact, Glenn explains that because of the influence of 
Western legal traditions, there is no such thing as a pure chthonic tradition in today's 
world313. Chthonic traditions can exchange information with other traditions because of 
their open character, making the content of the tradition most significant: “Yet the 
continuing existence of chthonic tradition indicates that openness and vulnerability are 
not the dominant criteria in the ongoing life of a tradition. Much more would appear to 
depend on what the tradition says”314. 
Some other common characteristics of chthonic or Aboriginal legal traditions include the 
following:  
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“the importance of custom, the absence of coercive institutions, the liberty 
of the individual, the solidarity of communities, the integration of legal, 
moral, and spiritual values, the central role of oral tradition, and finally, 
the individual quest for that state of mind in which community definitions 
of duty and responsibility were appreciated and internalized.”315 
However, despite these common elements, it is important to remember that Aboriginal 
legal traditions vary widely amongst groups throughout Canada as do their traditional 
dispute resolution techniques.  
For instance, the following example from Rupert Ross provides an amusing example of 
the cultural differences between Mohawk and Crees: 
“The Mohawk people, who had been agricultural for many centuries, long 
before Europeans arrived in this land, had of course, much more by the 
way of food and they developed a custom of setting out much more food 
than anybody could possibly hope to eat. Any (sic) by that they wish to 
show their generosity and their respect for their guests. The Cree people 
that came were from a different setting and it was a setting where there 
wasn't that much plenty and they had developed the opposite custom. That 
is you eat everything that is put in front of you to show respect for the 
person who is giving it to you. As the feast progressed you can imagine 
the difficulty. The Cree kept eating and eating and eating and thinking 
these guys are out to poison us... The Mohawk kept running back to the 
kitchen for more food saying ‘who are these guys trying to prove that we 
don't have enough food to go around’.”316 
As Ross explains, this story illustrates “the difficulty we have of seeing through our own 
rules” and “seeing accurately through the rules of other people”317.  
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Together, chthonic legal traditions comprise what can be referred to as chthonic law. 
Glenn describes chthonic law as being an informal “repertoire” in which “all, or most 
share and in which all, or most, may participate”318. He offers the following reflection 
when defining the expression chthonic law:  
“Since there are no (well, few) formally designated actors in chthonic law 
there is no one whose activity can readily be designated as law. (...) So the 
law that we know is in there, in the chthonic tradition, is all mixed up with 
other things - how to cook, how to catch rabbits and deer, how to behave 
to one's family (in a very large sense), how to be honourable. We can't be 
too precise about this. It just doesn't matter. If we take law simply as some 
sort of social glue, among others and of whatever composition, chthonic 
peoples have it. If pressed, they can produce it, and even convince 
supreme courts of it, but there is something not quite chthonic in the 
process. Chthonic law is thus inextricably woven with all the beliefs of 
chthonic and indigenous peoples and is inevitably, and profoundly, 
infused with all those other beliefs.”319 
Chthonic law is therefore linked to chthonic tradition. It is a flexible law which allows 
many different forms of social organization and which commands respect of the natural 
world320.  
The natural world is not, however, the only source of law within Aboriginal 
communities. John Borrows has identified five main sources of Aboriginal law: (1) 
sacred law, as stemming from the Creator or creation stories321, (2) natural law, 
stemming from observations of the physical world based on “how the earth maintains 
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functions that benefit us and all other beings”322, (3) deliberative, stemming from 
discussion, persuasion and deliberation323, (4) positivistic law, stemming from the 
“proclamations, rules, regulations, codes, teachings, and axioms that are regarded as 
binding or regulating people's behaviour”324 and finally (5) customary law. Customary 
law is described by Borrows as the “label” that would be given by those who do not 
understand the complexities of Aboriginal societies325. He defines customary law as 
“those practices developed through repetitive patterns of social interaction that are 
accepted as binding on those who participate in them”326. Custom is a source of law in 
other legal systems as well, such as civil, common and international legal systems.  
Somme common characteristics of Aboriginal law include the fact that this law was often 
“non-prescriptive, non-adversarial and non-punitive”327 and characterized by values 
which promote “respect, restoration and consensus and are closely connected to the land, 
the Creator and the community”328. This last element, connection to the land, is crucial to 
an understanding of Aboriginal culture and Aboriginal morality. The next section of this 
chapter will address this aspect of land connectivity and its impact on the Aboriginal 
perspective of exclusive land ownership and requirement to demonstrate exclusive 
occupation as determined by Canadian case law and policy, for this is a major hurdle in 
the current conflict resolution approach with regard to overlapping claims.  
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2.2 Aboriginal Perspective on Key Elements for Overlapping Claims Resolution 
(a) Land 
The relationship between Aboriginal people and the land is without a doubt the most 
significant component of the Aboriginal identity329 : “[w]hile there are many and diverse 
Aboriginal cultures, in all of them, the land has a place almost beyond the comprehension 
of a European-trained mind, which generally speaking, deals with land as an economic 
commodity”330. However, as we will now see, although land plays an existential role in 
Aboriginal legal universes, the idea that Aboriginal peoples were proto-communists 
sharing the land in an undiscriminating fashion, they being ignorant of frontiers, is not 
supported by historical evidence. Aboriginal Nations recognized the existence of 
frontiers, but the latter were more porous than exclusive. 
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples provides the following explanation on the 
reality of the land relationship for Aboriginal peoples:  
“Aboriginal people have told us of their special relationship to the land 
and its resources. This relationship, they say, is both spiritual and material, 
not only one of livelihood, but of community and indeed of the continuity 
of their cultures and societies. 
 
Many Aboriginal languages have a term that can be translated as 'land'. 
Thus, the Cree, the Innu and the Montagnais say aski; Dene, digeh; the 
Ojibwa and Odawa, aki. To Aboriginal people, land has a broad meaning 
(...) To Aboriginal people, land is not simply the basis of livelihood but of 
life and must be treated as such.  
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The way people have related to and lived on the land (and in many cases 
continue to) also forms the basis of society, nationhood, governance and 
community. Land touches every aspect of life: conceptual and spiritual 
views; securing food, shelter and clothing; cycles of economic activities 
including the division of labour; forms of social organization such as 
recreational and ceremonial events; and systems of governance and 
management.”331 
 
The Aboriginal relationship with land is discussed at length by authors Henderson, 
Benson and Findlay in their book Aboriginal tenure in Canada. They explain that the 
Aboriginal order is based on “the law of belonging to an ecological space”332. The 
following excerpt is cited as constituting a unifying vision of land: 
“We are the land. To the best of my understanding, that is the 
fundamental idea embodied in Native American life and culture... More 
than remembered, the earth is the mind of the people as we are the 
mind of the earth. The land is not really the place (separate from 
ourselves) where we act out the drama of our isolate destinies. (...) It is 
not the ever-present ‘Other’ which supplies us with a sense of “I’. It is 
rather a part of our being, dynamic, significant, real. It is ourselves, in 
as real a sense as such notion as ‘ego, libido’ or social network, in a 
sense more real than any conceptualization or abstraction about the 
nature of human being can ever be (...) The Earth is, in a very real 
sense, the same as ourself (or selves).”333 
The authors explain that an Aboriginal vision of land rests on an “ecological 
proprietarian order”334, that is, that land is not a commodity but rather a “shared and 
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sacred ecological space”335. As the authors explain, “the Aboriginal law manifests many 
different visions of land tenure derived from the unifying principle and ecological 
proprietarian order”336. Indeed, Aboriginal groups each possess their own customs, 
practices and knowledge which influence their particular relationship with land.  
The following quote from Aimée Craft's book demonstrates the significance and central 
role that the relationship with the land played in the lives of Anishinabe people:  
“Through the high places and low, Kitchi-Manitou shows us, speaks to 
us. Our ancestors watched and listened. The land was their book. The 
land has given us our understandings, beliefs, perceptions, laws, 
customs. It has bent and shaped our notions of human nature, conduct 
and the Great Laws. And our ancestors tried to abide by those laws. 
The land has given us everything.”337 
The relationship with the land has an undeniable influence on the consideration of land as 
a commodity. For instance, the Cree system of property has been described as 
functioning according to three legitimating principles338. The first principle is that a 
household has primary rights on the products of its own labour, such as the objects it 
creates or the animals which have been hunted339. The second principle which balances 
the first is in favour of the collectivity, restraining any need for greed: “no household 
may use, restrict or accumulate resources and products in ways prejudicial to the interests 
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of others”340. The third and final principle provides a guarantee of household rights and 
collective rights, in the form of power restrictions on territory stewards: “this is the 
principle that ungarnered resources, 'the land', cannot be alienated for the private benefit 
of any privileged individual or sector of the community”341. What these principles tell us 
is that the Cree, not unlike other Aboriginal groups, do not necessarily perceive 
exclusivity in the same manner that most Western societies do.  
An important perspective on this topic is the one brought forward by Sylvie Vincent who 
discusses the Quebec Algonquian's relationship to the land regarding boundaries and 
overlaps342. Based on her research, she is able to confirm the existence of historical 
“border crossings” at the limit of an Aboriginal group's territory: 
“Ces quelques informations permettent de dire qu'il existait au XVIIe 
siècle un principe de géopolitique et d'économie fondamental et accepté 
par tous selon lequel, comme l'écrit Bruce Trigger, nul n'avait le droit de 
circuler sans autorisation sur le territoire d'autrui. Encore fallait-il que 
chacun sache quelles étaient les frontières de son propre territoire et de 
celui de son voisin. Ce qui m'amène à conclure qu'aux premières heures 
du contact, et probablement bien avant, les nations du nord-est de 
l'Amérique du Nord convenaient entre elles des limites de leurs territoires 
et veillaient à ce qu'elles soient respectées. Ces limites étaient reconnues 
par chacune des nations et connues des Français.”343 
She discusses the existence of traditional limits and, in some cases, trespass laws, among 
the Algonquians, Innus, Naskapis and Cree. For instance, when discussing the Naskapis, 
she quotes anthropologist Eleanor Leacock who indicates that: “the important fact is that 
                                               
340Ibid. 
341Ibid. 
342Sylvie Vincent, “Chevauchements” territoriaux : ou comment l’ignorance du droit coutumier 
algonquien permet de créer de faux problèmes. Unpublished manuscript quoted with the permission of the 
author. 
343Ibid at 6. 
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traditional limits did exist”344. When discussing the Algonquian territorial limits, Vincent 
provides insights into what these limits represented in application. She indicates that a 
territory limit can be considered as open, in that, if a family was unable to find food on 
its own territory and was in critical need, it could use a neighbouring territory to hunt or 
fish345. However, as we have seen, this willingness to share does not mean that territorial 
limits did not exist or that Aboriginal groups or families were ready to accept overlaps346. 
The willingness to share must also be quantified; where an Aboriginal family could 
accept that another family hunt and gather a small amount of plants or animals on their 
territory, they would most certainly refuse that family if they settled long-term on their 
territory without authorization347.  
If these territorial limits did indeed exist and were recognized by Aboriginal groups, and 
if Aboriginal groups lived by their legal orders which regulated land use and resource 
exploitation without referring to the concept of overlapping claims348, why are we now 
confronted to the issue of overlaps? 
(b) Exclusivity 
Author Harold Johnson offers an interesting standpoint on one of the fundamental 
differences between an Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal perspective on exclusivity. 
                                               
344Ibid at 10. 
345Ibid at 16. 
346Ibid. Quite to the contrary, as Aboriginal groups do not hesitate to petition the courts in order to avoid 
overlaps on their territory. Just recently, in June 2015, three Algonquian First Nations declared that they 
are contemplating court action in order to stop the Algonquian of Ontario's treaty negotiations.  
347Ibid at 17. 
348Ibid at 18. Vincent quotes Paul Charest who finds that : “il n'est jamais directement question de 
chevauchement dans les données historiques qui ont été exposées”. 
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Speaking from a Cree perspective, he states that Aboriginal law cannot “abide the 
subjugation of the many by the few”349. Johnson's argument is largely based on the 
dichotomy between a Western liberal view of the individual and the Aboriginal view of 
the collective. Johnson rejects the western notion of property which he qualifies as sterile 
and devoid of human connection350. He also argues that entirely exclusive control and the 
exploitation of certain portions of a territory are not consistent with the Aboriginal 
agreement to share:  
“the artificial shortages that seem essential to your social organization 
are contrary to our law, which mandates that everyone should have 
equal access to the gifts and generosity of the Creator and our Mother 
the Earth (...) It is only because of the laws of property, and the fact 
that property can be held by artificial entities that create shortages for 
profit, that people in this territory go hungry, or do not own their own 
homes.”351 
 
As discussed in section 1.2(b) of Chapter 1, Chief Augustine of the Mi'kmaq Nation 
provided lengthy description of the Aboriginal perspective on land tenure and use. He is 
quoted repeatedly as indicating that there is no term in Mi'kmaq language which stands 
for ownership of property as it is understood today. As for the existence of overlapping 
claims between territories, Chief Augustine eloquently explains his perspective as 
follows:  
“(...) in our philosophical understanding of our world, there was no 
proprietary ownership of territory in our regions, that everybody had the 
freedom to traverse through the land quite freely, as long as they did not 
interrupt the way of life of the other group. (...) 
                                               
349Harold Johnson, Two families: treaties and government (Saskatoon: Purich Pub, 2007) at 45. 
350Ibid at 64. 
351Ibid at 45–47. 
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So the lines are very, very fluid and they are not very, very distinguishably 
[sic] this is the line that divides one district to another [sic] There would 
be [sic] seem to be quite a wide buffer zone in between these two areas 
where individuals from either district would be able to camp in those 
areas, as long as they were not causing problems for those that were 
within that area.”352 
The predominant non-Aboriginal approach to resolving overlapping land claims is 
simple: identify a boundary between the territory of one nation and the other353. This 
understanding has been referred to as a “common law and Eurocentric concept”354 of the 
overlapping land claims issue. As Chief Augustine explains, the Mi'kmaq did not abide 
by these traditions. Aboriginal representatives have also come forward to voice their 
disagreement with Western methods. For instance, the Chiefs of British Columbia have 
indicated that “First Nations did not historically manage complex interrelations through 
clarification and adoption of borders on a map. Rather, this was done through a range of 
mechanisms”355.  
2.3 Exploring the Notion of Boundaries in Overlapping Land Claims 
(a) Exclusivity as a Political Tool to Control Land Claims 
As seen in Chapter 1, by introducing the notion of exclusivity into land tenure, Canadian 
courts and Canadian policy artificially modified the way in which Aboriginal peoples 
traditionally considered land use and land ownership: 
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“All of the state mechanisms promote and extend the language of 
exclusivity, boundedness, statehood and private property onto indigenous 
relationships to land. They work to maximize the certainty and 
effectiveness of state jurisdictions and systems of property, enabling the 
development of land, resources, and community.”356 
 
As researcher Nadasdy explains, the land claims process is not a mechanism “simply 
formalizing jurisdictional boundaries among pre-existing First Nation polities”357, it is in 
fact a mechanism responsible for the creation of “legal and administrative systems that 
bring those polities into being”358.  
The exclusivity requirement in the land claims process is also used by the federal 
government in order to disqualify claims when they are faced with overlaps, claiming 
that these overlaps remove the exclusive aspect of a land claim. The government is 
therefore creating tense situations between Aboriginal groups, for its sole benefit: 
“Les processus canadiens de revendication foncière exigent des 
communautés autochtones qu'elles représentent leurs territoires avec des 
lignes de frontières nettes, et lorsque les plans territoriaux qui en résultent 
montrent des chevauchements entre communautés voisines l'État nie avoir 
des obligations envers des requérants dont la territorialité complexe ne 
peut pourtant pas se traduire adéquatement par l'abstraction d'une simple 
ligne.”359 
 
Sylvie Vincent illustrates this argument by using two of our previously discussed 
overlapping examples (see section 2.2(a) of Chapter 1) in order to demonstrate that the 
                                               
356Brian Thom, supra note 4 at 17. 
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358Ibid. 
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notion of overlapping claims is a product of government policy360. The first example she 
uses is that of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement which unilaterally 
extinguished all Aboriginal rights on the treaty territory, regardless of the rights-holders. 
As she explains, although these Aboriginal groups could have come to an agreement in 
1975, they are now stuck with a problem entirely created by decisions based on laws 
which do not correspond to their own and which are now imposed upon them361, creating 
frustrating situations for these groups:  
“La frustration des Innus, qui se sentent dépossédés d'une partie de leur 
territoire, et sans doute le malaise de certains Cris viennent d'une décision 
que l'on peut dire colonialiste prise par des gouvernements qui se sont 
octroyé le droit de dessiner de façon unilatérale les territoires des nations 
autochtones et qui, ce faisant, ont créé cette zone problématique dite ‘de 
chevauchement’.”362 
The second example she uses is the overlap between Innu groups in Quebec. In 1975, the 
nine Innu (montagnais) communities of Quebec and three Attikamekw communities of 
Quebec joined together by creating the Conseil Atikamekw Montagnais (“CAM”) to 
better negotiate their land claims. In 1979, the CAM submitted a map representing its 
global land claim to the government of Canada and Quebec. However, the government 
required that each group within the CAM provide limits for each of their respective 
territory. These limits do not necessarily represent the reality of Innu land use and 
constitute rather a political tool for band councils in their negotiation with government 
representatives363. In 1994, the CAM broke apart but the previously defined limits have 
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been carried on in negotiations and have created overlapping claims where they could 
have previously been avoided.  
As we have seen, federal and provincial policies ask that Aboriginal groups come to an 
agreement on their overlapping claims before negotiations for a treaty can proceed. 
Therefore, the government is essentially asking Aboriginal groups to solve the problems 
that it has created by ignoring Aboriginal laws and legal traditions364. In essence, the 
Canadian government is requiring that Aboriginal groups create an artificial truth for 
reasons based on practicality, while ignoring the actual state of Aboriginal land 
ownership and exclusivity. Moreover, this requirement can also increase the tension 
between two Aboriginal groups who had previous disagreements about land sharing but 
coped with them in their own manner: “All too often the state's expectations that 
indigenous communities should delineate exclusive territories have exacerbated 
preexisting tensions in overlapping territorial relationships, or created new ones”365.  
Generally speaking, the common law methods have failed because they have not 
considered the context in which they are being employed. Dispute resolution methods 
based on liberal concepts devoid of Aboriginal epistemological considerations cannot be 
successful:  
“Il serait assez naïf de croire que les techniques, méthodes et références 
utilisées pour régler des différends territoriaux entre États pourraient être 
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d’un bon secours pour résoudre la question des territoires chevauchants, 
revendiqués par les communautés autochtones. ”366 
 
Aboriginal traditions are characterized by complex relationships with the land which, we 
believe367, cannot be fully comprehended by Western law:  
“the actual complexity of kin-based territorial organization is difficult to 
represent cartographically. (...) Consequently, the complex nature of 
contemporary indigenous territoriality is poorly served by the current 
practice of drawing contiguous territories marked by singular, ‘exclusive’ 
boundary lines.”368 
(b) Aboriginal Perspectives on Boundary Framework 
It is undeniable that boundary lines did indeed exist between most Aboriginal groups, 
certainly between those who lived in close proximity to others. The purpose of this thesis 
is not to map out the boundary lines of a specific group, but rather to suggest a 
mechanism which would allow groups to conciliate these boundary lines within a 
framework representing their legal culture. However, based on the available literature 
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368Brian Thom, supra note 4 at 19. 
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and the current overlapping negotiations and agreements which have taken place between 
Aboriginal groups, we can hypothesize on possible outcomes of said framework. 
Aboriginal groups did conceptualize boundaries and access to territory granted by 
permission. For instance, in 1637, Father Paul Le Jeune, a Jesuit, describes the 
Montagnais in Quebec as exacting permission before passing on their territory, failing 
which canoes could be broken and dangers of war were provoked369. Vincent affirms that 
during the 17th century, there was an economic and geopolitical system amongst 
Aboriginal groups in North-East North America which was accepted by all and which 
provided that no party could circulate on another’s territory without first obtaining 
permission370. She concludes that the Aboriginal groups were aware of each other’s 
territories and respected them371. 
As Vincent and Brian Thom explain throughout their work, Aboriginal groups had their 
own understanding of exclusivity which was not represented by a single boundary line: 
“Typical ethnographic mapping of indigenous lands leads to the 
production of territorial boundaries to advance claims to land and resource 
rights. These boundaries, and the indigenous social groups they attempt to 
represent, often conform to protocols familiar to the state institutions with 
which indigenous people are engaging. They tend not to represent a 
phenomenologically informed view of indigenous relationships to land 
and formulations of community. There is an inherent tension in ‘counter-
mapping’ of this sort. The very maps that indigenous people hope will 
reconcile their claims with the jurisdiction and property claims of the state 
may in fact subvert indigenous notions of territory and boundaries.”372 
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[emphasis added]  
As Thom explains above, not only is the single boundary line inadequate to 
cartographically represent Aboriginal understandings of territory, jurisdiction and 
property, but it also adds to the emergence of overlap between groups by implementing 
the idea of an “ethno-territorial” identity373. In order to counteract such implications, 
Aboriginal groups must refocus the discussion around their own understanding of 
territory, exclusivity and sharing, as the case may be: 
“Cela signifie, à mon avis, que la société coloniale et les gouvernements 
qu’elle se donne vont devoir accepter de voir qu’ils ont forgé de toutes 
pièces nombre de problèmes comme celui des soi-disant 
‘chevauchements’ et que rien ne pourra les régler sans la connaissance et 
la reconnaissance du droit coutumier propre à chacune des Premières 
Nations. Cela nécessite aussi, de la part des Premières Nations, la 
conviction que leurs droits coutumiers offrent des pistes de solution qui, 
dans certaines situations, pourraient être non seulement valables 
aujourd’hui mais aussi meilleures que le recours au droit occidental.”374 
 
[emphasis added]  
Considering this reality, we must ask ourselves why we would attempt to define 
Aboriginal territory by using Western references of exclusive occupation. Must we stick 
with the concept of exclusive occupation but water it down to the point that it no longer 
resembles anything exclusive375? Why subject the Western concept to this alteration at 
all? We submit that resolving overlap issues should be undertaken by utilizing a dispute 
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resolution process which recognizes and operates according to Aboriginal laws and legal 
traditions, referencing their understanding of exclusivity376. 
It is hard to conceptualize what a map representing Aboriginal legal traditions of 
exclusivity and land-sharing would look like. In certain cases, boundaries might include 
complex notions such as “kin, travel, descent and sharing”, rendering these boundaries 
permeable377. Author Tim Ingold describes such boundaries as “more like sign posts than 
fences, comprising part of a system of practical communication rather than social 
control”378. 
Another interesting suggestion is provided by Brian Thom who indicates that lines could 
radiate from the residence of an individual and connect to ancestral land areas, creating a 
field of “stars radiating out to a multitude of locations throughout a broad landscape of 
corporate groups of bilaterally related kin”379. In this case, representation of kin relations 
is of crucial importance as these relationships comprise an essential portion of Coast 
Salish culture.  
In other cases, groups may decide to designate zones with different territorial 
applications. Authors Henri Dorion and Jean-Paul Lacasse provide specific information 
about the conception of territory within Quebec Innu groups, explaining that these groups 
consider that the notion of boundary traditionally corresponds to “boundary zones” or 
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“boundary regions” rather than boundary lines380. This could be another option, as in the 
case of the shared zones between the Cree and the Inuit of Quebec. Their shared zone is 
sandwiched between exclusive zones belonging to each group.  
We suggest that a map representing complex notions such as property, territory and 
exclusivity would vary depending on the understandings of each group. As authors 
Christopher Turner and Gail Fondahl explain, “Indigenous peoples cognize territoriality 
in a wide variety of ways, some of them substantially different from those common to 
State governments, including territorialities difficult to capture as mutually exclusive 
polygons”381. 
2.4 Dispute Resolution Models 
The following section will briefly review modern Canadian dispute resolution 
mechanisms which have been referred to as “alternative”. The second part of this section 
will provide commentary on various Aboriginal dispute resolution mechanisms which 
were and still are used by Aboriginal groups in traditional and modern conflict 
resolution. We will examine the important elements of these mechanisms which could be 
reflected in a framework addressing overlapping claims.  
(a) Alternative Dispute Resolution in Canada 
(i) Introductory Comments 
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The development of dispute resolution in the past few decades has been marked by a 
movement away from the traditional approach of litigation towards an approach 
integrating alternative dispute resolution processes (ADR). This disassociation from the 
traditional court process can be explained by a number of factors, which include a 
general dissatisfaction of Canadians with the adversarial process as a whole, caused by 
its complex procedures, lengthy timeline, enormous costs and lack of involvement in the 
outcome of the dispute382.  
The development of ADR in Canada and in the United States allowed parties to utilize an 
approach which is less antagonistic and adversarial383. The popularity of ADR is 
undeniable, prompting some to question whether “it is still appropriate to refer to it as 
'alternative' since the term may be misinterpreted to mean merely peripheral or inferior to 
judicial processes”384. For instance, in Quebec, the newly adopted Code of Civil 
Procedure requires that parties must first “consider private prevention and resolution 
processes before referring their dispute to the courts”385. Article 1 of this new code lists 
the main resolution processes as being negotiation, mediation and arbitration. However, 
article 1 also provides that “[t]he parties may also resort to any other process that suits 
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them and that they consider appropriate, whether or not it borrows from negotiation, 
mediation or arbitration”386. 
Mediation and arbitration both involve a third party which has, depending on the method 
employed, more or less authority on the decision-making process. In the context of 
Western ADR, mediators and arbitrators are expected to be neutral parties, accredited by 
an organisation and having received some sort of formal training. Mediation and 
arbitration are generally voluntary processes, but can both be provided for in binding 
contracts as the favoured dispute resolution procedure. 
(ii) Overlapping Claims and ADR 
Currently, the favoured dispute resolution strategy for addressing overlapping claims is 
that of negotiation. Alternative dispute resolution theorists explain that negotiation can be 
of two types: competitive or problem-solving387. In competitive negotiation, each party's 
end purpose is to win the negotiation388. The tactics associated to competitive negotiation 
include confrontational attitudes, secret strategies and difficult concessions389: “The 
confrontational stance adopted tends to create many opportunities for impasse between 
the parties, and this will often breed mistrust, frustration, anger, and, consequently, 
breakdowns in negotiations”390.  
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Inversely, the problem-solving approach favours mutually acceptable solutions391. In 
order to achieve such solutions, the parties focus on their interdependence and attempt to 
understand the other party's point of view, needs and interests. By considering these 
needs and interests as relevant and legitimate, it is easier to identify common and 
complementary interests392. Once needs are identified by each party, various solutions 
addressing these needs can be devised :“As a corollary, because not all individuals value 
the same things in the same way, the exploitation of differential or complementary needs 
will produce a wider variety of solutions which more closely meet the parties' needs”393. 
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that an active participation in the negotiation of 
mutually acceptable outcomes is indicative of an increased implementation of agreement 
terms394.  
In the overlapping claims process, negotiation must take place between two or more 
Aboriginal parties, before representatives of the federal and provincial or territorial 
government. Although the negotiation is between two or more Aboriginal parties, the 
presence of government representatives can, in some cases, increase the hostility at the 
negotiation table395. This hostility is most probably a consequence of the distrust caused 
by the imbalance of power between Aboriginal groups and governments. The notion of 
power is not “a characteristic of an organization or person but is an attribute of a 
                                               
391Ibid. 
392Ibid. 
393Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem  
Solving” (1984) 31 UCLA Law Review 754. 
394Andre Gaye McCallum, supra note 104. 
395Ibid, s 2.3. 
 120 
relationship”396. One party's power is related to the power of their opponent397. Studies 
have demonstrated that unequal levels of power generally produce less effective 
outcomes than situations which were characterized by an equal distribution of power398. 
Unfortunately, a principled or problem-solving approach can nonetheless be perceived by 
Aboriginal groups as adversarial, because of the power imbalance between government 
and Aboriginal groups399.  
Indeed, before arriving to a situation of overlapping claims, groups have generally gone 
through the comprehensive claims process detailed in Chapter 1. Therefore, when parties 
arrive to negotiate overlapping claims, they bring with them their baggage from the 
comprehensive claims process, where power imbalances are present. That is why it is 
important to consider the influence of these power imbalances even though the 
negotiation of overlapping claims will eventually be between two (or more) Aboriginal 
groups, as these imbalances still have a significant impact in these overlap agreements.  
Power imbalances are in fact illustrated throughout the entire negotiation process, 
beginning with the power of the federal government to accept or reject claims. They are 
further evidenced throughout the claims policy, notably by the terminology employed by 
the federal and provincial governments which is inscribed within a colonial discourse of 
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Aboriginal people “claiming” the land, that is, that they “bear the burden of establishing 
the validity of their rights”400. Aboriginal groups have expressed their dissatisfaction with 
this expression as it maintains and reinforces power imbalance between parties401. 
George Watts, Chairman of the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council expresses his views on 
the colonial terminology, such as the use of the word “claim”:  
“... we have to get rid of this concept that this is a land claim. It isn't a land 
claim, it's a settlement; a settlement of two different jurisdictions. There is 
a European jurisdiction that came here and there is the aboriginal 
jurisdiction over that land that has always been here. Please remove from 
your mind the European concept that you own everything and you can 
give it away. It's not possible. You cannot give me the land which my 
great-great-great-great-great grandfather passed on to me and I'm going to 
pass on to my great-great-great grandchildren. You will never give us the 
land, but what you can do is come to an accommodation of the conflicts in 
the titles that we have.”402 
Author Michael Coyle has written extensively on the presence of power relations in 
negotiations between governments and Aboriginal groups403. In theory, power relations 
in a negotiation are influenced by the capacity of a party to exercise influence on the 
negotiation outcome404. It is said that the determining factor for exercising influence and 
advancing an interest is whether or not a party has a strong alternative to negotiating an 
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agreement405. In other words, if a party has no other choice but to negotiate an 
agreement, it will hold a less powerful position in negotiations.  
In the case of Aboriginal groups, Coyle identifies three choices of alternatives in 
negotiating claims: the group may accept the status quo, it may pursue its claim before 
the courts and it may pursue political methods to advance the claim. In practice, 
Aboriginal groups are: 
“usually in the position of supplicants seeking redress from parties whose 
interests in achieving an agreed settlement are not as great as their own. 
The opposing parties are usually governments backed by greater resources 
for the conduct of negotiations and able to rely on the coercive machinery 
of the government to enforce the status quo in the event of break-
down.”406 
 
Therefore, if we examine the relative strength of each party, it is evident that the Crown 
has a power advantage. Coyle suggests, as we are, that this power imbalance continues to 
be present during the dispute resolution process used by government representatives in 
the resolution of overlapping claims, therefore affecting the legitimacy of the process: 
“Thus, if one party is able to impose its own cultural values, both in terms 
of how the parties are permitted to frame their competing claims as well as 
establishing a standard by which those claims are to be assessed, one 
might reasonably infer that a pre-existing power imbalance has been 
institutionalized into what claims to be a neutral process.”407 
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Culture shapes both the understanding and the preferences of a negotiation process408. 
Including elements of Aboriginal legal traditions and dispute resolution techniques in this 
process could simultaneously address issues of rebalancing negotiation power and create 
an appropriate framework to address overlapping claim situations.  
(b) Embracing Aboriginal Dispute Resolution As a Whole 
All peoples experience conflict, whether it is land conflict or another kind of conflict. As 
Val Napoleon explains, it is not the conflict itself which is problematic, but rather the 
management of the conflict so that “it does not paralyze people”409. The paralyzing effect 
that overlapping claims are having over treaty negotiations across Canada is a factual 
demonstration of the Canadian policies’ and Canadian courts’ failure to successfully 
manage this critical issue.  
(i) Development of Canadian ADR and Aboriginal Dispute Resolution 
Aboriginal dispute resolution processes have existed since time immemorial and function 
according to Aboriginal paradigms and beliefs. These beliefs include those based on 
respect and maintaining relationships, and are “characterized by flexibility, utilization of 
cyclical time, qualitative measurement of success and people-orientation”410. These 
dispute resolution processes were not “alternative” to litigious practices such as is the 
case for Western ADR; they were the procedures used by Aboriginal peoples simply 
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because they were integral to their traditions411. Dispute resolution was not only used to 
prevent violence, although it is most recognized for such purposes. Dispute resolution 
was used in everyday situations to address problems related to miscommunications, 
family conflict, trespass, and, evidently, boundary disputes.  
Lawyer and mediator Mark Dockstator compares the dispute resolution process in a 
Western paradigm with that of an Aboriginal paradigm by utilizing the example of a 
teeter-totter. He explains that a Western approach to balancing a teeter-totter would 
comprise the placing of an equal weight on each side to achieve a perfect balance, 
whereas an Aboriginal approach would focus on bringing the parties together in the 
center of the teeter-totter412. Although this approach may seem to resemble a classic 
ADR approach, the urge to categorize Aboriginal dispute resolution as integrated into the 
dominant system of Western-based dispute resolution must be resisted413 : “The more 
correct approach, (...) is to start with the assumption that each system is distinctive and 
attempt to construct a model of dispute resolution that recognizes the equality and 
validity of these differences”414.  
John Borrows highlights the importance of this recognition: “[the] further development 
of Indigenous dispute resolution is necessary because Canada's other legal traditions do 
                                               
411Ibid. 
412See: UVic Institute for Dispute Resolution, Making Peace and Sharing Power: a national gathering on 
aboriginal peoples & dispute resolution : proceedings. (Victoria: UVic Institute for Dispute Resolution, 
1997) at 167–168. 
413Ibid at 167. 
414Ibid at 168. See also: Leon Mitchell, “Using Mediation to Resolve Disputes over Aboriginal Rights: A 
Case Study” in Menno Boldt, J Anthony Long & Leroy Little Bear, eds, The Quest for justice: aboriginal 
peoples and aboriginal rights (Toronto ; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1985).; and Catherine Bell, 
supra note 382 at 244. 
 125 
not sufficiently engage Indigenous values and thus do not appropriately encourage 
Indigenous participations”415. Chosen methods must not simply “accommodat[e] 
Aboriginal identity and culture”416 but must truly allow transcendence of this identity and 
culture:  
“Indigenous legal traditions could become even stronger if indigenous 
systems were the default whenever management, regulatory or dispute 
resolution issues arose. Indigenous peoples could define their claims and 
resolve them in the ‘context’ of their own living culture. This would help 
to ensure that their legal traditions were not considered a relic of some 
long-lost, distant past, protected in a glass cage and treated as the heritage 
of mankind.”417 
For instance, the Osnaburgh/Windigo Tribal Council Justice Review Committee related 
the importance of maintaining harmony within the community to the specific 
interdependent requirements of a society based on hunting and gathering418. This teaches 
us that Aboriginal dispute resolution is “integrally linked to both social organization and 
cultural values and belief”419. If these cultural values are not reflected in the dominant 
dispute resolution system, groups may perceive them to be unjust, therefore denying their 
efficacy and legitimacy.  
Speaking of the criminal justice system, Maori author Moana Jackson, explains that the 
efficacy of a system “ultimately depends upon society's perception of its ability to 
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provide justice”420. She relates the acceptance of sanctions and rules to the presence of 
one's personal culture, without which the perception of fairness cannot be achieved. A 
parallel can be drawn for the mechanisms and rules used in the resolution of overlapping 
claims.  
(ii) Importance of Community, Peace and Harmony 
The importance of kinship, community and maintaining harmony within a community is 
one of the most significant cultural distinctions between Aboriginal dispute resolution 
and Western dispute resolution421. This description is echoed by Rupert Ross who 
describes the Aboriginal dispute resolution system as one focussed on “real resolution, 
restoration of cooperative co-existence and the elimination of bad feelings”422. The 
philosophy of peace and harmony has been identified by others as “the linchpin to an 
effective understanding of Aboriginal Dispute Resolution”423. 
Author Catherine Bell identifies common themes throughout various Aboriginal dispute 
resolution practices. The first main theme which emerges is that an Aboriginal justice 
initiative must rely on the recognition of “core community values” and the bolstering of 
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“community traditions” in order to be successful. This process can be challenging in that 
some Aboriginal communities have lost some of their traditions by reason of Canada's 
policies focussed on assimilation. As Borrows explains, for the communities that have 
“lost touch with their traditions, reclaiming and regenerating their traditions for 
contemporary application is therefore vital”424. Communities can use different methods 
to reconnect to their traditions, whether by asking Elders to identify fundamental values, 
drafting official documents based on their recollection or even engaging with other 
communities in order to identify some traditions and values which may help them 
reconstruct their own legal traditions425.   
It is important to stress that a community must not only focus on historical values which 
existed before colonization426. The community must undertake an introspection to 
determine which values have been amalgamated with Western notions of law and which 
may better correspond to contemporary values. Bell describes this as a struggle relating 
to the balance between “the desire to revive and protect traditional values and processes 
and, at the same time, be accountable to those in the community who have become 
separated from traditional ways”427. Even in the most cohesive communities, there may 
be different views on what the contemporary meaning of a tradition should be428. A 
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unanimous understanding of values simply does not exist429. For instance, if identified 
values include impartiality and fair process, some individuals in communities may want 
to steer away from choosing decision makers within their own community, as they may 
fear that this will be considered as nepotism or that the chosen decision makers may be 
tainted with existing bias430.  
Various methods of Aboriginal dispute resolution reflect the importance of community, 
peace and harmony, such as peacemaking and community-based negotiation. 
Peacemaking is used in diverse forms depending on the group and its traditions. For 
instance, within the Navajo Nation, the process begins with a prayer between the parties 
and a peacemaker who may know one of the parties involved in the dispute431. The 
process is focussed on finding a solution and restoring the healthy relationship between 
the parties: “[t]his puts the parties in a mindset much different than the traditional 
adversarial mindset we are accustomed to seeing in dispute resolution processes”432. 
Community-based negotiation is another technique often used by Aboriginal groups who 
will submit an agreement to community approval at the end of the process. By using this 
technique, Aboriginal groups gain more protection against a rejected agreement after 
negotiation, ratifying with the community as they negotiate433. Members of the 
community can also have access to their own negotiators, as well as government 
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negotiators and staff434. There is also a positive outcome for government negotiators, 
who can “understand the practical application of the sometimes impersonal concepts and 
issues that they are negotiating”435. 
(iii) Community Strength 
Using Aboriginal dispute resolution techniques forces communities to utilize their 
internal resources to resolve disputes, therefore reducing their reliance on outside 
assistance436. Recognizing Aboriginal laws is an important step in supporting “the 
strength and integrity of aboriginal communities”437.  In this manner, the use of 
Aboriginal legal traditions in dispute resolution can also be viewed as a piece of the 
puzzle towards stronger Aboriginal governance. In fact, recognizing Aboriginal laws 
would allow individuals to develop within their own values and principles, and build up 
the rule of law within communities438. This is turn, would bolster personal, collective and 
governmental responsibility439:  
“Decision-making in indigenous communities should not necessarily 
occur through those who are distant, professionalized and impersonal; 
indigenous dispute resolution has the potential to involve a greater range 
of people in determining the consequences for actions. Dispute resolution 
following this model would enable indigenous peoples to take 
responsibility for their own actions, and simultaneously be accountable for 
them.”440 
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During the BC First Nations All Chiefs' Forum, Chiefs from communities all over British 
Columbia demonstrated the importance of considering Aboriginal perspective when 
addressing issues impacting the lives of Aboriginals. The Chiefs reflect our earlier 
comments on diverse Aboriginal legal systems and approaches to land issues by 
indicating that there cannot be a “one size fits all” approach to resolving overlapping 
claims since all Aboriginal groups differ from one another441.  
Such a dispute resolution process would require a high-level of legitimacy in the eyes of 
the federal government in order to be successful. As John Borrows states: “Indigenous 
legal traditions will more positively permeate our societies if their power is 
acknowledged by official state and community institutions”442.  
Practically speaking, “Aboriginal institutions are probably better placed than their civil 
law or common law counterparts to articulate legal principles that will have meaning and 
legitimacy in Aboriginal communities”443. Fundamentally speaking, Aboriginal people 
should participate in the dispute resolution of issues concerning them because their 
knowledge, rather than being treated as something that should be studied and judged, 
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should be treated as an “active system that contains its own values, norms, uses, 
standards, criteria and principles for the use of such knowledge”444.  
(iv) Challenges of Aboriginal Dispute Resolution 
Having outlined the advantages of using Aboriginal dispute resolution, it is nonetheless 
important to consider that not all Aboriginal legal traditions and dispute resolution 
mechanisms are inherently “good” or rest upon a higher normative value than Western 
approaches445. Problems can arise within Aboriginal dispute resolution processes, as they 
would in Western processes.  
For instance, power imbalances can and do exist within Aboriginal dispute resolution 
systems similarly to Western dispute resolution systems. In order to avoid situations of 
power imbalance, it is crucial to focus on instilling mechanisms addressing these 
imbalances in power. As Borrows explains, such mechanisms can include the designing 
of checks and balances, which are “more likely to overcome the challenge of justice in 
small communities than an over reliance on technocratic, third-party decision makers”446. 
For instance, Borrows suggests that Aboriginal groups could design a process similar to 
s. 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in order to provide a “legislative 
override, if decisions of their justice system required review”447. He also provides the 
example of the Great Law of Peace for the Haudenosaunee and the Iroquois system of 
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checks and balances448. Aboriginal groups could also separate their branches of 
government with substantive and procedural limits or resort to larger cultural groups such 
as an elders council or a wider panel, such as those used by the Navajo and the Metis 
Settlements449. The point, as Borrows explains, is that Aboriginal groups can develop 
their own checks and balances through “innovation and experimentation” when deciding 
on the structure of their justice systems450 and could so do “in a manner that most 
appropriately matches their cultural norms”451. 
A second important issue evoked by some authors is the feeling of “internalized 
colonialism or colonial thinking”452 in developing dispute resolution mechanisms. For 
instance, some Aboriginal members could express worry that their mechanisms are less 
reliable than those of the “dominant society”. This can contribute to “a loss of confidence 
in traditional methods, or controversy about what these methods truly are and whom 
these methods serve”453. They may fear conflict with Western mechanisms and could 
“find it less complex to rationalize that the majority's system should be followed, thereby 
potentially creating disorder within their own community”454. On the other hand, some 
individuals may not feel as though adhering to the Western mechanisms is representative 
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of internalized colonialism, they may in fact feel as though these mechanisms correspond 
to their values455. 
Along the same lines, a third concern exists regarding the possible conflict between legal 
traditions of each group involved in the dispute resolution. Just as members of an 
Aboriginal group might not be unanimous as to the substance of its legal tradition, the 
legal traditions between two groups may also clash. This topic has not been widely 
addressed in commentary regarding Aboriginal dispute resolution, as conflict is usually 
regarded as existing with the Canadian government and not between two Aboriginal 
groups. However, historical examples of agreements between Aboriginal groups 
demonstrate that conflict between legal traditions can be overcome. For instance, 
differing legal traditions have been historically represented within political agreements 
based on kinship and ritual between Aboriginal groups, such as the agreements related to 
the Huron Confederacy or the Iroquois League456.  
A fifth concern is the difficulty to garner excitement and interest from people regarding 
initiatives involving them. Human beings, whether they be Aboriginal or not, are often 
sceptical and weary of change. For example, in the Aboriginal community of 
Kahnawà:ke, the people of Kahnawà:ke expressed dissatisfaction towards the way 
decisions were being made, by reason of the lack of separation between judicial and 
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legislative and the lack of community involvement457. The Office of the Council of 
Chiefs, a body which provides support services to the Mohawk Council of Kahnawà:ke 
Chiefs, investigated the issue and proposed a consensus-based decision making process 
entitled the Community Decision Making Model (“CDMM”) which included principles 
drawn from the traditional methods of Haudenosaunee decision-making458. The Mohawk 
Council of Kahnawà:ke established the Interim Legislative Coordinating Committee 
(ILCC) in May of 2005 and provided them with the responsibility over the legislative 
process459. The ILCC developed the CDMM into the Community Decision Making 
Process (“CDMP”) and was responsible for testing it within the community460.  
One of the main challenges associated with the CDMP was garnering community 
participation in the process. As Horn-Miller explains, the “[i]mplementation of the 
process also asks the community to change its way of thinking, that is, to go from 
thinking only of individual needs to considering the needs of the collective and impacts 
of those decisions seven generations into the future”461. The underlying factor fuelling 
this difficulty is the lack of trust, in part because of “ignorance and fear of the 
unknown”462. In a 2013 survey about the difficulties of the CDMP process, community 
members indicated in large majority that they had never participated at community 
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hearings or given written feedback on a proposed law463. Some reasons evoked by 
participants for the lack of participation include intimidation, lack of trust, lack of faith, 
false sense of importance and lack of knowledge464. 
A final difficulty which we foresee is that of recognizing legitimacy to a dispute-
resolution body which is not band-based. We believe however, that strength is indeed 
found in numbers and that Aboriginal participants will have to conciliate their traditions 
with those of other groups in order to accept the will expressed by a public authority that 
will be comprised of people foreign to their specific cultural group. 
2.5 Conclusion of Sections 1 and 2 
It is not because the Western and Aboriginal paradigm are distinct that one cannot draw 
positive elements from one or the other. What the dissimilarity between both paradigms 
does entail is that each worldview must be respected and the impacts of colonialism must 
be acknowledged when considering the interaction between the two paradigms465. 
Author Wenona Victor identifies two separate frameworks in order to comprehend the 
difference between the paradigms of Aboriginal dispute resolution and Western ADR466. 
The first framework is suggested by Rupert Ross, for the particular aspect of criminal 
justice. It is nonetheless of interest for our examination of utilizing Aboriginal dispute 
resolution in a Canadian context. His notion of “dueling paradigms” is to place both 
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paradigms on opposite ends of a spectrum467. At one end of the spectrum, he places 
Western forms of criminal justice, and, at the other end, he places Aboriginal forms of 
justice. Each ADR process would be placed on the spectrum and could move across it 
depending on how the dispute resolution process is carried out468.  
The other framework is proposed by Mary Ellen Turpel and suggests that the Aboriginal 
justice system and the Canadian justice system run parallel to each other469, intersecting 
at “points of convergence” where one system borrows elements from another.  
Although the latter framework is not without its faults, it is our opinion that an 
understanding of the Aboriginal dispute resolution mechanisms as running parallel to 
Canadian dispute resolution mechanisms is the most appropriate manner by which we 
can conceptualize a system based on Aboriginal legal traditions, accepted by Canadian 
law, which can successfully address overlapping claim issues between Aboriginal groups 
and implicate the federal, provincial and territorial governments that all have an interest 
in the resolution of these issues.  
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3. Embodiment of the Proposed Solution 
Before we begin this last section, an important reminder must be given to the reader. This 
thesis is not attempting to expose a “one-size-fits-all” approach to resolving overlapping 
claims, but rather an intellectual perspective rendering such approach possible: “What 
must be remembered as we begin to face this new challenge together is that the shape of 
the answer is not singular. There is no single answer that will speak to the diversity of 
experiences, geography, and culture of Aboriginal people in our communities”470. 
In keeping with an Aboriginal perspective and worldview, the introduction of this section 
will be comprised of a story, which tells the reader that the challenges identified in the 
first two chapters are not insurmountable, and that 'thinking outside the box' can have 
extraordinary consequences. The story is from Dewhurst: 
“Once upon a time there were two spiders in a lodge, sitting on the roof; 
discussing the web of justice. After a very long time they both agreed 
there was injustice in the world that needed to be fixed. And, because 
spinning webs is what spiders do, they both agreed that they had to spin a 
better web. But, sadly, they could not agree on how the new web should 
be spun. So, each spider decided to try to solve the problem in the best 
way she could.  
 
The first spider continued to sit on the roof thinking about how to build 
the complete and perfect web. She sat and she sat without moving, without 
spinning, thinking about all the things that could go wrong. If she moved 
too fast she might make a misstep, destroy the web, or fall to her death far 
below. If the creatures that sometime lived in the lodge with her didn't like 
her web, or if it got in their way, she would be frustrated and hurt by 
building her web only to have it smashed. The more she thought, the more 
problems she discovered. To try and head off these disasters, she thought 
about the best place to start her web. While many places seemed 
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beneficial, none seemed perfect. So, she thought about where her web 
should end. Again, there were too many possibilities. She couldn't sort 
through them all. So then she thought about the exact design of her web. 
There were just too many things beyond her control that might affect the 
web's shape, like the wind and the movements of the other creatures. She 
finally decided that she could not predict exactly how her web should turn 
out. When the other creatures saw her sitting there and offered to give her 
a helping hand, she refused for fear that the hand might crush her or be 
snatched away, leaving her to fall. So there she sat, without a web to 
sustain her, and then she died.  
 
The second spider crawled across the roof of the lodge looking for a place 
to spin her web. In a little while she found an opening where no webs had 
been built. Although she wasn't sure exactly how her web would turn out, 
she felt that it had to begin with the first strand. So, anchoring the first 
strand of her web securely to the framework of the lodge around her, she 
dropped into the empty space. There she hung, suspended in midair. She 
wasn't sure where the wind or the other passing creatures would take her 
but she placed her faith in the forces of nature to take her to a spot where 
should tie off her first strand. The wind blew her back and forth. Finally, it 
blew her to a place where she could tie off her first strand and she quickly 
did so. Then she started the whole process over again. On and on she 
worked, and her web took shape: sometimes through her own efforts, 
sometimes redirected or assisted by those around her, sometimes guided 
by the forces of nature. As she spun, some of the old strands were cut or 
broken, and she replaced them or resecured them. She never knew in 
advance what the final shape of her web would be. As her web developed 
she took time to appreciate what she had done and a pattern began to 
emerge. In the end, after long effort, she had spun something unique and 
beautiful. Her web was firm and flexible, it filled the openings that she 
found, and it was able to sustain her in a way that nothing had before.”471 
This section will be comprised of two sub-sections. The first will be a review of certain 
Aboriginal dispute resolution mechanisms which show some promise of success in the 
resolution of overlapping claims and the second will consist of a presentation of the 
approach which we have identified as bearing the most promise for the successful 
resolution of overlapping claims.  
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3.1. Successful Dispute Resolution 
The following four examples have been isolated as instances of dispute resolution 
mechanisms which have had some success in the resolution of overlapping claims or 
show promise to that effect. 
(a) Nisga'a Treaty 
The Nisga'a Treaty provides dispute resolution procedures which reflect elements 
characterizing Nisga'a justice traditions, such as “respect, acknowledgment, harmony and 
reconciliation”472. The dispute resolution process concerns only the conflicts or disputes 
between parties to the Nisga’a Final Agreement (either the Nisga’a First Nation, the 
Government of Canada or Government of British Columbia) and only to conflicts or 
disputes respecting the interpretation, application or implementation of the Final 
Agreement and where specifically provided in the Final Agreement473. 
The dispute resolution is set out in a three-stage process: collaborative negotiations, 
facilitated processes, and adjudication/arbitration474. Despite the presence of an 
adjudicative solution, the dispute resolution procedures focus on understanding the 
conflict based on notions which exceed the legal scope of the dispute. For instance, 
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Section 9 of Appendix M-1 of the Nisga’a Final Agreement Act475, the legislation giving 
effect to the Nisga’a Final Agreement, provides that: 
“9. The parties will make a serious attempt to resolve the disagreement by  
 
a. identifying underlying interests;  
b. isolating points of agreement and disagreement;  
c. exploring alternative solutions;  
d. considering compromises or accommodations; and  
e. taking any other measures that will assist in resolution of the 
disagreement.”476 
If the parties are not successful in their attempt to resolve the dispute, they will move to 
stage two of the dispute resolution procedure by which they can use facilitated processes. 
These facilitated processes include mediation, a technical advisory panel for questions of 
non-legal nature, a neutral evaluation conducted by one person jointly appointed by the 
parties and an elders advisory council in which elders are appointed by both parties. 
Having recourse to elders from a community is often used as an example of Aboriginal 
legal traditions. In this case, the appointment of elders is not limited to the Nisga'a Nation 
and can be from another First Nation council. The criteria for appointment of elders are 
defined as follows:  
“4. Preferably, the elders will be individuals who:  
a. are recognized in their respective communities as wise, tolerant, 
personable and articulate, and who:  
i. are often sought out for counsel or advice, or  
ii. have a record of distinguished public service; and  
b. are available to devote the time and energy as required to provide the 
assistance described in this Appendix.”477 
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If the use of facilitated processes does not lead to a solution, a party can deliver a notice 
to another party and refer the dispute to arbitration. In the case of arbitration, the 
arbitrator (or arbitral tribunal) will render a final and binding decision according to fair 
procedures outlined in the Nisga'a treaty. Moreover, these procedures encompass the 
legal traditions of the Nisga'a and will not be based solely on Western paradigms as the 
decisions “must be made in accordance with relevant provincial, federal, or Nisga'a law 
and the spirit and intent of the Nisga'a Final Agreement”478. 
(b) Nunavik Inuit Land Claims Agreement 
The Nunavik Inuit and the Crees of EeyouIstchee have come to an agreement regarding 
their overlapping occupation and use of the marine areas and islands adjacent to Quebec 
in James Bay, Hudson's Bay, Hudson's strait and Ungava bay. Both the Nunavik Inuit 
and the Crees of EeyouIstchee have “final agreements” with the federal government, 
levelling the negotiating field. In the Consolidated Agreement Relating to the Cree/Inuit 
Offshore Overlapping Interests Area479, the preamble recognizes the existence of 
Aboriginal rights and title for each party in the overlap area:  
“WHEREAS the Crees of EeyouIstchee and the Nunavik Inuit have 
certain overlapping aboriginal and other rights, titles and interests in 
certain marine areas and islands adjacent to the province of Quebec in 
James Bay and Hudson's Bay;”480 
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The Consolidated Agreement provides harvesting rights to both parties and provides 
respect of customs and traditions, indicating that the rights must be exercised by each 
party in accordance with “their respective customs and traditions in a manner so as not to 
compromise each other's harvesting activities”481. The Agreement concerns only the 
overlap area in which three zones are set out: a Cree Zone, an Inuit Zone and a Joint 
Zone. In the Joint Zone, it is provided that there will be equal participation of the Cree 
and the Inuit in ownership, wildlife and management:  
“c. to identify a Joint Inuit/Cree Zone within this Overlap Area, and with 
respect to such Joint Zone to provide for: 
i. the joint and equal ownership of lands and the joint and equal sharing of 
other interests, benefits and revenues by the Crees of EeyouIstchee and the 
Nunavik Inuit; 
ii. the sharing of wildlife between the Crees of EeyouIstchee and the 
Nunavik Inuit in accordance with the harvesting interests of both groups; 
iii. the joint and equal participation of the Crees of EeyouIstchee and the 
Nunavik Inuit in the management of the lands, resources and wildlife, 
including joint and equal participation in regimes for wildlife 
management, planning, land and water management and development 
impact assessment in such zone;”482 
As for the dispute resolution mechanisms provided in this agreement, the parties set aside 
the possibility to have recourse to the courts, unless it is necessary as a last resort, 
preferring instead to use cooperation, consultation and mediation by a neutral third party.   
(c) Tsawwassen First Nation Traditional Territory Boundary Commission Act 
In British Columbia, the Traditional Territory Boundary Commission Act established the 
Tsawwassen First Nation Traditional Territory Boundary Commission. The Commission 
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is responsible for all overlap issues arising from the boundaries provided in the 
Tsawwassen First Nation Treaty483. This Commission is composed of the Chief and two 
other members, and one of the members must have harvesting and natural resources 
knowledge484. The Act also provides that the traditions and practices of neighbouring 
first nations must be respected and honoured at all times, and that the commissioners 
must “do their utmost to develop and maintain relationships with them [the neighbouring 
first nations] based on the rights of each of those first nations”485. The Act makes 
reference to Aboriginal dispute resolution mechanisms, highlighting the importance of 
using a “consensus-based solution to problems of common concern”486. 
(d) Waitangi Tribunal 
Although this thesis addresses only the overlapping claims problem present in Canada, 
the issue of overlapping Aboriginal claims is present in other countries which suffered 
from colonization, such as Australia and New Zealand.  
In New Zealand, claims are addressed through a tribunal called the Waitangi Tribunal. 
This Tribunal was established in 1975, under the terms of the Treaty of Waitangi Act.487 
The Aboriginal peoples of New Zealand, called the Maori, can submit their claims on all 
matters relating to the Treaty of Waitangi, which is a one-page document consisting of 
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three articles signed in February of 1840488. The first article of the treaty provides the 
cession of sovereignty to the British Crown489. The second article “guarantees to the 
chiefs full, exclusive, and undisturbed possession of their lands, estates, forests, fisheries, 
and other properties they wish to retain. Maori land can be sold only to the Crown”490. 
The third article gives British-subject rights and privileges to Maori491. The purpose of 
the Waitangi Tribunal is to “inquire into and report on claims by Maori, that ‘any statute 
or regulation, or any past or present Crown policy, practice, act or omission is, or was, 
inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and is prejudicial to an 
individual Maori or group of Maori’(s.6)”492. 
The Tribunal works in a two-stage process. The first stage is an inquiry into the facts 
claimed. If the inquiry produces a positive result, i.e. the claim is well-founded; there can 
then be negotiation of a settlement493. If negotiations fail, the second-step is a process by 
which the Tribunal hears each party and emits recommendations494. The Tribunal can 
also refer claims to mediation495. A mediation process is provided in section 9 of the 
Second Schedule for the Treaty Waitangi Act, 1975 and is available for issues involving 
two or more claimant groups, as in the case of overlapping claims. The mediation is 
carried out by independent mediators and generally includes a mediator who is an elder 
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well-versed in traditional Maori practices and the Maori language496. As author Morris 
TeWhiti Love explains, the mediation process is important to resolve claims between 
Maori claimant groups in order to “resolve their differences and achieve the strength 
required for effective negotiation of a ‘macro’ treaty claim directly with the 
government”497. Mediation respects the principle of cultural awareness and mutual 
empowerment for all parties498. The following objectives are identified as the main goals 
of the mediation process; they resemble the objectives we are trying to attain throughout 
this thesis for the resolution of overlapping claims: 
“to provide a process that will assist Maori to come together as an 
effective body (or bodies) to prosecute and settle their historical treaty 
claims with the Crown 
 
to maintain an affordable, expert, and independent group of facilitators 
and mediators to achieve the first goal and to have that group available to 
groups of claimants as they move through the claim resolution process 
 
to improve the efficiency and credibility of the treaty settlement process 
by assisting groups to better self-manage their affairs, especially eventual 
treaty settlements.”499 
The mediation process is currently separate from the inquiry process undertaken by the 
Tribunal. However, the Tribunal is considering the possibility of having a “combined 
facilitation and settlement mediation process”500. The facilitation aspect of this process 
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would ensure that potential areas of conflict are identified and anticipated before the 
potential problem develops into an actual dispute501.  
3.2 Comprehensive Approach: Indigenous Legal Lodge 
(a) Introduction 
The review of current procedures in Chapter 1 and the review of Aboriginal dispute 
resolution and legal traditions in Chapter 2 have allowed us to determine which elements 
must be included in a successful dispute resolution system addressing overlapping 
claims. In order to be successful, we have determined that the dispute resolution system 
must: (a) include Aboriginal legal traditions, such as the importance of peace, harmony 
and the recourse to elders, (b) be flexible enough to adapt to different situations, and (c) 
promote the internal strength of Aboriginal communities by demonstrating Aboriginal 
authority.  
A fourth criterion remains to be discussed. This fourth element is the capacity for the 
chosen mechanism to integrate into the Canadian legal process, as the issue of 
overlapping claims exists within two, or more, sources of law. Aboriginal title, and 
Aboriginal rights, can be negotiated with the provincial, territorial and federal 
governments, or can be determined by the Court system. Considering this reality, 
overlapping claims evolve “at the interface of two normative systems”502 in a legal 
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context implemented by the Canadian legal system under which answers may be 
suggested by making reference to Aboriginal laws and legal traditions.  
Throughout the history of Canadian case law, Aboriginal customs and legal traditions, 
have been recognized, and in some cases, affirmed by Canadian courts503. The survival of 
Aboriginal legal traditions is a result of the complex settlement rule which has been 
applied by Canadian courts. The complex settlement rule recognizes “the introduction of 
English law for colonists as their birthright, but (...) also recognize[s] the continuity of 
some indigenous law for aboriginal peoples retaining a distinct national identity”504. An 
early case which applied the complex settlement rule is Connolly v. Woolrich, in which 
Justice Monk recognized the survival of Aboriginal legal traditions related to marriage:  
“(...) [W]ill it be contended that the territorial rights, political organization 
as such it was, or the laws and usages of Indian tribes were abrogated - 
that they ceased to exist when these two European nations began to trade 
with aboriginal occupants? In my opinion it is beyond controversy that 
they did not - that so far from being abolished, they were left in full force, 
and were not even modified in the slightest degree ...”505 
More recent cases have also adhered to the complex settlement rule and have recognized 
that Aboriginal laws continue to apply. For instance, in Calder v. British Columbia, 
Justice Hall quoted Lord Mansfield's decision in the English case Campbell v. Hall506, in 
which he outlined six principles of law which apply to territories which have been 
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conquered507. The fifth principle is of particular interest to us, as it focuses on the 
survival of legal traditions (also known as the “Doctrine of Continuity”508). After quoting 
this principle, Justice Hall states the following: “A fortiori the same principles, 
particularly Nos. 5 and 6, must apply to lands which became subject to British 
sovereignty by discovery or by declaration”509. Justice Hall therefore endorses, but in 
obiter only, the continuity conception of Aboriginal rights, and thus, the survival of 
Aboriginal law.  
Similar comments can be made about Justice Mahoney's decision in Baker Lake who, as 
we have seen in Chapter 1, determined that there are four elements which must be 
demonstrated to establish proof of Aboriginal title. When discussing the first element, 
that is, that those claiming the Aboriginal title be members of an organized society, 
Justice Mahoney makes reference to the applicability and survival of a previous legal 
regime:  
“While the existence of an organized society is a prerequisite to the 
existence of an aboriginal title, there appears no valid reason to demand 
proof of the existence of a society more elaborately structured than is 
necessary to demonstrate that there existed among the aborigines a 
recognition of the claimed rights, sufficiently defined to permit their 
recognition by the common law upon its advent in the territory. The thrust 
of all the authorities is not that the common law necessarily deprives 
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aborigines of their enjoyment of the land in any particular but, rather, that 
it can give effect only to those incidents of that enjoyment that were, 
themselves, given effect by the regime that prevailed before.”510 
 
[emphasis added] 
In her dissenting opinion in R. v. Van der Peet, Justice McLachlin (as she then was) 
indicates her opinion that Aboriginal rights must be recognized because of their source in 
legal orders which are independent of British law, stating that “Aboriginal rights find 
their source not in a magic moment of European contact, but in the traditional laws and 
customs of the aboriginal people in question”511.   
In the recent case of Mitchell v. M.N.R.512, the Supreme Court of Canada also made 
comments recognizing Aboriginal law:  
“European settlement did not terminate the interests of aboriginal peoples 
arising from their historical occupation and use of the land. To the 
contrary, aboriginal interests and customary laws were presumed to 
survive the assertion of sovereignty, and were absorbed into the common 
law as right...”513 
Chief Justice McLachlin pursued her reasoning by indicating that Aboriginal legal 
traditions continue to exist in Canada unless they have been extinguished in one of three 
ways: “(1) they were incompatible with the Crown's assertion of sovereignty, (2) they 
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were surrendered voluntarily via the treaty process, or (3) the government extinguished 
them”514.  
As Borrows has stated, “First Nations legal traditions are strong, dynamic and can be 
interpreted flexibly to deal with the real issues in contemporary Canadian law concerning 
Aboriginal communities”515. It is time that we make an effort to achieve this recognition 
of Aboriginal legal traditions when addressing overlapping claims. Unfortunately, the 
theoretical recognition of Aboriginal legal traditions by the Supreme Court is just that, 
theoretical, the court never having resorted to such legal traditions to solve a case. 
Furthermore, these Aboriginal legal traditions are nowhere to be seen in the practical and 
political application of policies relating to Aboriginal peoples516.  
In fact, in the case of overlapping land claims, the government continues to turn a blind 
eye to Aboriginal perspectives, imposing instead a Western method of resolving the 
claims, failing to consider that an artificial solution will not withstand the test of time. As 
Mark Walters explains, the “reality in aboriginal communities will continue to diverge 
from the letter of Canadian law”517.  
Author Vivian Alison presents the disputes between Aboriginal communities as being 
intra-cultural and inter-cultural in nature518. They are intra-cultural in that their resolution 
must be undertaken by the “application of cultural norms in a culturally appropriate 
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environment”, and inter-cultural in that the “question raised by the dispute is externally 
imposed”519. Thus, Alison concludes, “it seems appropriate that an Indigenous dispute 
resolution tribunal should embody intra-cultural and inter-cultural sensibilities and may 
include Indigenous and non-Indigenous expertise”520.  
In Canada, the cohabitation of two officially recognized systems of law, civil law and 
common law, enable it to fall within the definition of a bi-juridical state. As Justice 
Bastarache has stated, “[b]ijuralism in Canada is more than the mere 'co-existence' of the 
two legal traditions. It involves the sharing of values and traditions”521. Considering that 
Canada has adopted the complex settlement rule and has already recognized a plurality of 
legal orders (civil law and common law) and, combining a pluralistic approach by which 
the function of law must be perceived as “a means for facilitating human interaction”522 
with the idea that more attention must be focussed on “the social processes from which 
rules can emerge and become effective as law without receiving the imprimatur of any 
explicitly legislative organ of government”523, we contend that it is logical to recognize a 
third legal order of law, composed of Aboriginal legal traditions, as a legal order within 
Canada. Canada could then be referred to as multi-juridical instead of bi-juridical state524. 
As Professor Borrows explains: 
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“[t]here are sound arguments that Indigenous legal traditions are 
compatible with the Crown's assertion of sovereignty, were not 
surrendered by treaties, and were not extinguished by clear and plain 
government legislation, if reconciliation is the lens through which the 
courts interpret the parties' relationships. Indigenous legal traditions 
certainly fit into Canada's Constitutional framework without threatening 
peace, order and good government525. 
 
(...)  
 
Canada's balanced, somewhat decentralized, federal state is one of the 
country's great strengths. It makes it possible to reconcile diversity with 
unity. It creates the potential for experimentation in the 'social laboratory' 
that each constituent part of our federation encourages. The more explicit 
recognition of Indigenous legal traditions could lead to useful 
experimentation and innovation in solving many of Canada's pressing 
problems. Furthermore, the affirmation of Indigenous legal traditions 
would strengthen Canadian democracy by placing decision-making 
authority much closer to the people within these communities. Aboriginal 
peoples would be better served in the federation if they had the 
recognition and resources to refine law in accordance with their 
perspectives. This is important because central and provincial 
governments are more remote from Aboriginal peoples, physically and 
culturally. They also tend to be less responsive to the Aboriginal electorate 
than Aboriginal governments would be if they could exercise greater 
responsibility for their own affairs. A greater recognition of Indigenous 
legal traditions could provide some counterweight to the bi-culturalism 
and bi-elitism that sometimes infects Canada's policy.”526 
As such, through an understanding of Lon L. Fuller's theory and Mary Ellen Turpel's 
framework of parallel legal systems, it can be argued that Aboriginal law and Canadian 
law can coexist and be compatible with each other. Moreover, it has been said that 
Aboriginal legal institutions and laws: 
“can be received by analogy into the Common law to bridge the gap 
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal laws. They can be used in a 
culturally appropriate way to answer many of the contemporary challenges 
Canadian courts encounter. The incorporation of such a broad base of 
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legal principles would make the law truly Canadian and, as a result, more 
equitable and fair”527. 
This thesis therefore suggests that the proposed dispute resolution framework be separate 
from the existing justice system, without operating entirely outside of it. A dispute 
resolution mechanism operating within a dominant legal system cannot prescind the 
existence of this system:  
“a framework that overtly legitimises Indigenous authority is not in itself 
sufficient. Existing at the interface of Indigenous and non-Indigenous law, 
it is crucial that the tribunal have legitimacy within both Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous communities as a respected institution of Indigenous 
systems of law.”528 
In light of the foregoing elements, we respectfully submit that the Indigenous Legal 
Lodge, developed by Professor Val Napoleon and a team of researchers, could be a 
viable solution to address overlapping claims.  
The Indigenous Legal Lodge (“ILL”) was first proposed by Val Napoleon in 2007529. It 
was developed while working on a Governance Research Initiative regarding Treaty 8 
communities. Treaty 8 covers land which includes the northeast portion of British 
Columbia, the north of Alberta and a part of the Northwest Territories530. The ILL stems 
from an overlap dispute between the LheidliT'enneh treaty and the southern boundaries 
of Treaty 8. The Aboriginal groups on which the LheidliT'enneh treaty overlaps are the 
West Moberly, Halfway, Doig, Fort Nelson, Prophet River and Saulteau First Nations, 
who, according to Napoleon, no longer wished to bring the overlapping issue before the 
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courts531. Therefore, these First nations agreed to establish an “Indigenous Legal Lodge” 
to resolve their boundary dispute.  
(b) Inclusion of Aboriginal Legal Traditions 
As Napoleon explains, “[t]he theory underlying the Indigenous Legal Lodge is that it is 
possible to develop a flexible, overall legal framework that indigenous peoples might use 
to express and describe their legal orders and laws so that they can be applied to present-
day problems”532. Napoleon sets out the purpose of the ILL as follows: the framework 
“must be able to do two things: (1) reflect the legal orders and laws of decentralized (i.e., 
non-state) indigenous peoples, and (2) allow for the diverse way that each society’s 
culture is reflected in their legal orders and laws”533. The completion of both objectives 
will “allow each society to draw on a deeper understanding of how their own legal 
traditions might be used to resolve contemporary conflicts”534. 
The objectives of this project were to “research, record and articulate the customary 
laws”535 of these communities, including their leadership structures, their consensus-
building mechanisms and their rules relating to boundary disputes. The researchers 
indicate that the Aboriginal nations possessed mechanisms and processes to address 
conflict: “history has shown that external boundaries have always been the sites of 
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negotiations in accordance to each indigenous group's laws and political structures”536. 
Such mechanisms and processes include those based on kinship and marriage, rather than 
simply relying on common or civil law and their use or occupancy criteria537 : “Rather 
than focus on the legal rights of each party flowing from historical use and occupancy, 
the ILL will focus on social and political relations between parties, i.e., marriage, 
kinship, being neighbours, trade, and other arrangements, both historic and modern”538. 
These relations will be analyzed in order to determine the ongoing obligations of each 
party. This approach is described by the group as being “far more inclusive” since it will 
not simply try to determine who has a stronger legal right between the two parties. It will 
also avoid the fears voiced by some Aboriginal groups, such as those of the Coast Salish, 
that the “bilateral kin group as a significant and powerful social order will be dismantled 
and replaced by a patchwork of municipal-like self-governments with limited 
jurisdictions over their lands and territories”539. 
The structure of the ILL is comprised of various members sitting for a minimum of five 
days, including three members from a neutral indigenous group with no interest in the 
overlap dispute, a legal expert in Canadian law, three facilitators who can understand and 
apply indigenous legal traditions and individuals from each aboriginal group who can 
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inform the panel on their interpretation of the land issue540. The facilitators' role is not 
directed at determining the strength of a historic claim. Their role is one of reconciliation 
of relationships541.  
The ILL would have some independent power to inquire into overlap disputes, but will 
also be responsible for hearing the information which is brought forward by each party. 
In order to achieve a mutually beneficial agreement, the ILL will work with each party 
and discuss various optional agreements. Recommendations and decisions made by the 
ILL would be non-binding. Instead, Napoleon suggests that a process be set out for the 
affirmation of the decision by “every generation and witnessing at a public gathering” 
every ten years542. 
As for the outcome of the panel hearing, instead of focussing on historic use of 
occupancy, as is the case in federal policies and Canadian case law analyzed in Chapter 
1, the recommendations would be focused on the “interests, relationships and 
reconciliation” between the parties. The researchers list several possible outcomes 
including shared jurisdiction over the overlap area, nation-to-nation treaty for the overlap 
area, priority use in certain areas and joint management arrangements. The shared 
jurisdiction approach could be particularly interesting for nomadic groups who may have 
been accustomed to sharing the land with other groups. As one elder from the White 
River First Nation in Yukon explains, there is no need for them to trace a line between an 
overlap group: “We should share the land with each other. We are one First Nation. We 
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are Indian on our land. We should share our land now, together”543. As researcher Paul 
Nadasdy reports, this may be a common occurrence for certain groups: “In fact, a 
common theme in all of the overlap talks I examined - from 1990, 1995 and 2002 - was 
that it was the government that had imposed the need for a line, and that if it were left up 
to the First Nations they would just continue to share the land”544.  
(c) Flexibility and Adaptability 
Author Jessica Dickson analyzed the key strengths of the ILL by interviewing five 
indigenous stakeholders and by “linking their narratives to the composition and 
framework of the ILL as the basis for exploring its strengths and limitations”545. Dickson 
identified the key strengths of the ILL, the first being the flexible framework of the ILL 
which is drawn from the Indigenous legal orders. She also underlines the rejection of the 
“one size fits all model” as being another key element of the ILL.  
This characteristic of the ILL is especially important considering the potential conflict 
between the legal traditions of two different Aboriginal groups546. The chosen dispute 
resolution mechanism must be flexible enough to work with these potential conflicts and 
still arrive at a viable solution for all parties involved. 
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(d) Promotion of Internal Strength 
The ILL recognizes and confirms that Aboriginal communities do not need to rely on 
foreign dispute resolution systems in order to address problems within and between 
communities. In fact, “it draws from the particular human and cultural resources within 
communities” which, in turn, makes it more “representative and inclusive than other 
processes”547. Dickson explains that since the ILL decisions are based on a variety of 
elements such as marriage, kinship and trade, it “promotes decision-making based on 
more fluid expressions of Indigenous citizenship and nationhood and, in effect, land 
management”548. 
4. Conclusion of Chapter 2 
The Indigenous Legal Lodge is an interesting approach to the resolution of overlapping 
claims as it provides a flexible framework allowing Aboriginal peoples to use their 
cultural context in order to resolve overlapping claims in the manner which they see most 
fit. Rejecting a one-size-fits-all approach, the Indigenous Legal Lodge can adapt itself 
whether the groups were nomadic, semi-nomadic, strewn across provincial lines or 
waterways. It will be crucial that the appropriate individuals are identified to sit on a 
lodge, in order to ensure the best process possible. It is our opinion that the Indigenous 
Legal Lodge could be comprised of different participants depending on the overlap 
situation and the groups involved. Therefore, a new Lodge could be constituted for each 
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overlap situation. For instance, the members for an overlap dispute in British Columbia 
would not be the same as for a dispute in Québec. 
In their article Two Approaches to the Development of Native Nations, authors Stephen 
Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt outline the “Nation-Building Approach” which is built upon 
an assertion that Aboriginal peoples have rights to govern themselves549. A number of the 
characteristics presented by this nation-building approach are found in the Indigenous 
Legal Lodge.  
The first characteristic of the nation-building approach is that Native nations should 
assert decision making-power550. In the case of overlapping claims, it is generally 
accepted that First Nations should be responsible for making decisions regarding 
overlapping claims. If they are provided with all or most of the decision-making power, 
Aboriginal groups will be able to create tailor-made solutions to specific overlapping 
claim situations. Another important characteristic provided in the nation-building 
approach is that Aboriginal political culture should be present in mechanisms used to 
address Aboriginal issues. As the authors explain, one of the problems that Aboriginal 
groups face is their “dependence on institutions that they did not design and that reflect 
another society's ideas about how decision making and dispute resolution should be 
organized and exercised”551. As demonstrated throughout this paper, that is precisely the 
crux of the issue regarding the resolution of overlapping claims. It is also part of the 
                                               
549Stephen Cornell & Joseph P Kalt, “Two Approaches to the Development of Native Nations: One Works, 
the Other Doesn’t” in Miriam Jorgensen, ed, Rebuilding Native Nations Strategies for Governance and 
Development (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2007) 3 at 18. 
550Ibid at 19. 
551Ibid at 24. 
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explanation as to why Aboriginal groups continue to have recourse to said institutions in 
the face of overlapping claims and why they are not employing their legal traditions as 
discussed throughout this paper. The answer to this problem is complex and will vary 
depending on the overlapping situation. Indeed, a common explanation to this question is 
offered by some Aboriginal intellectuals as stemming from colonization552. As 
Youngblood Henderson explains, the colonial education system and its Eurocentric 
approach have taught Aboriginal peoples to “not believe in anything, to ignore each other 
or to care only for themselves. We were forced, and have become accustomed, to being 
something different from what we are or thought we were”553. Author Val Napoleon 
explains that the damage that has been done to Indigenous peoples’ conflict management 
systems explains why conflict has increased and has become destructive554.  
However, other reasons have been evoked by authors explaining why Aboriginal peoples 
are in some cases reticent to use their own legal traditions. For instance, the recourse to 
Courts can also be explained by the fact that leaders want to remain accountable to 
people in the community who have “become separated from traditional ways”555. 
Another reason which explains why Aboriginal groups have recourse to courts rather 
than to their own dispute resolution mechanisms is the presence of power imbalance 
between Aboriginal nations, especially in the case of overlapping claims where one 
                                               
552 See for an example of this intellectual approach: Henderson, supra note 274.  
553Ibid at 18. Youngblood Henderson does not, however, assign the blame only to the colonizers. He 
indicates that Indigenous peoples must accept their complicity with colonization in order to move away 
from it. As he indicates, if the complicity is accepted as a “shame”, “we will understand that it is up to us, 
and ultimately to us alone, to do something about it”, p. 19. 
554Val Napoleon, supra note 5 at 12. 
555Catherine Bell, supra note 382 at 247. 
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group has negotiated an agreement with the Canadian government and another has not. In 
this case, the group who has not come to an agreement will often feel as though they 
have been cheated and may feel that the Crown has not fulfilled its duty towards them. 
Legally speaking, the judicial recourse is to attack the government’s actions in Federal 
court by judicial review. In this case, traditional dispute resolution may not provide the 
desired outcome.  
Other reasons can be as simple as one nation disposing of a more important financial or 
human capacity than another nation, and using this unequal balance of power to mobilize 
courts in a strategic fashion in the course of negotiations. Conversely, recourse to the 
courts, however expensive, may be a means of establishing a level playing field for 
nations with fewer resources. To avoid such recourse altogether to State courts, a 
financial intervention by the federal and the provincial governments is essential. 
We believe that Aboriginal groups must be given the opportunity to develop decision 
making mechanisms which reflect their culture, traditions and world-views all the while 
addressing the contemporary problem of overlapping claims556. This development should 
also have success in reducing the recourse to the Canadian court system, if it is done in a 
manner which is respectful of all cultures and traditions and in a manner which provides 
an equal balance of power. It is our opinion that the Indigenous Legal Lodge provides the 
opportunity for Aboriginal groups to achieve this. 
 
                                               
556Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, supra note 549 at 25. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis sought to identify a renewed framework for the resolution of overlapping 
claims between Aboriginal groups in Canada. In doing so, we have established two 
significant conclusions. The first is that the existence of overlapping claims in Canada is 
the direct product of Canadian and provincial policies and legal requirements which have 
been developed by governments and courts alike over the past century. The second is 
that, in order to be morally compelling, the chosen dispute resolution mechanism 
addressing overlapping claims as well as the outcome of this mechanism must reflect 
Aboriginal legal traditions. 
The first chapter introduced the reader to the Western notions of exclusivity first 
implemented in the reserve system and further established by way of judicial decision-
making and the adoption of several government policies. A review of recent case law and 
current overlap cases demonstrated that courts employ an incorrect approach when 
attempting to resolve overlapping claims. This flawed approach is mirrored by federal 
and provincial policies which contribute to generate power imbalances between 
Aboriginal groups and do nothing to address the underlying normative considerations of 
overlapping claims.  
Furthermore, an argument was developed regarding the Crown’s duty to consult and the 
implementation of non-derogation provisions in treaties, demonstrating that consultation 
followed by a non-derogation provision does not offer real protections for Aboriginal 
groups. As was demonstrated, this method used by the federal and provincial 
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governments favours certain Aboriginal groups to the detriment of others and, 
consequently, can jeopardize the Aboriginal rights and title of overlapping groups.  
The focus of the second chapter was to first provide an intellectual foundation for our 
proposal of an alternative approach to the resolution of overlapping claims. This 
intellectual foundation is grounded in Lon L. Fuller’s famous theory that law must be 
perceived as a means for facilitating human interaction. The other element of Fuller's 
theory is that law must be perceived as morally compelling in order for it to be efficient. 
The same can be said, as we have argued, for dispute resolution mechanisms. In the first 
part of our analysis, an examination of Aboriginal legal traditions allowed us to 
determine that the Supreme Court’s current understanding of the exclusivity requirement 
must be reassessed if we are to achieve a successful resolution of overlaps. Exclusivity 
must be removed as the sole criterion for evaluating land occupation of Aboriginal 
groups in determining Aboriginal title. As demonstrated, boundaries and exclusive use of 
territories is not conceptualized by Aboriginal groups in the same manner as Westerners. 
The single boundary line is not representative of Aboriginal societies. 
In the second part of our analysis, a review of Aboriginal dispute resolution mechanisms 
and values led us to argue that Aboriginal groups should be provided with the tools 
required to address overlapping claims situations in order to advance in the treaty 
negotiation process and thus prevent litigation. We suggested that these tools be provided 
in the form of conflict resolution mechanisms integrating Aboriginal legal traditions and 
perspective on issues such as land and exclusivity, so that a viable dispute resolution 
process may be elaborated. It is high time that Aboriginal legal traditions, social customs 
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and world-views, cease to be ignored. In the words of the Chief Justice of Canada: “Put 
simply, Canada's Aboriginal peoples were here when Europeans came, and were never 
conquered”557. 
We concluded our second chapter by providing examples of successful dispute resolution 
mechanisms which are based on Aboriginal legal traditions. This examination led us to 
suggest a solution which we believe could be successful in meeting all of the criteria 
identified throughout this thesis. This approach was identified as the Indigenous Legal 
Lodge, a dispute resolution body first conceptualized and developed by Val Napoleon. 
The Legal Lodge would allow not only a reflection of Aboriginal legal orders, but would 
also be flexible enough to provide viable solutions to a host of different overlapping 
situations, by allowing Aboriginal groups to draw upon their own legal traditions to 
resolve conflict.  
The purpose of this thesis has been to demonstrate that both the legal and political 
approach to overlapping land claims in Canada is in need of important reforms. I hope 
that the conclusions I have drawn after extensive research will trigger normative and 
juridical discussions on the matter. 
 
 
  
                                               
557Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), supra note 191, para 25. 
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